Finland Charges Eagle S Oil Tanker Captain Over Undersea Cables Sabotage

Authorities said the cuts caused at least $70 million in immediate damage, for which the defendants deny being responsible.

Oil tanker Eagle S (L), which travels under the flag of the Cook Islands, next to tugboat Ukko (R) in the Gulf of Finland off Porkkalanniemi, Finland, on Dec. 28, 2024. Jussi Nukari/Lehtikuva/AFP via Getty Images

Finland’s national prosecutor’s office said on Aug. 11 that it had brought charges against the captain and first and second officers of the Cook Islands-registered Eagle S oil tanker over the cutting of undersea cables in the Gulf of Finland in December 2024.

Finnish authorities boarded the Russian-linked crude oil tanker on Dec. 26, 2024, to investigate the suspected sabotage of the Estlink-2 undersea power cable.

The Eagle S, which left Russia’s Ust-Luga with a cargo of oil products, is suspected of cutting five undersea cables in the Gulf of Finland by dragging its anchor on the seabed for about 90 kilometers (about 56 miles), Finland’s national prosecutor’s office said.

Finnish authorities said in a statement on Aug. 11 that in addition to preventing Finland from using the cables, the owners of the cables suffered at least 60 million euros (about $70 million) in immediate damages, in the form of repair costs alone.

“The disruption of electricity transmission and telecommunications cables with very high transmission capacity is also suspected to have caused a serious risk to energy supply and telecommunications in Finland, although services could be secured by using alternative connections,” the authorities stated.

The defendants have denied committing the offences and believe that Finland lacks jurisdiction in the case, as the incident took place outside Finnish territorial waters, according to the statement.

Even though the Eagle S is flagged in the Cook Islands, at the time that Finnish customs boarded the vessel, officials suspected that the tanker may have been part of a “shadow fleet” helping Russia evade international sanctions.

The damage to the Estlink-2 power cable followed similar incidents impacting undersea infrastructure in the Baltic Sea.

In November 2024, two telecommunications cables connecting Sweden and Denmark in the Baltic Sea were severed.

Telia Lietuva’s 135-mile cable between Lithuania and Sweden’s Gotland went offline on Nov. 17, 2024, at 8 a.m. GMT, followed by the 745-mile Cinia C-Lion1 cable linking Finland and Germany, which failed on Nov. 18, 2024, at 2 a.m. GMT.

A Chinese bulk carrier, Yi Peng 3, which had passed through the area in which the cables were cut, was wanted by Swedish authorities in relation to the incident. The Swedish foreign minister said in December 2024 that China refused its prosecutor full access to the vessel.

In April, a probe by the Swedish Accident Investigation Authority found no conclusive evidence to suggest that the Chinese ship had deliberately dragged its anchor to sever the cables.

In 2023, the Hong Kong-registered Newnew Polar Bear container ship was suspected of damaging an Estonia–Finland gas pipeline and two undersea cables connecting Estonia, Finland, and Sweden.

As a result, in January, NATO launched the Baltic Sentry mission, with eight other alliance nations in the area to protect undersea cables.

According to a recent report by The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) think tank, Russia’s dark fleet includes vessels engaged in “clear illicit activity,” such as deceptive shipping practices, fraudulent cargo documentation, and false-flagging.

Russia’s dark fleet has an estimated 1,600 vessels that continue to engage in illicit activity operations, the core of which is dedicated to Russia’s oil trade, according to the report.

Countries such as Gabon have played an increasingly prominent role in registering Russian-linked vessels.

The report said that while the deliberate severing of cables constitutes a hostile act, proving intent remains challenging.

This is because cable-severing incidents are common, with accidental damage occurring regularly as the result of anchor drags and fishing activity.

RUSI pointed to the 1884 Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables, saying it was never meant to deal with today’s hybrid threats.

“Under this framework, if a country discovers a Russian vessel interfering with cables, the prescribed legal procedure involves collecting evidence and referring the matter to Russia for action, an entirely unrealistic scenario given current geopolitical tensions,” RUSI stated.

Reuters and Ryan Morgan contributed to this report.