The war in Ukraine has shocked many with a modern sensibility—and with good reason.
In addition to the carnage and destruction, Russian President Vladimir Putin has single-handedly unearthed Carl Von Clausewitz’s definition of “war as the continuation of policy” from its prematurely dug grave.
To the chagrin of Western leaders, extraterritorial aggression to seize land and alter a country’s border is supposed to belong only in that previous era, which humanity has already passed through.
Regardless of such philosophical speculation, however, Putin demonstrated that even if the international community condemns the manner of his action, it doesn’t really matter from an amoral, realpolitik framing as long as he achieves his policy goals.
While the Ukrainian nation seems to be tenaciously resisting the Russian military operation, it is still almost certain that Putin will achieve most of his stated objectives. One way or another, Kyiv will not join NATO, the Donbas republics will have their autonomy enshrined, and Crimea will stay firmly in Russian hands—at least for as long as Putin remains at the helm in Moscow.
Some may argue that the repercussions resulting from his actions will make his excursion a net negative, but this is also shortsighted, as it continues to downplay the most important international actor in the global community: China.
Such a strategy was only possible in the brief period when the United States did possess overwhelming influence and power relative to the rest of the world in the 1990s (often referred to as the unipolar moment). Incidentally, this era coincided with Russia’s extreme economic and military weakness following the collapse of the USSR. A more farsighted U.S. foreign policy would have taken the opportunity to support meaningful reform and significant aid to the aspiring democratic nation.
Still, that would have been only a proactive way to help avoid the current state of affairs. Washington’s best option now, for the entire world and especially those living through the carnage in Ukraine, is to push for a diplomatic solution that takes account of the actual balance of power as it exists on the ground.
America continues to embolden Ukraine while simultaneously taking direct military aid off the table; in other words, we provide just enough support to ensure that we prolong the conflict without giving Kyiv the actual means to stop Putin from achieving his objectives.
Our hesitancy to escalate the situation is well-founded as we don’t want to ignite a large-scale war, but Putin also knows this. He’s not backing down from his goals, which would amount basically to a guarantee that he falls from power. But Putin is also aware that he essentially has a free hand to subdue the Ukrainian resistance by any means necessary, secure in the knowledge that U.S.-led NATO is almost certain not to get involved.
This brings us to our current strategy: we have gone all-in on a strict, establishment-wide agenda of “punishing the Russian nation,” accomplishing nothing and risking much.
This is the worst possible option. Not only for ending the bloodshed and changing the Kremlin’s policy, but also because it is sure to increase the relative geopolitical position of China. We have chosen a path that prioritizes political posturing over real resolutions and simultaneously strengthens Beijing while failing to counter Moscow.
Crippling sanctions meant to destroy the Russian economy are unlikely to impact Putin’s decision-making significantly. There is ample research that supports the contention that economic punishment is almost always ineffective in altering a country’s policy, instead only leading a government to double down while simultaneously making life harder for the innocent citizenry living under the regime’s control.
Rather than enact change, this will only help validate the Kremlin’s claim that the United States and its allies are rabid Russophobes. It gives credence to their narrative that the West seeks to punish the Russian nation and keep it from taking its rightful place as a major power on the world stage.
Additionally, Moscow claims that the Russians are fighting to protect their ethnic kin currently living under the despotic regime of a U.S.-installed puppet in Kyiv—the cradle of their civilization.
The inevitable consequence is that Russia will now turn its gaze away from the Western world and instead look to the government in Beijing that feigns friendship and cooperation. Leaders in Moscow are sure to know that this is only a weak façade hiding the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) insatiable hunger to expand its power and geopolitical influence. Still, Russia is struggling to keep its head above water. Reaching for the outstretched hand of Beijing is the only way to stop from drowning.
Don’t let CCP propaganda fool you, though—this authoritarian alliance was not always inevitable.
There is an old adage that the two-headed Russian imperial eagle faces east and west, but its back is always to the former.
Russia and China are not natural allies; however, the flawed Western policy forces Moscow closer to Beijing. The two share a significant amount of border in Russia’s respective east and China’s north. The latter’s enormous human capital makes the resource-rich former and its sparsely populated Siberia region especially attractive.
As such, these two neighbors are bound to be competitors. This fact is borne out in their historical relationship as well. Playing the weaker of the two off against the other is a reliable way to secure a more stable balance of power in the world and ensure that the expansive influence of the stronger is effectively constrained.
Today, the situation has been reversed; however, the time for the United States to try and co-opt Russia away from its eastward leanings and create a robust resource-rich bastion against the expansive CCP-led China has likely passed.
Moscow has truly upset the post-World War II liberal order. It has reminded the world that military means can still be employed strategically to achieve political ends. Some rogue nations may have defied the international system before, but none as blatantly as Moscow—or as powerful.
Most important, however, is the fact that Russia has also had the support—tacit or not—of China. How long before other countries test the waters of geopolitical revisionism to see if Beijing will also support their cries of Western victimization?
