The Baluchis Are Complicating the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

The Baluchis Are Complicating the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor
Pakistan’s Gwadar Port is under construction on Feb. 12, 2013. The Chinese regime has 40-year rights to manage the port. (Behram Baloch/AFP/Getty Images)
Stu Cvrk
2/28/2024
Updated:
2/28/2024
0:00
Commentary

A little-noticed item in the state-run People’s Daily on Feb. 24 contained some interesting nuggets that elucidate the long-running friendship between communist China and Pakistan.

The article quoted Babar Amin, a former Pakistani ambassador of Norway, as stating that the “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) aligns naturally with the goals of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) for regional connectivity and trade promotion.”

While that statement was unremarkable, the diplomat noted that Pakistan “seeks to enhance non-traditional security cooperation through the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure mechanism within the SCO, fostering collaboration on defense and security matters.” Therein lies the tale, as one man’s anti-terrorism is another man’s genocide, and both countries have longstanding “problems” with indigenous minorities.

Let us examine the topic.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

Pakistan was the first Muslim country to recognize communist China in 1950, with diplomatic relations commencing in 1951. This was a diplomatic coup at the time for Beijing, as Mao Zedong’s communists worked hard at being declared the legitimate government of China despite their seizure of power by the bayonet, not through the ballot box in 1949. That a Muslim country would recognize the godless communist regime is another peculiarity of history and a story for another day, especially since fellow Muslim Uyghurs continue to endure cultural genocide at the hands of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
In any event, the CCP has, over the years, rewarded Pakistan with various economic investments and arrangements, including a free-trade agreement in 2007 and the establishment of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in 2015. The groundwork for CPEC was laid through a memorandum of understanding on cooperation between China and Pakistan signed in 2013. Another major benefit was China’s technical assistance in the development and testing of the first “Muslim nuclear weapon” in 1990, as noted by U.S. News and World Report.
CPEC is part of Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s signature economic policy, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI, also known as “One Belt, One Road”). As noted by Britannica here, the goal of CPEC is “to connect the deep-sea Pakistani ports of Gwadar and Karachi to [Kashgar in] the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region in China [also known as East Turkmenistan] and beyond.”

CPEC aims to develop and modernize the transportation infrastructure needed to accelerate trade between the two countries, with an emphasis on improving Pakistan’s electrical distribution and transportation networks.

The benefits to China are substantial, including a significant reduction in the time and cost needed to transport Middle East energy supplies to China and the reverse transport of finished Chinese goods to markets in Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. China is also keen to exploit Baluchistan’s estimated $1 trillion in gold, copper, oil, coal, and natural gas reserves.

The benefits to Pakistan have been colored over time by increasing debt owed to China. VOA News reported in August 2023 that “most Chinese development financing in Pakistan between 2000 and 2017 were loans, not grants” that were made at or near commercial rates. As a result, a staggering one-third of Pakistan’s external/foreign debt is owed to China, up from one-quarter in 2018.
The other problem for Pakistan has been the resistance of local militants to development projects in Baluchistan.

Baluchistan

Baluchistan (also known as “Balochistan”) is the largest of the four provinces of Pakistan, comprising 44 percent of the country’s total land mass. Rich in natural resources like natural gas, oil, coal, copper, sulfur, fluoride, and gold, this is the least developed province in Pakistan. Ethnic Baluchis inhabit Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan, and like many countries in the region, ethnicity (“bloodline”) frequently trumps nationality, politics, and arbitrary boundaries drawn on maps. Arbitrary borders beget ethnic conflict. This is one by-product of the colonial era in Asia and Africa.

There have been insurgencies in this area for several hundred years due to a variety of issues, for example, under-development and “economic inequality,” education shortfalls (believed by Baluchis to be purposeful by the Punjabi majority government in Islamabad), lack of suitable and equitable representation in the national government, and separatist objectives for a “Greater Baluchistan.”

Insurgencies by Baloch nationalists have been fought in 1948, 1958–59, 1962–63, and 1973–77, with an ongoing and stronger, broader insurgency beginning in 2003 and continuing to the present day. In 2018, separatists of the Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) attacked the Chinese Consulate in Karachi. This attack followed “numerous isolated attacks on Chinese personnel working in Pakistan conducted by the BLA and other insurgent groups like the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) and the Baloch Republican Army (BRA),” according to the Daily Caller.
Pakistani naval personnel stands guard near a ship carrying containers at the Gwadar port during the opening ceremony of a pilot trade program between Pakistan and China on Nov. 13, 2016. (Aamir Quereshi/AFP via Getty Images)
Pakistani naval personnel stands guard near a ship carrying containers at the Gwadar port during the opening ceremony of a pilot trade program between Pakistan and China on Nov. 13, 2016. (Aamir Quereshi/AFP via Getty Images)
These attacks transcend xenophobia, as Baluchi nationals have targeted Chinese in recent years because the BLA and other groups view them as colonizers. This may be correct, as in 2017, there were reports that the China Pakistan Investment Corporation was planning to relocate as many as 500,000 Chinese nationals to Gwadar by 2023 under the 40-year lease of the port granted to China in 2017. While this mass migration did not happen, a continuing influx of Chinese to the port is changing the region’s demographics.
As reported in the Balochistan Post in August 2023, “Baloch nationalists and ‘pro-independence’ groups vehemently opposed [CPEC], labeling it as an ‘imperialist’ project to exploit the natural resources of Balochistan, and issued numerous warnings to China to roll back from the region.”
Sporadic attacks have continued to the present day, and according to The Guardian, “in 2023, a total of 10 Pakistani soldiers and security personnel were killed in three separate attacks in Balochistan.”

Concluding Thoughts

While Baluchi separatists have long pursued an independent Baluchistan through an ongoing insurgent campaign, the Chinese presence in Baluchistan associated with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor initiative has been a lightning rod for attacks in recent years. Insurgent attacks by Baluchi separatist groups are unlikely to abate as the Chinese presence in Gwadar province grows over time. There will almost certainly be more of them as Baluchi resentment grows.

What measures might Pakistan and China implement to deal with their “problem”? Pakistan and China have a 74-year history of economic, military, and diplomatic cooperation and share similar experiences with indigenous populations who are yearning for independence and who have suffered the harsh consequences of taking matters into their own hands. It is convenient for both governments to label their actions against Baluchis and Uyghurs (and others) as “anti-terrorism.” The likelihood that either government will publicly condemn the other’s actions against minority groups is nil.

No wonder former Pakistani Ambassador Babar Amin made common cause with China’s “Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure mechanism” associated with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The question is, what did he mean by the phrase “non-traditional security cooperation”? Could it be a hint at the use of unconventional methods that are against the Geneva Convention? The communist Chinese could teach graduate courses on the use of reeducation camps and other unlawful methods.

Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
Stu Cvrk retired as a captain after serving 30 years in the U.S. Navy in a variety of active and reserve capacities, with considerable operational experience in the Middle East and the Western Pacific. Through education and experience as an oceanographer and systems analyst, Cvrk is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, where he received a classical liberal education that serves as the key foundation for his political commentary.
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