When British Prime Minister William Pitt heard the news of Napoleon Bonaparte’s victory at Austerlitz on Dec. 2, 1805, he famously predicted, “Roll up that map; it will not be wanted these ten years.”
In 1799, Bonaparte had taken power by overthrowing the French Republic. On Dec. 2, 1804, exactly a year before the Austerlitz victory, he had crowned himself Emperor of France. France’s Revolutionary Wars, which had begun in 1792, were continued as the Napoleonic Wars. Fourteen years prior, the French had come to the aid of the Americans in their fight for independence. That, however, had been during the reign of the French monarchy.
Less than three months after George Washington took the presidential oath of office in April of 1789, French revolutionaries began their revolution in earnest by storming the Bastille. In a matter of months, the Franco-American relations were strained.
A Neutral Struggle
The United States struggled to remain neutral. Although America mustered through the XYZ Affair, a French retaliation against the pro-British Jay Treaty; the Quasi-War with France, which ended with the Treaty of Mortefontaine in 1800; the impressment of American sailors by the British Navy, which resulted in the Non-Importation Act of 1806; and the outrageous Chesapeake Affair involving the British Navy, which resulted in the doomed-to-fail Embargo Act of 1807; it seemed inevitable that a substantial military conflict would arise, either with France or Britain.Along with direct confrontations, there were indirect confrontations. A year after Austerlitz, Napoleon issued the Berlin Decree, placing the British islands “in a state of blockade.” The blockade primarily affected countries on the European continent. Britain responded with the 1807 Orders in Council, which blockaded any harbor that did not accept British trade. Napoleon responded with the Milan Decree in December of 1807, which prohibited both allies and neutrals from trading with Great Britain. America was economically caught in the crosshairs of this ongoing conflict.
The Berlin and Milan decrees composed Napoleon’s Continental System to strangle Great Britain’s commerce. There was a chink in Napoleon’s armor, however. At the same time of his Austerlitz victory, France and Spain’s navies were decimated by the British during the Battle of Trafalgar. This loss secured Britain’s naval dominance, and made enforcing the Continental System practically futile.
Three days before President Thomas Jefferson left office, he signed the repeal of the Embargo Act, which had hindered the American economy far more than Britain’s or France’s. His replacement, James Madison, looked for other ways to combat the highly flammable situation.
The Right Man
Born in 1754, Joel Barlow had been a soldier and chaplain during the American Revolution. A graduate of Yale, he pursued careers in law, publishing, writing, and land prospecting for the Northwest Territory. His land prospecting proved to be a scandal. Though he was exonerated of any wrongdoing, it isn’t quite clear how much he knew about the fraudulent company he was working for. Nonetheless, that scandalous opportunity had brought him to France in 1788, where he quickly established powerful connections and received French citizenship.Barlow, a vocal advocate for the French Revolution, spoke French and German fluently, and passable Arabic. The latter proved a pivotal qualification, as Secretary of State Thomas Pickering sought the right man to secure the release of American prisoners held captive in Algiers. Barlow proved to be that man.
Barlow, along with his wife Ruth, returned to America in 1805. He continued his writing and paid close attention to the foreign and domestic political affairs. A close associate of both Jefferson and Madison, he was soon called upon by the latter. The troubles with Britain and France were hitting a fever pitch. Americans had become furious over their treatment by the two European powers, and a new class of Congressmen, including John C. Calhoun and Henry Clay, were clamoring for war. War with either looked unpromising and war with both would be disastrous.
Off to Paris
Madison hoped Barlow, with his fluent French, association with high-ranking French officials, and successful experience in the Barbary States, could bridge the gap between America and the French leadership. The president nominated Barlow to be minister plenipotentiary (U.S. ambassador) on Feb. 26, 1811. The Senate appointed him the following day. By August, he was on the USS Constitution bound for Paris and arrived a month later.On Sept. 21, Barlow made his first official call, in hopes of alleviating or ending the ongoing British and French blockades. Napoleon had left Paris the day Barlow arrived, but the U.S. diplomat was met by the Duke of Bassano, the French foreign minister. Barlow was made to believe that with Bassano’s assistance and the return of Napoleon, they would “remove all obstacles to a most perfect harmony between the two countries.” Unbeknown to Barlow, the emperor was not scheduled to return from the imperial government’s location in St. Cloud for two months. The earliest a resolution could be reached and conveyed to both London and Washington would be spring of 1812.
Napoleon, however, had other plans. On the final day of 1810, his ally Tsar Alexander I had exited the Continental System. The System had plunged Russia into economic hardship and greatly devalued the ruble. Before Barlow had ever left for Paris, Napoleon began making plans to force Russia back into the System.
Time was of the essence. Barlow felt even more pressure when letters from British minister Augustus John Foster to Secretary of State James Monroe stated that Britain would lift the Orders in Council only after the French lifted their decrees. Matters were not helped when he also learned that the war-bent Clay had been elected Speaker of the House.
When they finally met, Napoleon asked Barlow if the USS Constitution was awaiting his reply about the decrees, Barlow quickly responded, “Sire, she waits only for that.”
A Deadly Political Game
By spring of 1812, Bassano made verbal agreements that Americans could now trade with the French duty-free, and that the French would release American ships, crews, and their cargo. This was also the case regarding the lifting of the decrees. Written agreements were another matter.In early May, Barlow demanded to see some document proving that the Berlin and Milan decrees were lifted. Bassano nonchalantly showed Barlow a document stating just that. The document, known as the Decree of St. Cloud, was dated April 28, 1811, but it was hardly a few days old. Bassano suggested that Barlow already knew about the document since its contents had been relayed to the U.S. government a year ago. But Barlow did not know about it nor had the document’s contents ever been relayed.
Despite the ruse and the French minister’s resistance to publishing the document, Barlow had it copied and sent it to London. London hesitated, but finally relented. On June 16, British foreign secretary George Canning announced that Britain would lift the Orders, and on June 23 they were lifted. Barlow’s tireless efforts and London’s decision, however, came 48 hours too late. Madison signed Congress’s declaration of war on Great Britain on June 18, 1812.
A Try for a Treaty
American diplomacy had failed in almost comedic fashion. Regardless, Monroe directed Barlow to secure a treaty with France. The American diplomat constantly hounded the French deputy minister in Paris until the deputy minister informed his superiors that action or the end of negotiations was required. Bassano cordially invited Barlow to Vilna, in Russia, and all but assured him a treaty.Unfortunately, it was nearing the end of October and Vilna was 1,400 miles from Paris. Nevertheless, Barlow, nearing 60 and not in the best of health, acquiesced. He journeyed by carriage for three weeks. Just as Barlow received Bassano’s invitation, Napoleon ordered his retreat from Moscow. Russia’s winter would soon consume most of the remainder of the Grande Armée.
War after war his hungry soul requires, State after State shall sink beneath his fires, Yet other Spains in victim smoke shall rise And other Moskows suffocate the skies, Each land lie reeking with its people’s slain And not a stream run bloodless to the main. Till men resume their souls, and dare to shed Earth’s total vengeance on the monster’s head, Hurl from his blood-built throne this king of woes, Dash him to dust, and let the world repose.
The bitter cold December of 1812 would not only dash to dust the many soldiers, but also this American diplomat. On Dec. 19, his carriage arrived in Kielce, Poland, but by then Barlow had developed a severe cold. The carriage headed to Zarnowiec where he ordered a nearly frozen man on the roadside to be picked up. His name was Adam Piwovarski, a Polish soldier who had fought for the French and was homeward bound to Zarnowiec. The carriage arrived on Dec. 21, but Barlow could go no further. His cold had developed into pneumonia. It was during this week in history, on Dec. 26, 1812, that Barlow, in his effort to secure a treaty with France in the early months of the War of 1812, died.Madison and Monroe would not receive news of Barlow’s death for another three months. America would be entangled in the War of 1812 until the Dec. 24, 1814 signing of the Treaty of Ghent―nearly two years after Barlow’s death. Napoleon would return to Paris. His final defeat at the Battle of Waterloo (fought after his brief return from exile) on June 18, 1815 made William Pitt’s 1805 prediction prophetic.
For Barlow, he was buried at Church of the Nativity of Our Lady in Zarnowiec, and a memorial stone, purchased by his wife, was placed inside the church. The family of Adam Piwovarski, whom Barlow rescued from certain death, ensured the memorial was maintained.
