Federal Court Judge Bars Chinese Student Due to Espionage Concerns

A University of Waterloo sign is seen at the main campus entrance in Waterloo, Ontario, on Oct. 17, 2020. (Shutterstock)

A broad definition of “espionage” must be applied to protect Canada’s interests as hostile states use non-conventional tactics, a Federal Court judge ruled in dismissing the application of a Chinese student who wanted to attend a Canadian university.

In a Dec. 22 decision, Chief Justice Paul Crampton ruled that an immigration officer was right in finding Yuekang Li inadmissible to Canada due to espionage concerns.

“As hostile state actors increasingly make use of non-traditional methods to obtain sensitive information in Canada or abroad, contrary to Canada’s interests, the Court’s appreciation of what constitutes ‘espionage’ must evolve,” wrote Justice Crampton.

Mr. Li had been accepted by the University of Waterloo to complete a Ph.D. in mechanical and mechatronics engineering. He applied for judicial review in January 2023 due to visa processing delays related to background checks and as the window was closing to join the program.

Immigration Canada did not link Mr. Li to nefarious activities in refusing him a visa and instead built a case around a number of different factors.

The visa officer noted that Mr. Li had studied at Beijing’s Beihang University, which has reported ties to the Chinese military, that he is studying in a field deemed to be a priority for the Chinese regime, and that he had a stated interest in helping China make progress in that field.

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“Having a specialization in an industry that the PRC [People’s Republic of China] has named as one of their top 10 targeted high-tech industries (biopharma and advanced medical products) raises concerns that the applicant may be targeted by the PRC for use in their non-traditional methods of espionage that could lead to information being provided to the PRC that is contrary to Canada’s interests,” wrote the immigration officer.

The decision was built around open-source information on the Chinese regime’s use of overseas students and scientists to collect sensitive commercial and military information, such as public reports by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS).

Mr. Li argued that the decision was unreasonable, claiming the officer applied an overly broad definition of “espionage” and that he misapprehended and ignored important evidence.

Mr. Li defined espionage as being clandestine in nature, done without the other party’s knowledge or consent, and directed by a foreign entity. For something to be considered espionage, the sensitive information being gathered should be secret in nature and not simply private, and the action should go against Canada’s interests, he argued.

Justice Crampton disagreed, saying jurisprudence supports a broader definition of espionage that includes simply reporting information to a foreign state to the detriment of Canada’s interests.

“At its most basic level, the concept of ‘espionage’ contemplates the secret, clandestine, surreptitious or covert gathering or reporting of information to a foreign state or other foreign entity or person,” he said.

Such activities make one inadmissible to Canada under section 34(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the judge said, “even if the information in question was gathered in public.”

The section states that a “permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on security grounds for ... engaging in an act of espionage that is against Canada or that is contrary to Canada’s interests.”

Attorney Raymond Lo, who represented Mr. Li, did not return a request for comment. He emphasized to the Globe and Mail that his client had not been accused of espionage.

“I think it is a shame that officers are refusing such talented individuals who have a lot to contribute to Canadian research based on what may possibly happen, largely relying on general reports rather than the individual’s past actions,” said Mr. Lo.

University of Waterloo spokesperson David George-Cosh told The Epoch Times the institution will “carefully” review the court’s decision, as it “contains helpful guidance on the government’s interpretation of risk that will help us in assessing applicants in future.”

He added the university relies on the federal government in matters of immigration and protection of national security. “We rely on their expertise and decision-making in cases such as these.”

Mr. Li’s proposed thesis supervisor at the university, Carolyn Ren, had provided him with a letter used in the case saying the field of study in microfluidics is not of interest for military applications and that her laboratory “has never done and will NOT do any research related to military applications.”

Justice Crampton said in his decision it was not unreasonable for the immigration officer to omit Ms. Ren’s letter.

“This is because the focus of the Officer’s concerns was on the PRC’s use of information he might provide, for its use in ‘biopharma and advanced medical products,’ which the Officer also described in terms of ‘new science, advanced technologies, and biomedical engineering and more,’” he wrote.

Increased Scrutiny

There has been increased scrutiny of late by Canada and its allies of attempts by Beijing to siphon research data from universities.

In a rare public forum in October, CSIS Director David Vigneault and his counterparts from the Five Eyes intelligence alliance discussed this specific threat.

“Everything that they’re doing in our universities and in new technology, it’s going back into a system very organized to create dual-use applications for the military,” he told the audience at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University on Oct. 17.

Meanwhile, the House of Commons science and research committee has been conducting an in-depth study into how Canadian universities have been partnering with Chinese ones, leading to the theft of intellectual property.

“Through perceived partnerships and collaborations, vital research and novel intellectual property is stolen. The PRC is by far the greatest perpetrator of these activities,” Mr. Vigneault told the committee on Nov. 22.

In related matters, a study published in October by the Frontier Assessments Unit identified 371 publications from collaborations between Toronto-based Canadian universities and seven Chinese universities tied to the military, including Beihang. The authors raised concerns about security implications for the Canadian institutions and national security.

The University of Toronto, the University of Waterloo, and Toronto Metropolitan University (formerly Ryerson), are mentioned multiple times in studies related to robotics, aeronautics, and other cutting-edge technology fields.

Andrew Chen contributed to this report.