Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth warned U.S. allies and partners about the hegemonic and malign threat from communist China as “real” and potentially “imminent.” He said that “China seeks to become a hegemonic power in Asia,” and warned that “Economic dependence on China only deepens their malign influence and complicates our defense decision space during times of tension.”
Beijing’s increasing restrictions on its rare earth element (REE) exports to the United States underline the risks of such dependency. In response, Washington is considering further restriction of computer chip exports to China, according to a June 20 report.
Mr. Hegseth made his comments at the annual Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on May 31, 2025. His words departed from the Biden administration, which said that conflict with China “is neither imminent nor inevitable.”
The differences of the two major U.S. parties on Taiwan are more complex and complimentary than most people realize. Some in the press claim that Mr. Hegseth risked “escalating” disputes with China. In bigger ways, however, the Trump administration sought to deescalate. Nowhere did Mr. Hegseth commit to defending Taiwan if the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) were to attack, for example. Neither has President Donald Trump made such a commitment.
President Joe Biden stated on multiple occasions that he would militarily defend Taiwan in case of an attack by the PLA. This cuts both ways, as a U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan serves to deter China from attacking in the first place, but also allows Taiwan to relax its defense spending.
The second Trump administration is a return to the former Taiwan policy of “strategic ambiguity.” Most people in the Biden administration sought to preserve this policy, and may be cheering its return. Strategic ambiguity incentivizes Taiwan to increase its defense spending, and leaves an offramp for the United States should it decide not to war with China.
Mr. Hegseth also sought to deescalate by walking away from the language of “containment,” used during the first Cold War against Russia and China alike. Many in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) believe the United States seeks to contain China economically and militarily, and some U.S. analysts believe the United States should do so as a matter of policy. But Mr. Hegseth is trying to deescalate by rejecting this language. He said, “We do not seek to dominate or strangle China. To encircle or provoke.” His words were likely meant to calm the CCP.
Yet Mr. Hegseth’s tough policy towards the CCP was evident in his call on U.S. allies and partners to increase their defense spending. “We ask, and indeed we insist, that our allies and partners do their part,” he said at the dialogue. “NATO members are pledging to spend 5 percent of their GDP on defense, even Germany. So it doesn’t make sense for countries in Europe to do that while key allies in Asia spend less on defense in the face of an even more formidable threat, not to mention North Korea.”
President Trump has mooted the strategy of not committing to defend allies that do not meet a minimum defense spending cutoff. In the past he argued that countries like Japan and Korea obtain their own nuclear deterrents, which would also shift some burden of defense to these allies. It would decrease the risk of the U.S. getting into a war with a nuclear-armed adversary, because Japan and Korea’s nuclear deterrent would deter that war.
While many criticize the Trump administration for not working with allies, Mr. Hegseth observed that “we’re supporting allies and partners as they strengthen their own defense capabilities and capacity. We want to empower you – as partners, not dependents – to work more capably with the United States.” That empowerment of allies is apparent in the increased tempo of joint training exercises with U.S. partners. “A critical part of working with our partners is increasing interoperability – learning how to sail, fly, and fight as one,” Mr. Hegseth said. He noted that the 2025 BALIKATAN exercise in the Philippines included the participation of Japan and Australia. It was the most extensive ever, and took place in the context of military exercises with India called Tiger Triumph and shared logistics capabilities with Quad countries that include India as well as Japan and Australia.
Mr. Trump’s approach to insisting on greater defense spending of allies led the Europeans to increase their defense spending, which allows the United States to redeploy forces to Asia for the deterrence of China. The resulting peace and stability, said Mr. Hegseth, “only multiply when our allies and partners are also strong.”
In the past, U.S. foreign policy was not only based on U.S. national interests, but on those interests being served through establishing the United States as a global leader and champion of freedom, liberty, markets, democracy, and human rights. American values, rather than just U.S. national interests, served as the basis for attracting nations around the world into our alliance systems. These helped keep the United States safe through forward deployment of U.S. forces as tripwires and balancers against countries like communist China, the former USSR, North Korea, and Iran.
As the Trump administration has made clear, and contrary to its detractors, it values these international alliances and partnerships. They strengthen through the hard love of insisting on greater partner defense spending and closer adherence to U.S. export controls imposed against adversaries. The days of the United States providing a free security umbrella to the world are over, as is the easy provision of technology to China and Russia. As the U.S. national debt increases, U.S. allies must pay their fair share, or get left behind.
The figure Mr. Hegseth quoted in his speech of 5 percent of GDP is a big ask, but necessary to keep the peace in today’s more dangerous world. Our democratic liberties are well worth the price.
