‘Sparta’s Sicilian Proxy War’

A dense, informative, and smart study of an oft-ignored conflict in ancient Greece.

An illustration of the destruction of the Athenian army at Syracuse, Sicily, from John Steeple Davis’s “The Story of the Greatest Nations, From the Dawn of History to the Twentieth Century,” 1900. Public Domain

If the prologue was any indication, Paul Rahe’s latest work discussing ancient Greece during the Peloponnesian War era was going to be dense, informative, and worthy of a slow and contemplative read. In fact, I recommend readers consider turning the prologue into a pamphlet, the information on fifth-century Greece is so wealthy and vast for its approximately 50 pages.

Mr. Rahe, a fellow in classics at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, professor of history at Hillsdale College, and a leading expert on ancient Greece, has drawn on a rarely discussed and possibly even more rarely examined war during the Peloponnesian War era. The definition of the term “war” in this instance can be scrutinized easily. It could be considered an Athenian expedition, a Sicilian defensive response, or, as Mr. Rahe notes it, a Spartan war by proxy. His book, “Sparta’s Sicilian Proxy War: The Grand Strategy of Classical Sparta 418-413 B.C.,” has very little to do with Sparta in the narrative leading up to and during the battle scenes, yet the resulting beneficial windfall was almost all Sparta’s.

The Athenian Backstory

Rather than launch the reader into the narrative with the arrival of Athenian triremes (ancient vessels) on the shores of Sicily, Mr. Rahe takes the reader through an extensive backstory of how and why the Athenians came to decide on the expedition. We are posited into Athens during a time of military aggression, despite Sparta and Athens signing a 30-year treaty; incessant political backbiting, especially between Nicias and Alcibiades; and, ironically, population recovery, due to Athens having recently been devastated by the plague. All of these elements play substantial parts in how the historical conflict plays out in the immediate and in its aftermath.

Mr. Rahe presents a lone Spartan (Spartiate) by the name of Gylippus, who is sent to assist in the Sicilian war against the newly arriving Athenians. Mr. Rahe’s introductory presentation of Gylippus is used practically like a plot device, like one would encounter in fiction. We are introduced to him at the start, but it is not until about the final third of the book where he is reintroduced. The Spartan seems nearly as forgotten as Sparta itself, for it is rarely mentioned either. It is a clever writing tactic to demonstrate Sparta’s “proxy” tactic.

In the lead-up to the battle between the Syracusans and the Athenians, we are provided a breakdown (in literal terms) politically. When the Athenians decided on sending this expedition to Sicily, they chose three (Mr. Rahe notes that due to the Athenians’ fear of tyranny, they always chose at least two to lead an expedition) to lead it: Alcibiades, Nicias, and Lamachus. The resulting narrative hinges primarily on Alcibiades, who practically salivated for sending this military force, and Nicias, who was completely against the decision and strenuously argued against it before the Council of 500 (the city-state’s representative government).

Awaiting Disaster

The decision from Athens was to go to Sicily. Mr. Rahe points out that such an expedition was ill-timed. “Had the Athenians shown up with sixty galleys that year [422] or in 421, they might have been welcomed with open arms. But when, in 415, they appeared again in force―this time with one hundred thirty-four triremes and thousands of hoplites [ancient Greek soldiers]—nearly everyone in Sicily and southern Italy grew nervous, and next to no one gave them a favorable reception.”

This unwelcomed arrival was merely the start of troubles. Before Alcibiades left Athens, he was suspected of desecrating one of the gods. Since he was one of the commanders of the expedition, a trial was postponed until he arrived in Sicily in order to avoid a military uproar. When he arrived, he was called back to stand trial, which quite possibly would have ended in either his “ostracism” (a Greek form of exile) or execution. Upon hearing this, Alcibiades fled, turned on his Athenians, and left his men to their fate. This fate was led now by Nicias, a man who was not only much older than Alcibiades and suffering from kidney disease, but who had fought against sending the expedition.

From a political and military perspective, Mr. Rahe presents a situation ripe for failure. The situation, however, nearly succeeded regardless, as the Syracusans of Sicily were near to capitulation. This, of course, is when Gylippus arrives to shore up the locals’ courage.

A Study in ‘Realpolitik’

Mr. Rahe’s “Sparta’s Sicilian Proxy War” is a study in the complexity and dangers that come with a military action based on political, or economical, desires. In the author’s epilogue, he discusses the matters of geopolitics and military engagements based on “political realism” that works to distinguish between “the desirable and the possible,” known today as “realpolitik.”

Toward the epilogue’s end, Mr. Rahe quotes intermittently from J.F.C. Fuller, the British military strategist, on the idea of “grand strategy” which proves an interplay with “realpolitik,” stating, “If on any given occasion he [the grand strategist] is to outline for his own nation ‘a plan of action,’ he must come to know ‘the powers of all foreign countries and their influence on his own.’ Only then will he ‘be in a position, grand tactically, to direct the forces at his disposal along the economic and military lines.

This is the complexity entangled in even proxy wars―wars that might appear haphazardly conducted in their day and overlooked by history. When war, whatever the scale, is broached as simply something that requires solely “the will to win,” it can lead to disaster in the short- and the long-term, as it so happened with Athens. On the flip side, those who were hardly as militarily engaged, can benefit substantially by playing a more subtle, yet more strategic role, as Sparta demonstrated.

A look at Sparta's contribution to a somewhat overlooked battle.

‘Sparta’s Sicilian Proxy War: The Great Strategy of Classical Sparta, 418-413 B.C.’ By Paul Rahe Encounter Books, Sept, 26, 2023 Hardcover: 376 pages

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