After the end of the Cold War, the United States didn’t much care what happened in Latin America as long as it was not itself threatened. Almost the entirety of Latin America was in the hands of left-wing governments for some time, though apart from the transmission of lethal drugs from China and elsewhere through Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico into the United States, little occurred that provoked the Americans.
The most positive aspect of these seismic shifts in the political life of Latin America is that almost all of them have been the result of constitutional processes and elections. The history of Latin America was replete with military coups and juntas that governed Argentina until 1982, Brazil until 1985, and Chile until 1990. It should be emphasized that the South American military normally appeared in tunics so overloaded with medals and ribbons they had difficulty getting them on, yet practically none of them ever exchanged a shot in genuine military activity. Most of their offensives and maneuvers had been conducted in the officers’ clubs.
The progress of democratic political institutions in the last 35 years in most of Latin America has been conspicuous and gratifying, and has generally proved itself capable of absorbing and rejecting within a frequently fragile but adequate constitutional framework profound moves to the political left and right. There has been great progress: Brazil was only 53 percent literate in 1968, and the equivalent number today is 95 percent.
Guerrilla warfare, which was widespread for many decades, has almost stopped, after the efforts of Castro’s disciple Che Guevara in Bolivia, which led to Guevara’s capture and execution in 1967. There was a prolonged civil war in Colombia, La Violencia, which became mixed up in the activities of ferocious drug gangs as well. These disturbances have subsided considerably.
Argentina is an instructive case, as it was one of the most prosperous countries in the world up to World War I, and even at the end of World War II had a standard of living very close to Canada’s. It was largely built by British investment as part of Britain’s pursuit and promotion of Argentinian wheat and beef. After the end of World War I, Britain was economically exhausted and could not devote as much capital to the growth of Argentina as previously. With the removal of the steady hand of British influence and capital, political militarism and demagogy prevailed and reached their apogee with Gen. Juan Domingo Peron. Despite Peron being evicted in 1955 and recalled in 1973, and his widow succeeding him on his death in 1974 and her eviction in 1976, Peronism remained popular in Argentina until the last few years. The British victory in the Falkland Islands in 1982 was required to send the generals who deposed Peron’s widow packing.
Mexico, the most populous Latin American country next to Brazil, after 100 years of tumultuous history settled down to straight six-year terms of the single real political party in the country, the Revolutionary Institutional Party, which ruled from 1929 to 2000 and is back again. For the most part, it produced tolerably orderly and not overly oppressive government, and Mexico’s progress was better than most Latin American countries. But with the extreme profusion of violent narco-crime in the northern provinces and the drift to the left under former president Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Mexico lost ground. There are signs of hope that the current president, Claudia Sheinbaum, although a committed leftist, is susceptible to reason on the most important issues.
President Trump imposed increased tariffs on Brazil because he objected to the imprisonment of President Bolsonaro. The U.S. administration would be as delighted at his son’s victory as at the success of Javier Milei in Argentina.
All of Latin America is at a turning point.
