The Ukrainian flag flutters between buildings destroyed in bombardment, in the Ukrainian town of Borodianka, in the Kyiv region, on April 17, 2022. (Sergei Supinsky/AFP via Getty Images)
The battle map of Ukraine has looked roughly the same for months now. This makes some military men uneasy. They say the counteroffensive failed. They question Ukrainian strategy, including in the press. That would normally be a major violation of military etiquette between allies, and so a U.S. firestorm of criticismback and forth over the best strategy has erupted.
The debate elicited comment from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy himself, who indicated support for Ukraine’s current approach, described by a British admiral approvingly as “starve, stretch, and strike” the Russians.
U.S. national security adviser Jake Sullivan also tacitly approved Ukraine’s strategy by noting that it has made steady, methodical progress. Some slivers of land and small towns have been recaptured, though Russia retains most of what it occupied.
The war is now highly politicized in the United States, which has sent over $40 billion in military aid to Ukraine during a time of mounting and fiscally unsustainable federal debt. The European Union has given $73 billion in both military and civilian aid to Ukraine. Germany and the United Kingdom have pledged $8 billion and $7 billion, respectively, in military support to Kyiv.
Donald Trump, who has been particularly vigilant against allied free-riding on U.S. military defense spending, has claimed he will end the war on day one of his second term by threatening to oppose the side that does not go to the negotiating table. This will play well among many of his supporters, who want to reduce federal spending and see Vladimir Putin as “anti-woke” and a potential ally against China.
But such a threat is already supportive of the Russian side, as any settlement at this point would require territorial concessions to Russia. That would amount to rewarding a dictatorial aggressor against peaceful civilians in a democracy. Threatening to assist Russia against Ukraine to force a democracy to give up territory is contrary to U.S. national security interests, doubly so given that Russia is already an ally of China, upon which it is dependent for energy export revenues.
Some Republican candidates take a more moderate stand than Mr. Trump by arguing against further assistance to Ukraine in favor of using troops for border security. Other candidates argue that the U.S. military can “do both”—we can protect U.S. borders while simultaneously supporting those of partner democracies like Ukraine and Taiwan.
Some Democrats want to lock in long-term funding to Ukraine both to discourage Mr. Putin from prolonging the war until a Republican candidate wins and to force future American candidates to continue the funding.
Some French officials are calling for four years of guaranteed funding. This might work against Mr. Putin, but is distasteful from a democratic perspective. It removes the bargaining power that the United States and allies currently have with Mr. Zelenskyy, for example, to encourage elections that would remove the threat of him becoming a dictator himself.
Mr. Zelenskyy recently extended martial law, which has raised concerns that he will only hold elections if some other country pays. Such a demand might save resources for the war but would be disastrous for Ukraine’s public image with the U.S. electorate.
President Joe Biden meets with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the Oval Office in Washington on Sept.1, 2021. (Doug Mills/The New York Times via Getty Images)
For those who endorse continued U.S. military support to the Ukrainians, there are two major points of tactical disagreement between military analysts.
The first point is whether to counterattack into Russian territory. Some Ukrainians are already conducting strikes with missiles and drones as far as Moscow, plus hitting strategic targets in Russia, such as airfields and fuel depots.
The United States, United Kingdom, and Germany, all of which are concerned about an escalation of the war against a nuclear-armed power, are apparently telling Mr. Zelenskyy that if he orders attacks across the border into Russia with Western-supplied weapons, then they will cease supporting Ukraine with intelligence and military materiel.
The second major point of contention is whether Ukraine should mass forces for an attack to cut through Russian defenses, make it to the Sea of Azov, and sever Russia’s land bridge to Crimea, or alternatively, pursue a more risk-averse approach of attrition against Russian forces.
Ukraine’s current battlefield tactics are closer to the latter while looking for an opportunity for the former. Kyiv is pursuing a gradualist approach that spreads Ukrainian forces across the entire front to probe for weaknesses while simultaneously defending what remains of Ukraine and eradicating the Russian forces that make themselves vulnerable by taking the offensive.
Where Russian weakness is found, Ukraine’s quick reaction forces in the rear can be directed to break through Russia’s deep defenses, including trenchworks and minefields. Ukraine is attempting to attrit Russian forces, including artillery, armored vehicles, supply depots, and capital assets such as navy ships, through the use of armed drones and short-range missiles.
Russian forces, meanwhile, have an elastic defense in depth. They withdraw as Ukrainians attack through multiple lines of trenches, minefields, and artillery fire, then counter-strike when the Ukrainians tire and weaken in their vulnerable forward positions.
The American strategists who supported the concentration of Ukrainian forces to cut resupply to Crimea admitted the strategy would cause significant Ukrainian casualties. They argue that this is the price for breaking the back of Russia’s control of occupied Ukraine. As winter approaches, such an attack will be more difficult, if not impossible. Russia is expected to launch another offensive as early as this fall and into the winter.
The differential rates of attrition of troops and materiel must be considered. Both sides employ snipers and are launching artillery shells, rockets, and drones at each other, including against the two capital cities of Moscow and Kyiv, as well as airfields deep in the rear. Attacks on city targets are thought by both sides to erode the national will to persevere. While Russia has more men of military age, Ukraine has better battlefield medicine.
Russia has gotten military materiel from China and Iran and is seeking more, including from North Korea. However, the Russian will to fight is clearly limited if its 1980s war in Afghanistan is any indication.
Ukraine’s will to fight seems more robust as the country’s very existence is at stake. Ukraine has centuries of history beneath the bloody thumb of Moscow, which the independent Ukrainian people are now rightly committed to ending forever.
Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
Anders Corr has a bachelor's/master's in political science from Yale University (2001) and a doctorate in government from Harvard University (2008). He is a principal at Corr Analytics Inc., publisher of the Journal of Political Risk, and has conducted extensive research in North America, Europe, and Asia. His latest books are “The Concentration of Power: Institutionalization, Hierarchy, and Hegemony” (2021) and “Great Powers, Grand Strategies: the New Game in the South China Sea" (2018).
