The suspected spy should be presumed innocent until proven guilty.
But his case is an interesting one because of his elite educational background, published political views that trace a precise line just a bit on Beijing’s side of the current China debate, position of influence on China issues, and reported networking with influential members of the press and business community.
The suspected spy later obtained a job working for an influential think tank in London founded by Tom Tugendhat, the United Kingdom’s minister of state for security. He also worked as a researcher for Alicia Kearns, the chair of the Commons Foreign Affairs Committee.
While the suspected spy did not have a security clearance, his high-level access to policy discussions would have given him something arguably more important—a feel for the political proclivities and lapses of the highest British officials, including the prime minister, on issues of China policy. He might have gotten classified information, including from the United States, if he were sufficiently trusted and the information passed unofficially from those with clearances.
The suspected spy “became active on Westminster’s social scene and used a dating website, making several attempts last year to arrange a date with a political journalist” from The Sun, according to The Times. Photos published by The Times show the young-looking suspected spy, now in his late 20s, with individuals from the British Chamber of Commerce, The Asia Group, The Wall Street Journal, and The Spectator.
Entities with members or clients that do business in China, such as the British Chamber of Commerce and The Asia Group, often take a soft-on-China perspective or fail to publicly report the most shocking aspects of the regime in Beijing. These “nuanced” perspectives are mirrored in the suspected spy’s writing for the University of London.
Putting soft-on-China voices in frequent social and intellectual contact with politicians and reporters who shape public opinion would be a relatively inexpensive way for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to massage British foreign policy in its favor, without either the soft voices or the news outlets understanding how they are being used.
Western nonprofits, think tanks, and universities often risk even closer relations with the CCP, putting U.S. media, academic, political, and other elites in direct contact with individuals from China’s embassies or consulates. U.S. and UK laws are sufficiently opaque that the funding for these Western entities could ultimately be from the regime in Beijing, handled by intermediate entities like U.S. corporations that do business in China.
According to The Times, the suspected spy “held a parliamentary pass and has worked with MPs on international policy, including relations with Beijing, for several years.”
Security officials fear that while in China, the suspected spy “may have been recruited as a sleeper agent and sent back to Britain with the intention of infiltrating political networks critical of the Beijing regime.”
The suspected spy was arrested on March 13 in Edinburgh. Another unnamed suspect in his 30s was arrested in Oxfordshire, home of Oxford University. They were both released on bail.
The Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament has claimed that China targets the United Kingdom “prolifically and aggressively” and that the government is underfunded and lacks the expertise to counter the threat, according to The Times. The committee argues that Beijing successfully penetrated “every sector of the UK’s economy.”
According to a Whitehall source cited by The Times, the suspected spy “was regularly complaining about a lack of nuance among China-sceptic MPs and seemed to have a particular issue with Iain Duncan Smith.” Mr. Smith has been among the most vocal of MPs against the CCP.
Countering the CCP’s espionage, interference, and influence operations in the United States and our allies requires stronger laws and more enforcement against foreign agents operating in our midst.
