The Only Winner in Ukraine Is China

The Only Winner in Ukraine Is China
Russian President Vladimir Putin speaks with Chinese President Xi Jinping before an extended-format meeting of heads of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit (SCO) member states in Samarkand, Uzbekistan on Sept. 16, 2022. Sputnik/Sergey Bobylev/Pool via Reuters
Anders Corr
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Commentary

Near the end of February, the G-20 finance ministers adjourned without a joint statement because two of them, from Russia and China, refused to condemn “in the strongest terms” Moscow’s aggression against Ukraine. Beijing likewise abstained a few days earlier from a similar U.N. General Assembly resolution.

Despite widespread global support for Ukraine, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) thinks it can attract European countries that senior diplomat Wang Yi perceives as malleable: Germany, France, Italy, and Hungary. With the last of that list, under Viktor Orbán, Beijing is actually making inroads.
The CCP sees the war as beneficial and as a distraction for the United States from the Chinese regime’s own territorial ambitions in Taiwan, the South China Sea, and northern India. A poll published by Morning Consult on Feb. 23 found that Chinese citizens strongly believe that Russia’s war helps their country.
Diplomatically, Beijing seeks to use the war as a pretext to expand its influence in the “Global South” by appearing as a neutral peacemaker. But Beijing’s support of negotiations, when Russia still occupies large parts of Ukraine, effectively rewards Russia by pressuring Kyiv into concessions. That would pave the way for the CCP’s future planned aggression against Taiwan.

Chinese leader Xi Jinping likely encouraged Vladimir Putin in their meeting just 20 days before the invasion. The two issued a joint statement expressing a “no-limits friendship” and “new era” of international relations, agreeing to $117.5 billion in oil, gas, and other deals that later mitigated the impact of sanctions.

Beijing demonstrated ideological alignment with Russia within days of the invasion by blaming the United States, rationalizing it as a “legitimate” expression of Russian national security, and repeating Russian disinformation that the United States financed a network of secret bioweapon labs across Ukraine.

Beijing didn’t fool Kyiv. “The only country who really benefits now from this ... war in Ukraine, is China,” noted Ukraine’s presidential economic adviser Oleg Ustenko in March 2022, two weeks after the invasion.

Zhang Jun, permanent representative of China, speaks during the U.N. Security Council meeting discussing the Russian and Ukraine conflict at the United Nations Headquarters in New York City on March 11, 2022. (Michael M. Santiago/Getty Images)
Zhang Jun, permanent representative of China, speaks during the U.N. Security Council meeting discussing the Russian and Ukraine conflict at the United Nations Headquarters in New York City on March 11, 2022. Michael M. Santiago/Getty Images

Russia’s pariah status and subjection to sanctions make it ever more reliant on Beijing.

Militarily, the two countries join for up to five major exercises annually. While the Biden administration repeatedly asserts that Beijing hasn’t yet sent military materiel for Russia’s war in Ukraine, China has in fact supplied jet fighter parts, jamming technology, satellite imagery for weapons targeting, and dual-use items such as computer chips and civilian drones that have reached the front lines.
In February, Beijing released an anti-American manifesto titled “US Hegemony and Its Perils.” It blames the United States for Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution and claims that in Ukraine and other countries, “the United States is repeating its old tactics of waging proxy, low-intensity, and drone wars.”

The CCP’s support for Moscow comes at a price, including major discounts on oil and diplomatic subordination, as most recently illustrated by Beijing’s now-easy diplomatic access to Belarus.

Kyiv cautiously hopes that Beijing might stop Putin’s war. But the best one might realistically expect is that China opposes Russian nuclear threats, which could leverage the CCP into increasing conventional arms exports to Russia.

Beijing’s new peace proposal shows how the CCP favors Russia. It doesn’t call for the withdrawal of Russian troops, instead denouncing alliance “blocs” such as NATO and the use of “unilateral” sanctions. However, Moscow quickly rejected even this pro-Russian proposal, saying it didn’t recognize “new territorial realities.”

President Joe Biden responded to China’s plan by saying Beijing’s involvement was “not rational” and that the plan only benefited Russia. He warned that if the CCP supported Moscow’s brutality with weapons shipments, then U.S. corporations would leave China.

With no negotiated solution in sight, the war’s outcome still hinges on international sanctions and battlefield assets. On Feb. 26, Biden announced another $2.5 billion in aid to Ukraine, bringing the total to $113 billion.

Two days earlier, the United States sanctioned more than 200 entities linked to Russia’s war, including by prohibiting five Chinese groups from acquiring U.S. technologies. NATO and the G-7 responded with additional sanctions and threats, some against Beijing. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned of a “third world war” if China supplies Russia with weapons.

The risks are dire. Yet Ukraine’s partners can’t allow military support or appeasement of Moscow. Beijing must be held to account for any support it gives, including through non-military trade. New territory for Russia would incentivize further invasions by other dictatorships, including one by the CCP regime of Taiwan.

Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
Anders Corr
Anders Corr
Author
Anders Corr has a bachelor's/master's in political science from Yale University (2001) and a doctorate in government from Harvard University (2008). He is a principal at Corr Analytics Inc., publisher of the Journal of Political Risk, and has conducted extensive research in North America, Europe, and Asia. His latest books are “The Concentration of Power: Institutionalization, Hierarchy, and Hegemony” (2021) and “Great Powers, Grand Strategies: the New Game in the South China Sea)" (2018).
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