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The DISRUPT Act: Why the Final Days of 2025 Made the Case

The DISRUPT Act: Why the Final Days of 2025 Made the Case
U.S. military fighter jets sit on the tarmac at José Aponte de la Torre Airport, formerly Roosevelt Roads Naval Station in Ceiba, Puerto Rico, on Dec. 26, 2025. The United States has deployed a major military force in the Caribbean and has recently intercepted oil tankers as part of a naval blockade against Venezuelan vessels it considers to be under sanctions. Miguel J. Rodriguez Carrillo/AFP via Getty Images
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Commentary

A Supply Chain, Not a Slogan

Imagine a sanctions analyst on a U.S. bank’s midnight shift watching a payment ping from a Chinese trading company to a Gulf intermediary for “industrial valves.” The invoice is generic, the routing threads through a Hong Kong shell you’ve seen before, and the beneficial-owner field is blank. The cargo is labeled “machinery parts,” vague enough to pass first review, and the end-user’s address resolves to a shared office suite.

Nothing in the file is a smoking gun. But it feels familiar: China’s commercial ecosystem provides the frictionless cover that lets sanctioned partners keep moving.

Charles Davis
Charles Davis
Author
Charles Davis is a military veteran and lecturer with an intelligence background. His military awards include: two Bronze Star Service Medals, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, two Meritorious Service Medals, NATO Service Medal, Iraq Campaign Medal, Afghanistan Campaign Medal, Saudi Arabia Liberation Medal, and Kuwait Liberation Medal.