Deadliest Peacekeeping Mission Ever
The head of MINUSMA declared on Dec. 9 that all personnel not affected by the “liquidation” will have left Mali by the Dec. 31 deadline. The U.N. mission in Mali has been the deadliest peacekeeping mission in the world, with more than 300 personnel killed. Many of those peacekeepers died because of improvised explosive devices, largely during road convoys.“The Malian terrain was vast and difficult,” Maj. Gen. Mamadou Gaye, commander of the 13,000-strong force, said during the closing ceremony in Bamako.
But Gen. Gaye still believes that the U.N. mission has been “very positive” and has given the body “a great deal of satisfaction,” even though it would have liked to have done more with the “limited resources” it had. He nonetheless expressed confidence in Mali’s security forces to resolve the security crisis.
“The Malian government’s request for withdrawal demonstrates its trust in [the Wagner Group] and its own defense forces: With the influence of insurgent groups rising steadily, it’s hard to imagine an environment that is safer for civilians moving forward,” Mr. Rousselle told The Epoch Times in an email.
The Wagner Group is a Russian state-funded private military company led until 2023 by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a former close ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Mr. Rousselle said the role of the U.N. mission became “obfuscated” over time.
MINUSMA Branded ‘Colonial Project’
Landlocked Mali has struggled to contain an Islamic extremist insurgency since 2012. Extremist rebels were forced from power in northern cities the following year with the help of French-led Operation Serval, later replaced by Operation Barkhane. But rebels regrouped in the desert and began launching attacks on the Malian army and its allies—which soon included the U.N. force. Mali’s government—which seized power after coups in 2020 and 2021—pushed out France’s counterinsurgency force in 2022 following a breakdown in relations with its former colonial power.“When it comes to the control of MINUSMA, most of the actors come from the West. So the military junta felt that in order to attack or counter Western influence in Mali, the best thing [was] to send MINUSMA packing,” Mr. Kwaja told The Epoch Times.
He explained that MINUSMA has often been viewed from the perspective of the United Nations—which itself is sometimes viewed from the perspective of the United States.
“That has been the way countries and other actors view peacekeeping operations across the world,” Mr. Kwaja said. “Mali and, by extension, the Sahel are very central to the fight against jihadist movements both in terms of the spread and the influence. The Sahel does not only host armed groups; it also serves as a transit point or training ground for these armed groups.”
Mr. Rousselle noted that the rise of insurgent groups preceded the U.N. mission and that they’re unlikely to disappear any time soon.
“We are already seeing signs of regional spillover, and the recent wave of coups across the region suggests the fragile nature of these states and their institutions,” he told The Epoch Times.
“The negative perception of the mission as a colonial project likely played a role in raising local sympathy for Islamic radicalism, thus the media campaign likely played a role in this regard.”
Mr. Rousselle blamed the “substantial” media campaign that equated the mission with the country’s colonial past and said evidence suggests that the Wagner Group was “heavily involved” in this media campaign, producing television and radio content as well as broad-based social media campaigns.
Officials Insist MINUSMA was ‘Remarkable’ Success
There are growing concerns that U.N. peacekeeping operations are increasingly becoming unwelcome in parts of Africa, where a majority of the missions operate. In September, Congo requested the withdrawal of the U.N. mission trying to contain violence in the eastern part of the country.U.N. officials have always held that MINUSMA’s mission wasn’t to fight jihadists. Its mandate, they’ve pointed out, was to support the implementation of a major peace agreement with northern separatists (non-jihadists); to help the Malian authorities stabilize the center, another source of violence; and to protect civilians and human rights.
He said MINUSMA carried out “many projects” in which the Malian state wasn’t present, claiming that this marked “a real difference” in the lives of hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of Malians.
Consequently, the effectiveness of MINUSMA depended in part on the cooperation of Malian actors, Mr. El Ghassim concluded.
The final nail in MINUSMA’s coffin was the 2020 military takeover in Mali. The junta broke the old alliance with the former dominant power, France, and turned militarily and politically toward Russia.
The U.N. openly denounced flight bans and other obstructions by the military junta, causing the latter to protest against the “instrumentalization” by MINUSMA of human rights.
“Most Malians did not understand this, as the government misled them,” Mr. Keenan told The Epoch Times in an email.
He affirmed that MINUSMA did most of its mandated jobs well under “near-impossible” conditions.
“But, it showed the poor governance and corruption of the pre-coup government. After the coup, the coupists, along with the Russians, wanted MINUSMA out, as its human rights obligations were the complete opposite of the concerns of the junta and the Wagner Group,” Mr. Keenan said.
