There has been a big increase in the number of GPS spoofing and jamming attacks aimed at interfering with Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) data, which is standard on all international shipping.
Jeroen Pijpker, lecturer at NHL Stenden University of Applied Sciences in the Netherlands, told The Epoch Times that the university has recorded 400 GPS spoofing and jamming incidents in its database, with 25 percent of them related to actual vessels. He said he believes that these cases are just the “tip of the iceberg.”
Nir Ayalon, founder and CEO of Cydome, a maritime cybersecurity firm based in Israel, told The Epoch Times that 95 percent of incidents caused by spoofing or jamming do not end up making the news.
He said Cydome has seen a 500 percent increase in GPS spoofing and jamming this year, with a 2,000 percent rise in the number of maritime blackspot areas.
Ayalon said GPS spoofing is sometimes carried out by ship operators in order to disguise their location or identity, but that it is also perpetrated as a hostile act.
‘Manipulation of the Data’
Ayalon said GPS spoofing or jamming can be carried out in two ways: by intercepting GNSS messages from the antenna to the ship’s transceiver or by manipulating the Automatic Identification System (AIS) data, which all ships use.According to Ayalon, it is easier for attackers to manipulate AIS data because they are online.
“It does not require any encryption or any authentication, so you can basically add any information that you want there,” he said.
“It’s very easy to get into AIS data.”
Ayalon said GPS spoofing could, in effect, render ships invisible—in other words, they would show up on the map in a certain location, but in reality, they would not be there.
Referring to the MSC Antonia incident, he said: “Basically, [its] location was manipulated and the ship autopilot tried to fix the path to the path that it thought was the right one ... so the ship grounded.
“If you would look at the place where the AIS is telling you that the ship is ... there’s no ship there.”
Sometimes, spoofing is carried out by bad actors who are trying to damage a specific vessel, according to Ayalon.
Jamming and Spoofing
Ayalon said that in order to carry out GPS jamming or spoofing, a bad actor needs only a relatively small high-frequency antenna, which would usually need to be sited on a tall building, a cliff, or another high place, close to a port or a shipping lane.“They will need an antenna,” he said, noting that it is not always something that can be seen.
“It can be quite a small device.”
“Recent instances where GPS interference served as a defensive measure against drone and missile threats targeting critical infrastructure include the Israeli coast and the Red Sea during the [Israel–Hamas] conflict as well as the Persian Gulf and Arabian Gulf,” the article stated.
Ayalon said there are a number of GPS spoofing blackspots around the world where mariners know that they have to be especially alert.
These areas include the Black Sea, the Red Sea, the South China Sea, the Persian Gulf, the eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea, the Barents Sea, and the seas around North Korea.
There is also a small blackspot near Pensacola, Florida, which may be linked to a U.S. naval air station.

Ayalon said a lot of the satellite data for shipping around China is also not accurate because of spoofing.
Ship ‘Honeynet’ Created
Pijpker said GPS spoofing remains an “under-researched topic.” His own university has created a ship “honeynet“ in an attempt to understand the ”malicious traffic,” he said, referring to a network setup created with intentional vulnerabilities to attract hackers.He said it is a “virtual ship” linked to the internet by a Starlink device and a decoy server. It is designed “to see what kind of people are attacking ships,” Pijpker told The Epoch Times.
He said a lot of crew members trust what the computer and other semi-autonomous systems display.
“This means that we see more and more events like the MSC Antonia [incident],” Ayalon said.
According to him, there are a lot of tools with which crews can check the integrity of their GNSS.
Crews will need to start using these types of systems “in order to make sure that they’re in the right place,” Ayalon said.







