New Zealand’s intelligence agency says China is the country’s only large-scale espionage threat.
According to the 2026 Security Threat Environment report released by the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) in August, foreign states and their proxies are targeting the country’s public and private sectors for intellectual property, innovative technology, and other non-public information—activity NZSIS describes as anything but “benign,” warning it could hand rivals a strategic advantage against the country and its partners.
While several states conduct espionage against New Zealand, the report singles out China as “the only country doing it at scale,” adding that Beijing’s intelligence services may be “the most active” of all.
Methods range from legitimate-seeming academic and commercial exchanges to cyber intrusions, front companies, and outright theft, with NZSIS forecasting that the activity will only intensify over the next year.
In a specific case, the agency has disclosed an attempt by a Chinese regime-linked organization to install ground-based satellite-tracking equipment (GBSE) in the country.
Two China experts say the report reflects a hardening in New Zealand’s posture toward Beijing.
Shen Ming-shih, a research fellow at Taiwan’s Institute for National Security and Defense Research, told The Epoch Times recently that the episode reflects a broader shift in New Zealand’s China policy—from one long focused primarily on economic ties to one now emphasizing counterespionage and military security concerns.
Feng Chongyi, an associate professor of China studies at the University of Technology Sydney, shares a view similar to Shen’s.
Feng said in a recent interview with The Epoch Times that New Zealand is increasingly adopting a “dual-track” approach—balancing trade ties with China against deepening security coordination with the United States and its Five Eyes allies.
The Satellite Case
The report names the organization behind the GBSE case as Purple Mountain Observatory, which NZSIS says attempted to install the equipment in New Zealand over the past year, working with a local company that was likely unaware of the equipment’s military intelligence value or who was ultimately receiving the data.
The observatory is directly linked to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
It operates as a subordinate institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS)—itself an agency directly under China’s State Council—and maintains an internal CCP party committee tasked with ensuring the observatory follows party directives.
CAS’s president, Hou Jianguo, simultaneously serves as the academy’s party secretary and as a member of the CCP’s 20th Central Committee; all 11 members of CAS’s top leadership are CCP members.
NZSIS assessed that while the observatory’s ties to the CCP mean it could be compelled to hand over any data collected, in this case, “it would have been willingly passed on.”
The agency also noted that this was not an isolated incident: the operation was not the first time this organization has attempted to install its own GBSI in New Zealand, and it is “unlikely to be the last,” the agency said.
The agency said such infrastructure carries strategic weight because New Zealand’s Pacific location allows tracking of satellites passing over the Asia-Pacific in a variety of orbits, with minimal radio-frequency interference and visual obstructions.
More broadly, NZSIS describes GBSI as equipment designed to track satellites and space debris, as well as for collecting a range of other scientific data—capabilities the report says are “attractive for foreign states seeking to advance military capabilities and intelligence operations.”
Pacific Implications for Five Eyes
Noting that the CCP has been aggressively jockeying for position in the South Pacific, Shen warned that if China succeeds in establishing GBSI infrastructure in the South Pacific, it would not only gain access to regional data but could also observe military deployments and naval movements by the United States, Australia, and New Zealand in the area.
“If it establishes [GBSI] facilities to track spacecraft and spy satellites in the South Pacific, that would effectively mean the CCP has already built a foothold there—and would be able to more closely monitor the military deployments and ship movements of countries like the United States, Australia, and New Zealand in the region,” Shen said.
“The CCP could intercept satellite signals related to military or intelligence matters between the Five Eyes alliance and New Zealand. That would obviously constitute a leak, or would lower the level of cooperation and overall advantage within the Five Eyes alliance.”
New Zealand is a member of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance alongside the United States, the UK, Australia, and Canada.
Broader Patterns of Interference by the CCP
The NZSIS report also details broader tactics used by the CCP to target New Zealand, noting that China remains the “most active” state in this activity, alongside other countries operating on a smaller scale.
According to the report, China’s military intelligence services have increasingly targeted professional networking sites and online job platforms, specifically seeking out current and former New Zealand government officials with access to classified or sensitive information.
Posing as consultants, think tank employees, or recruiters, Chinese intelligence officers vet candidates to gauge what information they hold and whether they might divulge it, sometimes paying them to write research papers to test the depth of their knowledge.
Successful candidates are then pressured to hand over privileged non-public information, often while being encouraged to keep their government jobs to maintain the flow of intelligence and open doors to recruit colleagues.
The report also warns that foreign state proxies use front companies, supply chain intermediaries, investment schemes, and recruitment drives to obtain sensitive technology, at times routing acquired goods through multiple countries to obscure the final destination.
The report further notes that China’s national security laws compel any individual or organization in China to comply with requests from its intelligence services, including handing over data or providing system access—a legal reality the report says businesses must factor into their risk calculations.
On the societal front, NZSIS flagged pressure campaigns targeting New Zealand’s ethnic diaspora communities, describing tactics such as threats against family members, denial of consular services, withheld passports or visas, and demands that diaspora members cease participating in specific protests or political activities.
Beyond a Simple Policy Adjustment
Feng argued that the report reflects something larger than routine diplomatic recalibration.
He noted that New Zealand itself possesses limited high-tech capability, but because it shares U.S. technology and intelligence, it must now align closely with Washington to close vulnerabilities—preventing China from exploiting the relatively open scientific, educational, and commercial channels within the Five Eyes network to access sensitive technology and intelligence that the United States and its allies are trying to keep out of Chinese hands.
“New Zealand’s evolving security posture toward China now extends well beyond a mere foreign-policy adjustment,” Feng said.
While China’s espionage activity in the South Pacific country “should not prevent New Zealand organizations from engaging or doing business with entities in that country,” the report states, “The broader use of coercive tools by states will likely be an emerging security challenge in the coming years, and we need to be alert to the risk.”
