MP Concerned Over Outdated Canadian National Security Policy, China Threat Omission

The MP says Canada’s National Security Policy hasn’t been updated since 2004, and doesn’t make any reference to authoritarian states such as China and Russia.

A sign for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service building is shown in Ottawa on May 14, 2013. The Canadian Press/Sean Kilpatrick

An MP has expressed concerns about Canada’s outdated National Security Policy and its notable omission of any reference to the security threats posed by the Chinese regime.

This issue came to light during the House of Commons Science and Research Committee meeting on Oct. 23.

Bloc Québécois MP Maxime Blanchette-Joncas pointed out that Canada’s sole National Security Policy was released in 2004, in response to the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, and has not been updated since. Additionally, he emphasized that the policy does not make any reference to authoritarian states such as China and Russia, compared to the United States, which routinely updates its National Defense Strategy with every new presidential administration.

“What signal does this send to our enemies and to our allies and to the population when we’re unable to update our national security with a policy that’s updated?” Mr. Blanchette-Joncas asked.

In response, Sébastien Aubertin-Giguère, the associate assistant deputy minister of National and Cyber Security at Public Safety Canada, acknowledged the need to renew and update the 2004 national security policy. However, he also noted that this lack of revision “doesn’t necessarily mean that the national security organization, the governments are not focusing on the right threats.”

“We’ve made a lot of efforts to change our position to make sure that we have the proper funding to have the capacity to defend ourselves from this threat,” Mr. Aubertin-Giguère said. He added, “I think we do have credibility with our allies.”

The House science committee has been examining security risks related to federal government research and development grants and funds to Canadian universities and research institutions engaged in partnerships with Chinese entities.

The investigation came amid concerns regarding Canadian universities’ partnerships with Chinese academic institutions linked to the regime’s military or other companies, such as Huawei. Security concerns have emerged due to reports of the regime’s attempts to steal intellectual property and engage in other malign activities. A number of Canadian universities have announced earlier this year that they will terminate or phase out their partnership with Huawei.

Mr. Aubertin-Giguère told the committee that, to the knowledge of Public Safety Canada, the Chinese regime does not directly fund Canadian universities. However, he noted that there “might be something private.”

Intellectual Property Theft

David Vigneault, director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), recently made a rare public appearance alongside all of his Five Eyes counterparts at a public forum in California on Oct. 17. During this event, hosted by the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, Mr. Vigneault underscored the threats presented by the Chinese Communist Party. He emphasized that the regime leverages the openness of Western democracies to engage in innovation and technology theft.

“We see the PRC [People’s Republic of China], the Chinese Communist Party passing legislation, to force any person of Chinese origin anywhere in the world to support their intelligence service,” he said. “It means they have ways of [coercing] people here, in each of our countries, anywhere, to essentially tell them and give them the secrets that you know.”

This warning was echoed by Nicole Giles, senior assistant deputy minister of Policy and Strategic Partnerships at CSIS, during her testimony before the House science committee. Ms. Giles also pointed to recently introduced Chinese law that empowers “PRC intelligence and law enforcement agencies to compel cooperation of firms and people.”

“That significantly changed the nature of the threat,” she said.

In response to another question about researchers in Canadian universities and their potential collaboration with laboratories in China, Ms. Giles noted that there are “continual efforts by PRC institutions and individuals to try to insert themselves into our universities’ research and projects.” However, she declined to disclose specific information, citing the need to protect CSIS’s investigative methods and privacy considerations.

“The reason we run our entire stakeholder engagement program is based on the premise that foreign actors are trying to interfere and influence our universities and the research outcomes, in addition to stealing valuable intellectual property,” she said.