Supreme Court Will Consider If Police Can Be Sued for Fabricating Evidence

A Napoleon, Ohio, jeweler claims the police fabricated evidence against him.
Supreme Court Will Consider If Police Can Be Sued for Fabricating Evidence
The U.S. Supreme Court is seen in Washington on Nov. 13, 2023. (Mandel Ngan/AFP via Getty Images)
Matthew Vadum
12/14/2023
Updated:
12/17/2023
0:00

The Supreme Court will consider whether an Ohio jeweler can bring civil rights claims against police for malicious prosecution after criminal charges brought against him were dropped.

The case comes after the Supreme Court loosened the legal standard for bringing such lawsuits against police in federal courts in 2022, finding that plaintiffs may proceed if they can demonstrate that their criminal cases ended without a conviction.

The court announced in an unsigned order on Dec. 13 that it granted the petition for certiorari, or review, in Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, Ohio. No justices dissented. The court didn’t explain why it made the decision. At least four of the nine justices must vote for the petition for the case to proceed to the oral argument stage.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit ruled against jewelry store owner Jascha Chiaverini when he sued police after he was charged with, but not convicted of, felony money laundering, as well as a misdemeanor charge of possessing stolen property and a charge of violating his precious metals dealer’s license.

Mr. Chiaverini claims in his petition that the police “fabricated evidence” to justify the money-laundering charge and that their actions were sufficient to justify a claim under the Fourth Amendment, which requires that the legal process began in the absence of probable cause.

The story began in 2016 when a man came by Mr. Chiaverini’s store to sell jewelry. The man affirmed orally and in writing that it was his property. He was paid $45 by the jeweler, who expected to make an $11 profit on the scrap metal.

Hours later, a couple called the store asking about a stolen ring, but the description they gave differed from the ring in question. Mr. Chiaverini called the police to request assistance.

The police were convinced that the ring and an earring sold to Mr. Chiaverini were stolen property, the petition said.

They gave the jeweler an internally contradictory letter demanding that he retain the ring and earring as evidence and that he hand them over to the people who claimed they were stolen.

Mr. Chiaverini attempted to consult with his attorney, but officers left the store without waiting for him to do so. The city’s law director promised to get back to Mr. Chiaverini about the matter but didn’t.

The police returned to the store, saying he would be treated as a “co-victim” if he would hand over the jewelry. Confused and under instructions from his lawyer, he refused to hand over the jewelry.

The petition said a police officer then filed a report falsely claiming that Mr. Chiaverini said he bought the ring and kept the records about it because he suspected it was stolen. Police secured a search warrant and filed charges against him.

Under Ohio law, the money-laundering charge could only be based on transactions that exceed $1,000, but a police officer signed off on the charge, saying the jewelry was valued at $350 and that, despite knowing that, Mr. Chiaverini paid only $45 for it.

In the 2nd, 3rd, and 11th circuits, the misconduct identified would sustain a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim because those circuits use a charge-specific rule under which a plaintiff is allowed to proceed with a malicious prosecution claim as to a baseless charge, regardless of what other charges have been brought, according to the petition.

But the 6th Circuit applies the “any-crime” rule, under which probable cause for any single charge “insulates every other charge from a malicious prosecution claim.”

Because the 6th Circuit found probable cause for the two other charges, it threw out the malicious prosecution claim related to the money-laundering charge without even assessing probable cause as to that charge.

“The ‘any-crime’ rule defies both common law and common sense ... [and] would, for instance, allow a police officer who fabricated a felony to avoid liability for a malicious prosecution claim so long as there was probable cause to believe the plaintiff was jaywalking,” the petition said.

“That cannot be the rule.”

In its brief urging the Supreme Court not to accept the case, the city took the position that the jewelry was definitely stolen and that the man who brought it to the store was “a thief.”

The police took action against Mr. Chiaverini out of concern that the jewelry would be lost because the jeweler said he was not obligated to retain the items.

Sixty days after a judge held a hearing, the charges were automatically dismissed because a grand jury had failed to indict the jeweler.

The jeweler and his company sued the police and the city, seeking more than $3 million in damages, but the police moved to dismiss, arguing they were immune to the lawsuit.

The federal district court ruled against the jeweler, finding there was probable cause for the “arrest and continuation of legal proceedings.”

The 6th Circuit also rejected Mr. Chiaverini’s claims, holding that probable cause justified the search of his store, as well as his arrest and prosecution, but didn’t rule on whether probable cause justified the money-laundering charge, the city’s brief said.

The case comes a year and a half after the Supreme Court relaxed the legal standard for bringing such lawsuits in federal courts, overturning the tougher prevailing standard.

In that case, Thompson v. Clark, police officers raided the home of U.S. Navy veteran Larry Thompson in Brooklyn, New York, in 2014 based on a 911 call from his cognitively challenged sister-in-law. A diaper rash on a baby was misidentified by the sister-in-law as a sign of abuse.

Police officers arrived and said they were investigating possible child abuse and needed to look at the baby. The police entered over Mr. Thompson’s objections, threw him to the floor, handcuffed him, and conducted a search without seeking a warrant. Doctors found no evidence of child abuse, but Mr. Thompson spent two days in jail. Prosecutors dropped the charges against him, and he sued.

The Supreme Court ruled 6–3 that under the previous standard laid down in Heck v. Humphrey (1994), Mr. Thompson had to show there was a “favorable termination” of the underlying criminal prosecution. The former precedent held that a claim for damages couldn’t advance unless the plaintiff could prove the conviction or sentence had been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”

But Justice Brett Kavanaugh wrote in the court’s majority opinion that in a Fourth Amendment claim for malicious prosecution, “a plaintiff need only show that his prosecution ended without a conviction. Mr. Thompson satisfied that requirement in this case.” The officers “are still protected by the requirement that the plaintiff show the absence of probable cause and by qualified immunity.”

Attorney Marie Miller of the Institute for Justice, a public interest law firm that filed a brief in the case in support of Mr. Chiaverini, told The Epoch Times that she was “encouraged by the court’s decision to hear the case.”

“The lower court’s ruling is particularly troubling because it allows officers to insulate themselves from liability for malicious, unconstitutional conduct. Officers who unreasonably seize a person need only identify a crime the person could properly be accused of. Even a minor crime will do—like using turn signals improperly or riding a bike on a sidewalk,” she wrote in an email.

“That rule and result lack support in the Constitution, the civil-rights statute and its history, and basic justice. We hope the Court sees this and reverses.”

The Epoch Times contacted both Mr. Chiaverini’s attorney, Easha Anand of the Stanford Supreme Court Litigation Clinic, and the city’s attorney, Megan Wold of Cooper and Kirk in Washington, for comment but didn’t receive any replies by press time.

The oral argument in the case hasn’t yet been scheduled.