Russia’s New Siberian Pipeline to China Remains in Doubt

Although Russia’s Gazprom has announced a natural gas pipeline agreement with China, Beijing has not confirmed the deal and may never do so.
Russia’s New Siberian Pipeline to China Remains in Doubt
Russian gas giant Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller (C) shakes hands with Vice President of CNPC, President of PetroChina Wang Dongjin (L) during a signing ceremony following a meeting between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping at the Kremlin in Moscow on May 8, 2015. Kirill Kudryavtsev/AFP via Getty Images
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Commentary

Russia’s state oil company, Gazprom, seems to think it has a deal with China to build a second Power of Siberia (PoS-2) natural gas pipeline.

Gazprom CEO Alexi Miller announced last month that the agreement is sealed in a “legally binding” agreement between Gazprom and the China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC). Beijing, however, has not yet confirmed the arrangement and, given geopolitical and economic considerations, may never do so. The pipeline about which Gazprom is so keen may never go through.
Russia has a clear interest in going ahead with the immense 1,600-mile PoS-2 project. Because of the American and European embargo on Russian trade, especially energy, the pipeline would secure China as a large buyer. Analysts at the Atlantic Council estimate that, even if the project goes through, it would not provide gas for years, imposing a payback period that could lock China in for some 30 years.

In addition to providing Russia with secure and much-needed cash flow, such arrangements would also give Moscow additional leverage in Europe should the day come when the West lifts the embargo on purchases of Russian energy. The pipeline would also weaken the market power of Russia’s two great competitors on global natural gas markets: Qatar and, significantly, the United States.

Certainly, China has an interest in securing an ongoing energy source. Even though it has considerable Russian supplies through the first Power of Siberia pipeline (PoS-1) and Arctic LNG (liquefied natural gas), as well as arrangements in Central Asia and Qatar, the additional flow would bolster China’s energy security and Beijing’s geopolitical position.

Especially appealing to Beijing is the idea that strength in natural gas would undermine Washington’s economic and geopolitical power. Creating a Russia–China energy nexus away from dollar-based global energy markets would also serve Beijing’s aim to dethrone the dollar’s premier status as the world’s international currency, what economists and bankers call the global reserve. China, however, has reason to hesitate on what Miller says is a done deal.

Cost is a major consideration. There is no getting away from the expense of PoS-2. It would involve much more expense than previous arrangements and is not expected to pay any return until 2030 at the earliest. Earlier negotiations on PoS-2 give a clear indicator of Chinese reticence. Gazprom had sought Chinese funding for the entire project, but CNPC refused even to consider financing the Russian part of the project.

Another reason for hesitation is China’s commitment to take a certain amount of Qatari natural gas. The additional Russian flow could upset those arrangements. What is more, Beijing has regional problems accepting gas from such a pipeline. PoS-2 would primarily serve North China and be used mainly for heating and industry. But because China’s natural gas-fired power plants are mostly in the south and east, the project would impose on China the need to create further transmission facilities.

Probably most significant of all, the addition of PoS-2 into China’s energy mix would run counter to two technologies that Beijing is actively promoting. One is heat pumps, and the other is batteries. China has already built 250 gigawatts of electrically driven heat pumps and has plans to expand the effort. Meanwhile, batteries and electric vehicles feature in just about every planning document coming out of Beijing. Especially significant is Beijing’s effort to narrow the nation’s need for natural gas by replacing LNG-powered heavy vehicles with battery-powered equivalents.

Beijing may, for geopolitical reasons, bow to Gazprom and Moscow and go ahead with the pipeline project. But as should be clear, there are significant considerations that would make Beijing balk. For the time being, Chinese officials will likely stall. Indeed, if history is a guide, Beijing may delay a decision in the hopes that circumstances will reveal the wisdom of a yes or a no or simply make a decision unnecessary.

Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
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Milton Ezrati
Milton Ezrati
Author
Milton Ezrati is a contributing editor at The National Interest, an affiliate of the Center for the Study of Human Capital at the University at Buffalo (SUNY), and chief economist for Vested, a New York-based communications firm. Before joining Vested, he served as chief market strategist and economist for Lord, Abbett & Co. He also writes frequently for City Journal and blogs regularly for Forbes. His latest book is “Thirty Tomorrows: The Next Three Decades of Globalization, Demographics, and How We Will Live.”