The Epoch Times has compiled the following timeline on Winnipeg lab scientists Xiangguo Qiu and Keding Cheng, based on information in the newly released 600-page package related to their firing and complemented with open-source information.
The two, who are a couple, were escorted out of the National Microbiology Laboratory (NML) in Winnipeg on July 5, 2019, amid an RCMP investigation and subsequently fired on Jan. 20, 2021.
A timeline infographic can be seen here, as well as at the end of this article.
1996
Xiangguo Qiu, a graduate of Hebei Medical University and Tianjin Medical University, moves to Canada from China to pursue graduate studies.1997/1998
Keding Cheng, a biologist and Ms. Qiu’s husband, immigrates to Canada from China.2003
Ms. Qiu starts work at the high-security NML in Winnipeg. She would move up to eventually hold the position of head of vaccines and antivirals at the lab by the time she was fired in 2021. She was also an adjunct professor at the University of Manitoba.2006
Mr. Cheng starts work at the NML as a biologist. His last position was within the proteomic and mass spectrometry unit at the time he was fired in 2021.2012
CSIS information says Ms. Qiu has worked on multiple research projects and papers since 2012 with an individual or entity (redacted) that “works closely with the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] to acquire Western technologies.”2013
The head of the Institute of Microbiology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, and the Chinese Center for Disease Control visits NML, hosted by Ms. Qiu. This episode is cited as part of a nomination for Ms. Qiu for a 2016 “international cooperation award” in China, noting that she “consulted with the leaders and experts of both China and Canada on matters related to cooperation, and provided the Chinese side with the Ebola genetic sequence, which opened a door of convenience for China.”Mr. Cheng begins an application for the “Science and Technology Innovation Talent Program of Henan Province.” The request was for $720,000 in funding for a project taking place between 2014 and 2018. The program requires candidates to “passionately love the socialist motherland [People’s Republic of China].” It is not clear if Mr. Cheng submitted the application. According to CSIS, China’s “talent programs” incentivize economic espionage and intellectual property theft.
2014
Mr. Cheng starts hosting international students from China.2016
Ms. Qiu is nominated by a senior Chinese military general for an “international cooperation award.” The military leader appears to be Maj. Gen. Chen Wei, who is in charge of research on biosafety, biodefence, and bioterrorism, among other topics, for the Chinese military.The nomination notes that Ms. Qiu collaborated with the director of the Academy of Military Medical Sciences (AMMS), who is likely Maj. Gen. Zhang Shitao. It also indicates that Ms. Qiu “used Canada’s Level 4 Biosecurity Laboratory as a base to assist China to improve its capability to fight highly-pathogenic pathogens … and achieved brilliant results.”
April 2016
Ms. Qiu’s CV for Chinese audiences shows she started work as a visiting professor at the Beijing Institute of Biotechnology at this time. The university is used by the PLA for the study of advanced biological technology.October 2016
Ms. Qiu publishes a paper with Major Gen. Chen on an Ebola vaccine. The technology in the paper is later used by CanSino to develop a COVID-19 vaccine, as first reported by The Epoch Times. Canada attempted to acquire the vaccine in 2020 but was blocked by Beijing.2017-2022
According to CSIS, China’s key national R&D priorities for this time period include “supporting national defence research projects by transforming the results of basic civil research into military applications.” CSIS cites Ms. Qiu’s paper co-written with individuals linked to the Academy of Military Medical Sciences (AMMS) in China. The agency adds that the tasks of AMMS include the development of “military biotechnologies, biological counter-terrorism and the prevention and control of major diseases.”2017
Sometime in 2017, Ms. Qiu submits a paper to Virologica Sinica, official journal of the Chinese Society for Microbiology. The paper became copyright property of the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV).January 2017
Ms. Qiu’s CV for Chinese audiences shows she started work as a visiting research fellow at the National Institutes for Food and Drug Control (China).March 31, 2017
Ms. Qiu gives a presentation on the Ebola vaccine at WIV. CSIS notes that although she was approved by the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC), which is in charge of NML, to travel to China between March 24 and April 8, 2017, there’s no record that she was approved to visit WIV.
Sept. 20-Oct. 1, 2017
With approval from PHAC, Ms. Qiu provides training at WIV. During her time there, she discussed her application for China’s Thousand Talents Program with WIV employees. According to CSIS, WIV’s leaders believe her application for the talent program is “very important for our institute’s future development.” CSIS says Ms. Qiu started her application to the talent program in October.Oct. 17, 2017
Ms. Qiu is listed as an inventor on a patent filed in China without the knowledge of PHAC management. The patent is related to an inhibitor for the Ebola virus.December 2017
A WIV senior technician, who later also works at the NML, applies for and receives a “secret security clearance” at the WIV.Dec. 13, 2017-Jan. 9, 2018
Ms. Qiu advises a Chinese research student to apply for a visitor visa instead of a work permit, as is legally required, to make it easier for the student to enter Canada. In interviews with investigators, Ms. Qiu denied having committed immigration fraud.Jan. 8, 2018
Ms. Qiu seeks Mr. Cheng’s advice on the Chinese student’s work permit issue.February 2018
The senior technician from WIV joins the University of Manitoba and NML under the supervision of Ms. Qiu. CSIS mentions the hiring of the technician as part of an agreement between Ms. Qiu and the WIV, which included providing “research expenses, instruments and equipment, research assistance,” and other items to “guarantee the normal operation of [Ms. Qiu’s] scientific and research work.”April 2018
Ms. Qiu travels to China on a flight ticket booked by CanSino.May 2018
A package from China, labelled “kitchen utensils,” is delivered to the Winnipeg lab addressed to Mr. Cheng. The package turns out to contain mouse protein. Mr. Cheng said shipping brokers sometimes use different labellings to ease shipping. He said the package was from a Chinese scientist whom he met in China while on vacation. The scientist was studying Hepatitis.May 18, 2018
Ms. Qiu receives the Governor General’s Innovation Award for co-developing a treatment for the Ebola virus.May 30, 2018
Ms. Qiu asks NML management about shipping Ebola and Nipah virus strains to WIV, saying she had been contacted by the lab with the request.
June 2018
Ms. Qiu signs an application to work on a “Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) Advanced Customer Cultivation Project” with WIV. The project, to take place between Jan. 1, 2019, and Dec. 31, 2021, was meant to establish “mouse-adapted and guinea pig-adapted Ebola viruses (EBOV), with the aim of rescuing both adapted viruses through reverse genetics for study / production of mRNA vaccines.” Ms. Qiu and WIV’s vice-director were named as project designers and managers for the project, and the WIV senior technician, who was also working at NML at the time, was tasked to work on mRNA vaccine construction.Project documents included a note that NML management shouldn’t be informed about the project, as WIV was in the process of requesting pathogen transfers from the Canadian lab.
At least five of the 15 virus strains that the NML later shipped to the WIV were referenced in this project, which suggests that they were to be used for this project, the documents say.
July 2018
Ms. Qiu discusses shipment of Ebola and Nipah viruses from the Winnipeg lab to the Wuhan lab in emails with WIV employees. She says a formal agreement is not necessary as “no one owns the IP,” adding that “hope there is another way around.”Ms. Qiu’s CV for Chinese audiences shows she started work as a visiting professor at the Hebei Medical University at this time.
August 2018
The NML alerts CSIS of Ms. Qiu and Mr. Cheng potentially being exploited by a foreign actor.Sept. 14, 2018
Internal emails among NML management on WIV’s virus sample request says: “They are requesting material from us due to collaboration with dr. Qiu. Historically it’s also been easier to obtain material from us as opposed to US labs.”Sept. 27, 2018
National Security Management Division, in charge of security for PHAC and Health Canada (HC), is alerted to Ms. Qiu’s patents in China, flagging intellectual property (IP) concerns. CSIS is also made aware.October 2018
Ms. Qiu conducts a workshop on biosafety for a group of 30 individuals at the WIV, with the expenses covered by the lab. The activity was not pre-approved by PHAC before her travel to China.Ms. Qiu’s CV for Chinese audiences shows she started work as a visiting research scientist at WIV at this time.
Ms. Qiu accepts an invitation to be a member of the International Advisory Committee for the Wuhan P4 lab.
Oct. 12, 2018
In an unauthorized move, the WIV senior technician attempts to remove tubes from the Winnipeg lab.As well, security flags that three restricted visitors were left unescorted at the NML.
Oct. 18, 2018
WIV provides a Material Transfer Agreement to NML for the shipment of Nipah and Ebola virus strains.Oct. 19, 2018
Ms. Qiu visits WIV.
Oct. 31, 2018
A restricted visitor attempts to remove a styrofoam container from the NML.Nov. 2, 2018
PHAC approves WIV’s request for shipment of Nipah and Ebola strains.Dec. 21, 2018
The National Security Management Division hires a security firm, Presidia, to investigate Ms. Qiu and Mr. Cheng.Jan. 11, 2019
Ms. Qiu is listed as an inventor on a patent filed in China without the knowledge of PHAC management. The patent is on a detection method related to a test for the Marburg virus.Jan. 27, 2019
Mr. Cheng enters the wrong code to access one of the labs at NML. The code belonged to another employee.Feb. 12, 2019
In reference to one of the Chinese patents, an NML official tells investigators it’s possible that research from the lab was used for its development.March 23, 2019
PHAC/HC’s National Security Management Division issues its fact-finding report on Ms. Qiu and Mr. Cheng.March 31, 2019
NML ships 15 different strains of Nipah and Ebola viruses to WIV.Spring 2019
Ms. Qiu is signed on to another WIV project with the WIV vice-director and the WIV senior technician working at the NML. The project involves using “reverse genetics in order to create synthetic virus strains,” which is used to “assess cross-species infection and pathogenic risks of bat filoviruses for future vaccine development purposes.” CSIS says this suggests gain-of-function studies, which have high biosafety risks, “were possibly to take place.” The project, with a funding of $50,000 per year, was to take place from June 2019 to May 2021.June 10, 2019
CSIS says it “reopened” an investigation into Ms. Qiu and Mr. Cheng at this time.June 20, 2019
Ms. Qiu asks affiliation with the Academy of Military Medical Sciences be removed when editing a paper by one of her students.July 5, 2019
Ms. Qiu, Mr. Cheng, and their students from China are escorted out of the NML by RCMP. It is revealed that the RCMP is investigating the issue.PHAC sends letters to Ms. Qiu and Mr. Cheng to inform them that they are suspended with pay pending an administrative investigation.
July 12, 2019
University of Manitoba suspends ties with Ms. Qiu and Mr. Cheng.Feb. 5, 2020
PHAC/HC’s National Security Management Division issues its administrative investigation report on Ms. Qiu and Mr. Cheng.The following are among the items highlighted: Ms. Qiu’s unsanctioned work with Chinese entities; NML project manager being surprised to learn of the scope and breadth of her projects; Mr. Cheng downloading material to an unsanctioned external hard drive from the lab network; Mr. Cheng working on the tick virus with China without lab management knowledge; Mr. Cheng continuing to provide access to NML’s secure network through his own credentials to restricted visitors despite being warned not to do so; and Mr. Cheng not being honest in his statements to investigators.
Feb. 19, 2020
PHAC sends letters to Ms. Qiu and Mr. Cheng providing the findings of the administrative investigation conducted in relation to allegations made against them. PHAC tells the two scientists they have to attend a mandatory review meeting and lets them know of the potential disciplinary actions, including termination.March 19, 2020
CSIS interviews Ms. Qiu.March 20, 2020
CSIS interviews Mr. Cheng.April 9, 2020
CSIS submits reports on Ms. Qiu and Mr. Cheng to PHAC.The following are among the revelations: Both scientists co-authored a paper with people associated with PLA’s “offensive chemical and biological weapons” capabilities; Ms.Qiu was not “fully truthful” in her responses to CSIS; restricted visitors under their supervision attempted to remove Government of Canada property from the NML; real possibility that PHAC propriety and sensitive research could end up in the hands of “foreign threat actors and used for nefarious purposes.”
June 30, 2020
CSIS submits to PHAC an updated assessment of Ms. Qiu, under the CSIS Act.The following are among the points included: Ms. Qiu has a close and clandestine relationship with a variety of PRC entities and has not disclosed them; her “reckless” judgment could have “impacted public safety and interests of Canada”; she was associated with multiple PRC “talent programs,” some of them paying tens of thousands of dollars per month—the programs are focused on IP theft and espionage; Ms. Qiu had numerous undisclosed engagements with WIV, including agreeing to work two months each year at the lab as part of a “talent program”; among the stated work arrangements at WIV was starting a series of research topics “using China’s disease source as advantage”; a restricted visitor was from a Chinese military university, has been seen in military attire, and lived in one of Ms. Qiu’s and Mr. Cheng’s properties; Ms. Qiu “intentionally transferred scientific knowledge and materials to China,” gave access to two employees of a PRC institution “whose work is not aligned with Canadian interests,” and didn’t respect proper protocols in transfer of pathogens to China; Ms. Qiu is a threat to the security of Canada.
July 7, 2020
CSIS submits to PHAC an updated assessment of Mr. Cheng under the CSIS Act.The following are among the points included: Mr. Cheng applied for a “talent program”; he wasn’t truthful in his responses to CSIS; he is a threat to the security of Canada.
Aug. 20, 2020
PHAC sends letters to Ms. Qiu an Mr. Cheng, notifying them of suspension of their security status pending a Review for Cause.Oct. 19, 2020
PHAC sends Ms. Qiu and Mr. Cheng letters informing them of their Review for Cause related to their employment.Jan. 19, 2021
PHAC sends letters to Ms. Qiu and Mr. Cheng informing them that their personnel security clearance has been revoked.Jan. 20, 2021
Ms. Qiu and Mr. Cheng are fired from the PHAC/NML.
