Over the past two weeks the CCP has reasserted its control over the military and public security apparatus; organized study sessions; strengthened Internet and social controls; promoted and rewarded members of the people’s armed police; called together leading cadres for public forums to emphasize the importance of “social management,” and strengthened Party organizations at all levels.
At the center of this blitz of activity is a secret meeting held by the Politburo on Feb. 12—the committee that sits atop the Chinese Communist Party—to discuss the threats posed by the “Jasmine Revolution” in the Middle East.
Longtime China analyst Perry Link obtained news about this meeting, which he publicized in the New York Review of Books.
The main purpose was to come up with strategies to make sure the wave of demands for democracy in the Middle East would not occur in China. The primary emphasis was on propaganda, and the Central Propaganda Department was called on to effect a rash of controls.
“For a few years now they have been afraid of ‘color revolutions,’ and their philosophy has been to stamp things out before they get started,” Mr. Link wrote in an e-mail to The Epoch Times.
The Epoch Times analyzed over a dozen speeches and announcements that preceded and followed that meeting. Without exception they talk of the Party’s need to strengthen its control over society, the armed forces, including the armed police, and importantly, the Internet.
Hu Speaks
Party head Hu Jintao and the top CCP leadership have felt the need to enforce cohesion and bring their message personally to leading officials.
Hu, with the full Polituburo Standing Committee in attendance, delivered an address on Feb. 19 at the Central Party School to provincial and ministerial level Party cadres. Titled “Hu Jintao: Firmly Upgrade the Scientification of Social Management,” and subtitled “Build a Social Management System of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,” it emphasized the importance of maintaining comprehensive social and other control. Mr. Link believes this address was the public presentation of the secret Politburo discussion.
Having the politburo attend is unusual, according to democracy activist Wei Jingsheng. “The whole Politburo Standing Committee, that hasn’t really happened before. They’re paying a lot of attention to resistant elements in the Party.”“This Jasmine Revolution and related unrest has had quite an impact on the CCP,” Wei says.
The report on the event refers to the “grim challenges” to the Party posed by protesters, petitioners, unlicensed merchants, and those furious at having their houses demolished.
These are longstanding issues, and the Party is worried that they could swell into protests if the conditions were ripe, Mr. Link wrote in his analysis of the Politburo document.
Hu made seven points about the CCP’s social control strategy, in the hopes of “promoting a harmonious society.” The seventh item was to “Further strengthen and perfect management of information networks; upgrade the level of control over virtual society; [and] develop robust mechanisms for channeling online opinion.”
The latter refers in part to China’s vast army of Web censors and “50 Cent Party” propagandists, who are paid to steer online discussions in the direction desired by the authorities.
“They’ve slowly lost control of the whole society, so they want to increase their control. In this area they’re a lot more nervous than they were,” Wei said. “Now they’re very scared of the ordinary people—this is a new development over the last two years. I think the Egypt incident made them extremely scared.”
Since no major protest actions have taken place, and are unlikely at present—witness the recent abortive calls for protest—the CCP’s actions may be seen as partially preventative.
“The big question for the Chinese democracy movement is whether the elite-dissident level can hook up with the deep popular-level resentment over corruption, bullying, land seizures, environmental destruction, etc. If that connection ever gets made, the regime could flip,” Mr. Link wrote to The Epoch Times. “The bosses know this, and that’s why they are so assiduous about keeping the lid on tight.”
“This is an ‘overreaction,’ yes, but one the CCP leaders very much intend,” he said.
Next: High-Tech Social Control
High-Tech Social Control
In a Feb. 20 morning meeting Zhou Yongkang, head of the Central Political and Legislative Committee, which controls the judicial system and oversees the police, made a speech about social control, talking with provincial and ministry level leading cadres.
In the evening on Feb. 20 he made another announcement: “Informationize and Use Networks to Innovate Social Control.” The meaning is to use high-tech means to surveil and control the populace.
On Feb. 17 the Ministry of Public Security published a note titled “Standards for Grassroots Public Security Political and Ideological Work” that referred to the grass-roots propaganda activities being undertaken by the ministry to attempt to solve social problems before they mushroom.In one speech Shenzhen City officials said they will make managing the “floating population” the “core” of the city’s social control apparatus and concerns about this group were frequently mentioned by cadres.
The floating population—a group of several hundred million migrant workers who increasingly chafe against the institutionalized discrimination they receive—has been identified by observers as a possible stability concern for the communist leadership.
Controlling the Gun
Other announcements were meant as encouragements for the people’s armed police (PAP), the paramilitary force that crushes protests.
Meng Jianzhu, a member of the State Council and head of the Public Security Bureau, on Feb. 11 congratulated 14 PAP officers on their promotions to the rank of major general. He said it had been approved by the State Council and Central Military Commission (CMC).
The move is seen by analysts as another “carrot” to keep leading PAP cadres loyal to the Party. The process of building up the PAP and strengthening Party control over it began over a decade ago, according to a three-part analysis in Beijing Spring. This is meant to ensure the PAP will put down riots at the CCP’s command. The Egyptian military siding with the people in recent events was a crucial factor in the Mubarak regime’s fall.
Ideology at the Core
Amidst the talk of informatization and other high-tech jargon, the Party has not forgotten the need for ideological education.
A Feb. 20 notice from Xinhua also reminded readers that 2011 is the 90th anniversary of the establishment of the CCP, and that a round of study of core Party documents is in order.
The notice emphasized the need for careful study of the important revolutionary works of the Three Generations of Central Party Leaders, namely the theories of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin, as well the new ideological contributions of Hu Jintao. “[We must] solidify the leading position of Marxist theory in the ideological sphere … the unified ideological foundation consolidating the whole party,” it said.The military would not be left out.
On Feb. 10, the PLA said it would “diligently implement” Hu Jintao’s instructions and make arrangement for “in-depth political work in military training.”
Similarly on Feb. 14, Xinhua announced the “Study Regulations for Party Cadres in Armed Forces.” There was a “clear-cut requirement” to pay close attention to that document.
“The military is not as stable as it used to be,” Wei says. “They don’t believe in the CCP as much as they used to—this is something new that has emerged recently.”
Since 2008, Wei says, the Party has been putting in large efforts to increase control over the military, including the police and the PAP. “The CCP requires this sort of legitimacy in the minds of the people,” Wei said. “It’s not like a normal government. The Party requires ideological commitment.”
“Mass work is our Party’s cherished tradition,” a frontpage People’s Daily article said on Feb. 19. “Mass” refers to the masses of people, while “work” refers to propaganda and ideological education.
On Feb. 22 a Beijing Party official announced that, from March to October, children would begin the monthly flag raising ceremony by saluting a red flag with the hammer and sickle.
Additional research by Xiangyu Ding.
