Commentary
On July 27, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin stated, “I am committed to pursuing a constructive, stable relationship with China, including stronger crisis communications with the People’s Liberation Army.” It’s a gesture, but entirely unrealistic. The more effort the United States puts into stabilizing the relationship, the more slack for China to change facts on the ground in its favor. Other performances, such as plans to send over two dozen U.S. F-22 stealth fighter jets to Asia for exercises, announced this week, are not enough.
China’s military planes almost daily invade Taiwan’s airspace. Beijing has humiliated senior Biden officials, including Secretary Austin, who China has thus far declined to grant a high-level audience. The military man shouldn’t have sought it in the first place. Austin ought instead to leave diplomacy to the diplomats, and focus on appearing fearsome. He can add to U.S. and Taiwan deterrence against Beijing by simply appearing more gruff, through an end to his pointless begging for a meeting with Beijing. That might get, with greater alacrity, the Washington-Beijing crisis communications that the Secretary seeks.
With China’s military buildup of missiles, troops, and ships opposite Taiwan, Beijing is increasing the rapidity and tenor of threats hurled in Taipei’s general direction. Without much concrete defensive response from the United States, experts are increasingly concerned that an amphibious invasion of Taiwan could come within the next five years.
Such an attack could, potentially, be met by a U.S. military defense of the island. The Taiwan Relations Act does require the U.S. military to plan and prepare for Taiwan’s defense, as well as sell weapons to Taiwan and engage with Taiwan’s leadership on security matters. However, many U.S. defense professionals are operating under a cloud of fear, and such a defense could escalate into a wider U.S.-China war. That unhappy prospect deters the United States from committing to Taiwan’s defense, ironically making war more likely. The lack of a U.S. commitment may also be aimed at encouraging Taiwan to maximize its own defense expenditures and military readiness.
The ambiguity eggs China on in its hope that military pressure, and possibly a military invasion, could put Taiwan under Chinese Communist Party (CCP) control. All of this bluster and ambiguity has some national security experts, including Ian Easton, author of “The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan’s Defense and American Strategy in Asia,” publicly unsure whether the United States and its allies would actually defend Taiwan militarily if China were to invade.