The federal government is taking steps to protect sensitive research from foreign countries that pose a threat to national security by identifying key technological sectors at risk and blacklisting specific research institutions, the vast majority of which are based in China.
The new Policy on Sensitive Technology Research and Affiliations of Concern was announced by Industry Minister François-Philippe Champagne, Health Minister Mark Holland, and Public Safety Minister Dominic Leblanc on Jan. 16.
“While Canadian-led research is defined by its excellence and collaborative nature, its openness can make it a target for foreign influence, increasing the potential risks for research and development efforts to be misappropriated to the detriment of national security,” the ministers said in a statement.
When the policy comes into force in the next few months, Canadian researchers seeking federal funding will need to determine whether their field of study has been identified as a “sensitive” technology area. Some of those fields include artificial intelligence, quantum computing, robotics, and life sciences.
If the research falls within one of these areas, no involved researchers can be affiliated with or receive support from a list of Named Research Organizations. If a researcher has some ties, they must be terminated for the project to be eligible for funding.
The government says the list will be kept updated and currently names 85 Chinese institutions, including universities that are part of the defence and security apparatus. It also comprises other major civilian universities identified as having links to the apparatus, including Tianjin University, the Harbin Institute of Technology, and the Beijing Institute of Technology.
The list also includes 12 institutions based in Iran, including the Imam Hossein University, and six universities based in Russia, such as the 48th Central Scientific Research Institute.
Even though only three countries are targeted, with China counting for the overwhelming majority of institutions, the policy states it remains “country-agnostic.”
‘Risk-Targeted Due Diligence’
The government announced its intention to implement such a policy in February 2023. Shortly after in April, it released its National Security Guidelines for Research Partnerships, seeking to “better position researchers, research organizations and Government funders to undertake consistent, risk-targeted due diligence of potential risks to research security.”The government says the new policy was developed in consultation with other departments, Canada’s federal granting councils, and Canada’s research community.
Government officials speaking to media about the policy said it will come into force in the coming months to give the research community time to “fully digest” the new measures and find replacement partners if needed.
The officials said they do not have “precise” information on the current level of activity from foreign researchers falling within the policy.
Asked by reporters about potential diplomatic blowback, the officials said the focus is on specific security and defence entities and not on particular countries. They also pointed out that research partnerships can still take place with the listed entities if they’re outside the scope of the identified sensitive technology areas.
“It’s not a blanket prohibition on engagement with those institutions,” said an official.
Past Affiliations
The new policy will only apply to foreign researchers with current affiliations to listed entities. Federal officials said the issue of past affiliations was part of discussions when developing the policy, as it could constitute a loophole.“There’s an arbitrary aspect in trying to draw a line to a particular moment in the past,” said an official about the issue. He said out of respect to researchers, the policy applies going forward and affiliations can be terminated before submitting a grant request.
“Granting agencies have had the power now for some time to terminate funding to a project that poses a risk to national security at a general level, so it is not that there was no action taken on those previous collaborative proposals.”
The denial had not been made on proof of Yuekang Li’s previous activities, but on the grounds that they could potentially happen. As part of his rationale, the immigration officer cited Mr. Li having attended Beihang, as well as the field of research and his stated intention to help China make progress in that field.
The Canadian government has been increasingly attuned to the theft of research and intellectual property, especially coming from the Chinese regime.
“Through perceived partnerships and collaborations, vital research and novel intellectual property is stolen. The PRC is by far the greatest perpetrator of these activities,” Canadian Security Intelligence Service Director David Vigneault told the House of Commons science and research committee on Nov. 22.
