China’s Deadliest Mine Disaster in Years Reveals Dangerous Work Conditions

After the Shanxi blast, workers described fake maps, missing worker tracking cards, and other safety issues.

This photo released by Xinhua News Agency, shows a scene at the rescue site of the Liushenyu coal mine in Changzhi city, China's Shanxi Province on May 23, 2026. Cao Yang/Xinhua via AP

A deadly gas explosion at a coal mine in northern China’s Shanxi Province has become part of a broader story of governance and safety after reports alleged hidden doors, off-book workers, false mine maps, missing worker-tracking cards, and earlier safety penalties at the site.

The blast occurred at 7:29 p.m. on May 22 at the Liushenyu coal mine in Qinyuan County, Changzhi city. State media Xinhua News Agency initially reported a rising death toll that reached 90, while later news conference figures put the toll at 82 dead, two missing, and 128 injured. The Epoch Times could not independently verify the casualty numbers.

Chinese authorities have previously faced criticism over restrictions on reporting after mining accidents. Reporters Without Borders said in 2006 that journalists trying to cover a coal mine accident in Jilin Province were attacked while being denied access to the mine and hospital.

The May explosion has been described as China’s deadliest mining disaster since 2009, when a mine explosion in Heilongjiang Province killed 108.

Worker Count Changed During Rescue

One of the earliest issues involved identifying the actual number of workers underground.

Guo Xiaofang, deputy secretary of the Qinyuan County Party Committee and county head, said at a press conference the mine’s entry board showed 124 people underground on the day of the explosion. During rescue work early on May 23, authorities found that the list of workers who had come out of the mine did not match the company’s underground-worker information. After further checking, officials determined that 247 people had in fact entered the mine.

The count discrepancy was tied to missing location-tracking cards. Post-accident checks identified that 144 workers had carried underground positioning cards, while 103 had not. China’s mine-safety rules require coal mines to enforce identification-card entry procedures and bar workers from entering without cards, with mismatched cards, or with multiple cards.

Workers quoted by Xinhua said card use was loose in practice. One miner said almost no one in his 18-person work team wore a positioning card and that no one required them to do so. Another worker said people could enter with a lamp, helmet, and other supplies without a positioning card.

Subcontracted Labor

The accident also exposed a labor structure that separated many miners from direct management by the mine.

Miner Song Yueping told Xinhua that many workers at the mine did not sign labor contracts directly with the coal company but with outside teams. Those teams contracted with the mine under settlement models based on coal tonnage or tunneling footage.

Several said they belonged to outside construction teams and were not directly managed by the mine. One worker said the mine contracted with an outsourcing company and paid according to progress, while leaving management of personnel, wages, and safety to parties outside the mine’s direct control.

Shen Mingshi, a researcher at Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research, told the Chinese edition of The Epoch Times that workplace safety in China’s mining sector is tied not only to company conduct but also to enforcement and labor protections. He said workers often have little recourse regarding unsafe conditions when local governments and companies prioritize production and revenue.

Off-Book Workers, False Maps

The blast later drew attention to alleged concealed mining areas and records that did not match the mine’s actual layout.

Rescuers told Xinhua that maps supplied by the company did not match the underground conditions and that the mine had unmarked hidden tunnels. Later accounts said the company had two sets of mine drawings and two monitoring systems. Some areas using off-book workers were not shown in the official map, and preliminary findings said coal produced from the concealed area was neither counted in output nor taxed.

A mining construction expert told the news outlet that some mines use one set of drawings to handle inspections and filing requirements, and another to guide actual production. The rescuers also described hidden doors made with wire mesh, bags, and spray plaster that resembled tunnel rock, saying the setup could be closed and disguised during inspections.

The same outlet reported the mine had been fined in 2025 after such hidden work areas were found, but the penalty did not deter the company from continuing production. It also alleged safety supervisors assigned to the company did not play an effective role during a long period of unlawful high-intensity production.

A Mine Already Flagged for Risk

The Liushenyu mine had already appeared on the National Mine Safety Administration (NMSA)’s 2024 list of serious-disaster production coal mines, where it was identified as a high-gas mine.

The NMSA issued an emergency gas-safety notice two days after the blast, saying the Liushenyu explosion had caused “particularly major casualties and property losses.” The notice said gas remains coal-mine safety’s “top killer” and warned that some companies continue to prioritize production and profit over safety, with gas-control measures repeatedly left unimplemented.

Liushenyu had been penalized at least five times in five years, including for an emergency-stop protection failure, workers lacking reflective workwear, and a hidden working face found in 2025, according to Xinhua and Beijing News.

Regulatory Failure

The Chinese State Council Accident Investigation Team said preliminary findings pointed to major violations by the company, and that the company’s actual controller and other responsible people had been placed under control, according to Xinhua reports.

The same accounts also said assigned safety supervisors did not effectively perform their role during the mine’s long-running unlawful production. They said the mine’s hidden work areas, unregistered output, untaxed production, and mismatched monitoring systems raised questions about how the operation continued despite prior penalties and regulatory attention.

Hu Liren, a Chinese entrepreneur interviewed by the Chinese edition of The Epoch Times, said private mining firms in China often face incentives to maximize production while shifting costs onto labor and safety. He said penalties imposed after violations are often too weak to outweigh profits from continuing production.

A Wider Pattern

The types of practices described in the Shanxi blast have appeared in official mine-safety enforcement materials before.

In 2020, the NMSA described a separate inspection in Guizhou. In that case, regulators found fake drawings, concealed mine conditions, weak training, and failures in gas-checking and safety responsibility systems.

The NMSA’s post-blast notice also warned of recurring problems in gas prevention, including weak red-line awareness, emphasis on production and profit over safety, serious complacency, and failure to implement prevention measures.