How North Korea and Iran Accelerate Missile Threats Through Shared Learning

Missiles displayed in the Iranian capital Tehran in an undated file photo. Atta Kenare/AFP/Getty Images

Commentary

In July 1998, Iran fired what it called the Shahab-3. The launch looked, to most observers, like another step in Tehran’s long march toward regional reach. But analysts later pointed out a detail that should have landed like a warning flare: Iran’s test was essentially only the second known flight of the North Korean Nodong family—North Korea itself had reportedly flown it successfully just once before, in 1993. Iran wasn’t merely buying hardware; it was moving inside the development cycle of a partner state. That is what “reciprocal sharing” between Tehran and Pyongyang has meant for three decades: collapsing timelines, trading lessons, and turning sanctions pressure into a reason to cooperate.

The Early Deal: Missiles for Cash, Then Something More

The first phase was straightforward. During and after the Iran–Iraq War, Iran sought missile capabilities quickly. North Korea—isolated, militarized, and hungry for hard currency—sold Scud variants and associated support. Arms-control reporting notes Iranian officials acknowledging Scud purchases “from foreign countries like North Korea” in the 1980s, and U.S. intelligence assessments later describing continued “ballistic missile-related cooperation” from North Korean entities into the 2000s.