The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been experiencing its share of leadership changes. Some may be for the good of the organization, while others might be more aligned with the interests of Chinese communist leader Xi Jinping.
What many may miss in the reporting of these senior-level terminations is the connection to two primary political factions within the PLA: the Shaanxi gang and the Fujian clique.
The Shaanxi gang has significant familial ties to Xi’s family, as his father, Xi Zhongxun, was a revolutionary leader from Shaanxi Province. It is also deeply connected to the founding generation of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Leaders from this region are purported to be trusted allies of Xi Jinping, reinforcing both nepotism and the patronage system, where regional connections play a role in political appointments. Members of this informal organization claim a direct connection to revolutionary heritage, which strengthens the faction’s legitimacy.
Given the association that both groups claim with Xi Jinping, it is likely frustrating and culturally embarrassing to him when their senior representative leaders are found to be involved in PLA corruption schemes. In the past year, three commanders from Shaanxi and five from Fujian have been dismissed or detained. Shaanxi members Zhang Youxia and Zhang Shengmin had close familial ties, and Fujian members He Weidong and Miao Hua served with Xi during his time in Fujian Province.
Most recently, Ding Laifu, who formerly commanded the 73rd Army Group and was a trusted subordinate of Xi’s, was relieved of his position. The change in leadership within the 73rd may be more reflective of differing views on action in terms of Taiwan, as it is stationed in Xiamen city across the straits.
Another telling connection, which might suggest divergent opinions regarding Taiwan, was the arrest of He, the vice chairman of the Central Military Commission. He previously served as the commander of the Eastern Theater, while Lin served as his commander of the 72nd group. Both leaders held significant influence within the Fujian clique and had intimate knowledge of the PLA’s intentions for Taiwan.
While these changes are likely tied to Party or strategic differences, the removals of Miao and Li Shangfu appear to be in line with concerns over corruption. Corruption among senior leaders in the PLA may include pay for promotion, mismanagement of resources, kickbacks in procurement, or exploitation of privileges, all of which fall under the investigative authority of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection.
In the case of Li, there are potential links to mismanagement of resources and kickbacks in procurement, with reports of missiles filled with water rather than rocket fuel and silo lids that don’t function. These actions would be viewed as a violation of public trust and a contradiction to the pillars of strength and discipline associated with the PLA.
Miao, who was relieved of his position in November 2024, served as the director of the Central Military Commission’s political work department, which replaced the general political department. The organization’s goals are to maintain ideological control, propaganda, and discipline. While there are no released updates on his status or the specifics of the charges against him, there is speculation that he abused his authority to promote and demote personnel within the PLA.
Regardless of the reasons for the terminations, many of the events can be tied to Xi’s acolytes, which could potentially weaken his authority. And while these leaders and their associated camps make an interesting story, the real story is the PLA’s reduced readiness, its inability to maintain modernization timelines, and its strategic vulnerabilities. Lastly, if there is a rift in relationships between Xi and senior-level officials over the country’s approach to Taiwan, will actions to silence or remove them have the intended effect?
