Six months had passed since the opening scenes at Lexington and Concord. The Second Continental Congress had been in session for five months. George Washington had been commander-in-chief of the Continental Army for three months. It had been two months since King George III had proclaimed that the 13 colonies had “proceeded to open and avowed rebellion, by arraying themselves in a hostile manner, to withstand the execution of the law, and traitorously preparing, ordering and levying war against us.”
Though the Continental Congress and those of the Continental Army had, according to the king, gone too far, Congress was still hesitant about making a seemingly necessary and inevitable decision. Since the 13 colonies aligned the eastern seaboard, what made for easy maritime trade and disembarkment, had proven to allow for easy naval invasions, especially since the world’s largest navy had now become their enemy.
The British Royal Navy dominated the seas, and at the start of the American Revolution possessed around 250 vessels of various kinds. Before the war’s end, that number would nearly double. Nonetheless, Washington and some members of Congress felt that protecting the coastline and ports was an absolute necessity.
Most members of Congress thought it not just an unnecessary escalation of hostilities, but a futile move. When the subject was broached by delegates from Rhode Island on Oct. 3, 1775, it was quickly shot down. Samuel Chase, the delegate from Maryland (home of the future Naval Academy at Annapolis), called it the “maddest idea in the world.” It should be remembered that the Continental Congress was still nearly a year from declaring independence.
A Letter From Washington
The committee made recommendations that Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut send vessels to intercept British ships carrying munitions, and then for Congress to permit the building of two naval warships. As is typical of any congressional decision, it was long in coming. The resolutions would lie in wait for another week.On the same day that Congress received news of the two unarmed and unescorted British ships, Washington wrote and sent off a letter to Congress. His letter was accompanied with a plea of expediency from Joseph Reed, Washington’s military secretary, to William Ellery, the postmaster in Hartford, Connecticut. “The Letters above referr’d to are of great Importance let there be special Care in crossing the North River.”
Washington had received the same intelligence reports about the two ships. Seeing opportunity, he did what Congress was hesitant to do. On Oct. 13, Washington’s letter arrived and was read aloud before Congress. Among the topics addressed was the suspected espionage of Dr. Benjamin Church, the recalling of British Gen. Thomas Gage, and the installment of his replacement Gen. William Howe, and his plans for intercepting British ships.
Congress Decides
Realizing Washington had already begun what the committee had proposed, Congress saw no further reason to postpone a decision on the naval question. It was during this week in history, on Oct. 13, 1775, that the Continental Congress followed Washington’s lead and approved the establishment of a Continental Navy. Congress quickly followed up with establishing a Naval Committee composed of John Langdon of New Hampshire, Silas Deane of Connecticut, and John Adams of Massachusetts.
Over the course of the Revolutionary War, the Continental Navy was joined by more than 1,000 privateers and together they would capture over 2,000 British merchant ships. One of those ships, the British brigantine Nancy, which was one of the two intercepted on their way to Quebec, possessed 2,000 muskets, barrels of gunpowder, 30 tons of musket shot, 100,000 flints, and 30,000 round shot.
