Feds Had Intel Beijing Was Funding Candidates Before 2019 Elections, Inquiry Hears

Feds Had Intel Beijing Was Funding Candidates Before 2019 Elections, Inquiry Hears
Commissioner Justice Marie-Josée Hogue listens during the Public Inquiry Into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions in Ottawa on April 2, 2024. (The Canadian Press/Sean Kilpatrick)
Noé Chartier
4/8/2024
Updated:
4/8/2024
0:00

An elections integrity body had intelligence before the 2019 general elections that the Chinese regime was providing funding to local races, but says it didn’t meet the threshold to warn the public.

Top public servants who were part of the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol (“panel of five”) testified to that effect at the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference on April 8.

Nathalie Drouin, who was part of the panel in her capacity as deputy minister of justice at the time, was asked to comment on a summary of intelligence about the Don Valley North Liberal Party nomination race in 2019. Han Dong had won the contest.

“There were irregularities in the nomination that may have included activities undertaken by individuals close to PRC [People’s Republic of China] Officials,” says the summary.

Ms. Drouin, currently the deputy clerk of the Privy Council and the prime minister’s national security and intelligence adviser, said Elections Canada had been warned about the intelligence because it contained allegations about funding.

The summary of intelligence on Don Valley North, prepared by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), does not mention any funding allegations. A separate CSIS summary released to the inquiry, however, does discuss illicit financing by Beijing.

The summary says that intelligence assessments (which are typically based on multiple reports) suggest Beijing-related threat actors had received financial support from China.

“There likely were at least two transfer of funds approximating $250,000 from PRC officials in Canada, possibly for FI[foreign interference]-related purposes, though most likely not in an attempt to covertly fund the 11 candidates,” it reads.

Ms. Drouin was asked whether she knew specifically about that specific transfer of funds allegation.

“I don’t recall receiving that level of granularities, that level of details,” she said. “I didn’t know about the fact that it was going to potentially 11 candidates. That report regarding this intel came after the election.”

Monik Beauregard, who was associate deputy minister of Public Safety at the time and a member of the panel of five, cautioned that the summary of intelligence is based on multiple reports, some of which were produced before the elections and some after.

“There is a lot of ambiguity here in this paragraph,” she said about the transfer of funds allegations.

“We were aware there were financial support allegations for some candidates,” she said, adding the panel had asked the security agencies to continue to closely track the situation.

While admitting being aware the federal government was aware of intelligence on foreign interference involving the transfer of funds, Ms. Beauregard said the panel determined it was not necessary to alert the public.

“Because it was clear that there was a lot of ambiguity and lack of clarity in terms of intent and purpose,” said Ms. Beauregard.

The Critical Election Incident Public Protocol is composed of five top bureaucrats who have the duty to determine whether the public should be alerted of threats to the integrity of elections.

Other evidence presented during the testimony of the panel includes an email from CSIS sent on Oct. 18, 2019, containing an intelligence report “relating to potential foreign interference.”

The report, sent three days before the 2021 electoral vote was held, was significant enough to mobilize the establishment.

Lyall King, chair of the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force, sent out an email on Oct. 21, 2019, providing a summary of who had received the intelligence. He said the Privy Council Office (PCO), sometimes referred to as the prime minister’s department, had been briefed over a secure line before its release.

A separate letter was also sent to Elections Canada, which after reception contacted PCO to discuss the reliability of the intelligence. Mr. King wrote that Elections Canada decided to have investigators with the Office of Canada Elections be briefed on the matter, with the briefing taking place on Oct. 19.

Additional details, such as the nature of the intelligence, were not provided during testimony.

Ms. Drouin only said the intelligence was related to the electoral process.

Commissioner of Canada Elections Caroline Simard told the inquiry on March 28 that her office is investigating potential breaches of the Canada Elections Act around several allegations of Chinese interference in the 2019 elections, including the nomination of Han Dong for the Liberal Party.

One of the allegations pertains to the Chinese consulate having transferred around $250,000 to help an unspecified candidate in the 2019 election.

Chief Electoral Officer Stéphane Perrault also testified at the inquiry on March 28 and said CSIS had warned him about the 2019 Liberal nomination contest in Don Valley North.

The public inquiry will complete its second hearings phase on April 10 with Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and other ministers taking the stand.

Commissioner Marie-Josée Hogue has to file an interim report by May 3.