Broken by Design: Why the CCP Never Keeps Its Deals—and Why This One Won’t Be Different

U.S. Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick waves as he arrives at Lancaster House, on the second day scheduled for trade talks between the United States and China, in London on June 10, 2025. Reuters/Toby Melville

Commentary

In early 2025, the United States and China signed what was touted as a breakthrough: a new trade deal, a temporary easing of tariffs, and a tentative return to stability. The Geneva Accord, as it was quickly dubbed, generated headlines across global markets. But beneath the surface, one question lingered—quietly among officials, loudly among skeptics:

How long will this deal last before Beijing breaks it?

To ask the question is not to be cynical. It’s to be historically literate.

Because the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) doesn’t just have a bad track record of breaking international agreements. It has a consistent one.

A Pattern Hiding in Plain Sight

The CCP has developed a repeatable model: sign agreements under pressure, violate them once leverage shifts, then deny any wrongdoing while blaming the other party. This cycle has played out across multiple domains—trade, diplomacy, technology, academia, and security. The result isn’t just broken promises. It’s structural risk.

Consider China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. Western leaders saw it as a milestone for reform. In return for market access, China promised to end industrial subsidies, open up sectors to competition, and follow transparent trade practices.

Instead, the CCP fortified its command economy. State-owned enterprises continued to enjoy subsidies. Tariff barriers were replaced with bureaucratic obstacles. And in sectors such as rare-earth minerals, Beijing strategically restricted exports while demanding foreign companies localize production and surrender technology.

When China faced its first major WTO challenge—over those same rare-earth restrictions—it lost. But it also learned: Breaking the rules has a long grace period and very little cost.

The Phase One Illusion

Fast forward to 2020. Amid escalating trade tensions, the Trump administration signed the so-called Phase One agreement with China. The deal required Beijing to dramatically increase its imports of U.S. goods, protect intellectual property, and curb forced technology transfers.

What followed was a now-familiar pattern. According to data from the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, China failed to meet its purchase commitments by more than $200 billion. Industrial espionage continued. U.S. firms still found themselves coerced into partnerships that gave their Chinese counterparts an inside look at proprietary technologies.

Even as U.S. officials issued reports documenting noncompliance, Beijing’s official line remained unchanged: Everything is fine, and any issues are Washington’s fault.

Europe and Asia: Not Just an American Problem

The CCP’s pattern doesn’t discriminate by continent.

In 2020, the European Union and China concluded the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment after years of negotiation. The ink wasn’t dry before China imposed sanctions on European lawmakers who criticized its treatment of Uyghurs. The European Parliament froze ratification, and the agreement remains in limbo today.

In Southeast Asia, China has promised for more than two decades to finalize a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea with ASEAN nations. Yet during this same period, Beijing has militarized artificial islands and expanded its maritime claims at the expense of Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia—all while continuing “negotiations.”

For smaller states in the region, bilateral memoranda of understanding with China have become Trojan horses—promises of infrastructure or trade in exchange for political silence and economic dependency.

Beyond Trade: The Non-Economic Betrayals

The CCP’s selective compliance extends into science, culture, and security.

In 2015, China agreed to refrain from state-sponsored cybertheft for commercial gain. Within a year, U.S. intelligence agencies reported a full resumption of hacking operations targeting U.S. companies and defense contractors.

In academia, Beijing launched Confucius Institutes promising cultural exchange and language learning. In practice, these became instruments of censorship and surveillance, leading to dozens of closures worldwide.

And in the case of Hong Kong, the most blatant breach: A 1984 treaty with Britain promised “one country, two systems” for 50 years. That promise was nullified by a single law passed in 2020, criminalizing dissent and ending the city’s autonomy decades ahead of schedule.

These are not random incidents. They reflect a worldview in which agreements are tools of tactical advantage—not binding frameworks of mutual respect.

Deals as Delay Tactics

There’s a term in the Islamic world: hudna—a tactical cease-fire used not to end conflict, but to regroup for a later attack. The CCP’s approach to diplomacy echoes this logic.

To be clear: The CCP is a state actor with global influence and a seat at the United Nations Security Council. But when a regime consistently signs agreements as a means to buy time, manipulate headlines, or fracture alliances, it behaves more like a revolutionary force than a rules-based partner.

Which raises the deeper question: Why does the international community keep treating these agreements as if they are made in good faith?

The Real Risk Isn’t the Broken Deal—It’s What Happens Next

The real problem with the new U.S.–China trade deal isn’t that it might fail. It’s what happens when it does.

Because the next time that China restricts rare-earth exports—or limits the flow of magnets critical to electric vehicles and missile systems—it won’t be a diplomatic crisis. It will be a supply chain shock. And if the United States hasn’t already diversified, reshored, or partnered with trustworthy allies to build redundancy, the consequences could be devastating.

This is what separates the CCP’s deal-breaking from conventional disputes: The risk is not theoretical. It’s physical, economic, and immediate.

Can Washington Adapt?

Some may argue that this time will be different—because U.S. leadership is different. That a second Trump administration plays harder, monitors better, and retaliates faster.

But the CCP doesn’t need you to be naive. It only needs you to be overconfident.

Even strong leaders who negotiate from a position of leverage still face a party-state system that excels at delay, obfuscation, and retaliation through unofficial channels. By the time a violation becomes visible, the damage is already done—and the blame, often, has been successfully deflected.

What Needs to Happen Now

Rather than betting on goodwill or strength alone, the United States must now plan for the inevitable. Assume that the deal will be broken sooner rather than later, and act now, with urgency.

That means, in part:

• Building domestic capacity in rare-earths, semiconductors, and pharmaceuticals.
• Setting automatic enforcement mechanisms with real penalties.
• Forging redundancy through allied supply chains, especially with India, Australia, Japan, and the European Union.
• Creating public visibility of trade flows and compliance metrics. The CCP is always afraid that its misdeeds will be publicly exposed.

In short, expect betrayal—and make it irrelevant.

Conclusion: A Test, Not Yet a Triumph

This latest trade deal isn’t a triumph of diplomacy. Yet. It’s a test of whether Washington has finally learned the rules of the game.

Because in any negotiation, the real question is not just what’s written on paper. It’s who you’re signing it with—and what they’ve done every time before.

History has already shown us the answer. Now it’s time to act like we believe it.