China’s No. 3 Military Chief’s Absence Stokes Speculation About Xi’s Grip on Power

Gen. He Weidong, a longtime ally of the CCP leader, has been missing from the public eye for almost two months.

Gen. He Weidong, vice chairman of China's Central Military Commission (CMC), attends the opening ceremony of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in Beijing on March 4, 2025. Pedro Pardo/AFP via Getty Images

News Analysis 

The mysterious disappearance of China’s third-ranked military leader is sparking questions about the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime’s stability.

Over the past month, Gen. He Weidong has missed at least three political events at which his presence was expected.

The general, a close ally of CCP leader Xi Jinping, is vice chairman of China’s Central Military Commission (CMC), which commands the country’s armed forces. He also holds a spot on the CCP’s elite politburo.

Most recently, He missed a Politburo study session on April 25. Footage broadcast by state television broadcaster CCTV showed that all Politburo members were present at the meeting, with the exception of top diplomat Wang Yi, who was on a Central Asia visit, and He.

So far, Beijing hasn’t offered any explanation of He’s status.

The absence has fueled speculation that the 68-year-old general has been caught up in an ongoing purge of the military, given that his unexplained absences are conspicuous ahead of the CCP leadership reshuffle that takes place every five years.

It also adds to the uncertainty surrounding the country’s defense establishment, after a litany of military command purges that have raised questions about the CCP’s ability to wage a war and the overall stability of its leadership.

He’s most recent public appearance was on March 11, when he attended the closing ceremony of the party’s rubber-stamp legislature in Beijing.

Beijing has neither confirmed nor denied any of the speculation regarding its third top commander.

China’s defense ministry previously said that it was “not aware” of reports that He was under scrutiny. During a monthly news briefing on April 24, the ministry dodged a question about the general’s status.

“We have responded to this question before,” Zhang Xiaogang, the ministry’s spokesman, told reporters in Beijing.

For analysts monitoring China’s political landscape, the absence of an official denial only deepens the uncertainty surrounding the general’s fate.

In November 2024, in response to a Financial Times report citing unnamed current and former U.S. officials that China’s current defense minister, Adm. Dong Jun, was under investigation for corruption, the defense ministry’s spokesperson dismissed the claims as “purely fabrications“ spread by malicious rumor-mongers. To quash speculation about his status, the defense minister made a public appearance in December, hosting visiting defense officials from Africa.

China's Defence Minister Dong Jun attends a meeting with Vietnam's Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh and Chinese leader Xi Jinping at the Office of the Party Central Committee in Hanoi on April 14, 2025.Minh Hoang/POOL/AFP via Getty Images

If the speculation about He is confirmed, he would become the highest-ranking military figure targeted in the CCP’s decade-long campaign against corruption.

Analysts tracking the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) said such a purge would be especially troublesome for Xi, who elevated the commander to the military’s top rank, putting him ahead of other veteran military officials.

The general’s ties with Xi go back two decades to Fujian, a coastal province in southeastern China. He spent most of his early career serving in a PLA unit in Fujian and saw Xi rise through the ranks from local official to provincial governor.

Since Xi took power in late 2012, several military officers from that PLA unit, known as the 31st Group Army, have been fast-tracked for promotions.

Even so, the pace of He’s rise was exceptional, according to Wang Youqun, who once served as a copywriter for a senior member of the Party’s leadership.

In a commentary published in the Chinese language edition of The Epoch Times on May 1, Wang characterized He as “Xi’s No. 1 confidant” in the military and said the general ascended at “an extraordinary rate under the Chinese leader’s patronage.”

In the 19th National Congress in 2017, He was not among the list of more than 100 alternates to the party’s Central Committee.

During the 20th Party Congress five years later, He essentially jumped three grades, becoming a full member of the Central Committee and making it into the body’s leadership panel, the Politburo. He also became one of the two generals serving as vice chair of the CMC, bypassing the usual step of being an ordinary member first.

Should He be removed, it would “be a signature event that signals Xi Jinping’s waning grip over the armed forces,” Wang said in his commentary.

Fall of Xi’s Allies

He’s absence comes at a time when Xi’s core leadership team within the military has suffered multiple blows.

Adm. Miao Hua, who oversaw the military’s loyalty to the Party as an ally of Xi, has been removed as a delegate to the CCP-run legislature, Beijing revealed on April 30.

Although authorities haven’t provided an explanation for Miao’s departure, experts have said that the removal indicates progress in the investigation of the admiral.

China’s defense ministry said in November 2024 that Miao was suspended from office and placed under investigation for “serious violations of discipline,” a term that often refers to corruption or disloyalty.

Miao, who also served in the 31st military unit during the 1990s, is considered by China observers to be a close ally of Xi. Before his suspension, Miao held a role as an ordinary member of the CMC and as director of the Political Work Department for seven years. The department oversees political indoctrination and plays a key role in determining the promotion of senior military officers.

Adm. Miao Hua (C), China's director of the political affairs department of the Central Military Commission, disembarks his aircraft after arriving at Pyongyang International Airport on October 14, 2019. Kim Won Jin/AFP via Getty Images

As of May 6, Miao’s name remained on a list of CMC members on the Ministry of Defense’s website, although other references to Miao had been scrubbed from the website.

If Miao were dismissed from the CMC, the current commission would be left with just four members under the chairman, Xi.

There is already a vacancy in the CMC, created by the fall of Li Shangfu, who was removed as defense minister in October 2023, following two months of unexplained disappearances. Li was eventually expelled from the Party in June 2024 and was accused of accepting massive bribes and “severely polluting” the military equipment sector and companies.

Xi’s Waning Control

CCP leaders have long viewed their control over the armed forces as crucial to maintaining their grip on power. Mao Zedong, the party’s paramount leader, famously proclaimed that power grows from the barrel of a gun.

Xi has used the anti-corruption campaign to assert his control over the military and advance a modernization drive aimed at transforming the PLA into a world-class armed force capable of fighting a war, experts say.

The purges have taken down some powerful figures in the military who opposed Xi’s rule, clearing the way for him to elevate officers whom analysts considered to be closely associated with Xi.

Over the past two years, however, the anti-graft drive has also ensnared Xi’s allies, including high-ranking officers such as Miao and Li. Such developments have led to questioning of the stability of Xi’s hold over the military.

Overseas dissidents question whether Xi might be facing an internal power struggle, particularly with Gen. Zhang Youxia, China’s second-highest ranking military official, who remains in his position at 74—well beyond the expected retirement age of 68.

Vice chairman of the Central Military Commission Gen. Zhang Youxia leaves after delivering his speech during the opening ceremony of the 19th Western Pacific Naval Symposium in Qingdao, China's Shandong province on April 22, 2024. Wang Zhao/AFP via Getty Images

Given the secrecy of China’s opaque political system, analysts find it challenging to assess the true situation.

Regardless of who gave the orders to remove the senior officials, the fall of military elites—including Xi’s close associates—poses an embarrassment for the Chinese leader, according to Edward Huang, a Taiwan-based media personality.

“I think Xi Jinping’s hold over the military isn’t as strong as it used to be, that’s for sure,” Huang told The Epoch Times.

Huang and other analysts are watching for any signs of power shifts that may surface during upcoming CCP meetings, particularly a secret conclave known as the fourth plenum.

China typically holds seven plenums between Party Congresses, with the fourth one traditionally tasked with addressing personnel matters. Party leaders have yet to announce the date for this meeting, although it is supposed to take place before the end of 2024.

With only two years left for the 21st Party Congress, an event to see the transition from the current generation of leaders to the next, the groundwork for the handover often begins years in advance.

Taiwan

The uncertainty within the upper echelons of the Chinese military comes as tensions between Beijing and Washington continue to escalate, raising concerns that the CCP may attack Taiwan to divert attention from its economic woes under U.S. tariffs.

Taiwanese experts have said that instability at the top levels of the Chinese military could affect Beijing’s strategy for Taiwan, a self-ruled island that Xi has pledged to bring under CCP control.

“Xi Jinping has the capacity to launch an attack [against Taiwan], but once he pushes the button on war, he risks losing power, a gamble he’s not willing to take,” Huang said.

Huang pointed out that the missing Chinese general had previously served as the commander of the PLA’s Eastern Theater, responsible for overseeing operations in Taiwan and the East China Sea.

He was believed to have played a key role in planning live fire drills around Taiwan in August 2022, in retaliation for a brief visit to the island by then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.), according to a U.S. Defense Department assessment released in December 2024.

A Taiwan Air Force Mirage 2000 fighter jets prepares to land at the Hsinchu Airbase in Hsinchu on April 2, 2025. The Chinese military announced new exercises on April 2, in sensitive waters near Taiwan, in a second consecutive day of drills around the self-ruled island it claims as its own. I-Hwa Cheng/AFP via Getty Images

Shen Ming-Shih, a research fellow at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, a think tank funded by the Taiwanese government, said internal power struggles within the Chinese military could push Beijing into initiating a conflict to shift attention, although he predicted that the conflict would be brief.

Alternatively, Shen told The Epoch Times, the power struggles could lead to policy chaos, undermining China’s capacity to wage war. In this scenario, the CCP “would lack the capacity to start any external conflict or war until internal issues are sorted out,” he said.

Nonetheless, Shen said the power struggles present an opportunity to end communist rule in China, especially if the United States gets involved.

Luo Ya contributed to this report.