The Belgian prosecutor’s office has accused the suspect of belonging to a criminal organization and carrying out espionage activities for an unspecified “third country” while interning at NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) military headquarters in Mons, Belgium.
The office noted that the suspect was arrested on July 24 following searches at her home and place of work done with the support of the Computer Crime Unit (CCU) and forensic and scientific police units after her conduct had been reported to NATO officials and then turned over to Belgium’s s General Intelligence and Security Service
The prosecutor’s office didn’t specify which nation the suspect is accused of spying for, but it mentions that that she is a Canadian national of Chinese origin.
Suspect Profile
Although the prosecutor’s office hasn’t released the name of the suspect, online records appear to indicate that she has previously worked for several Canadian government departments and agencies. These include the Canadian Space Agency, Statistics Canada, and the National Research Council of Canada (NRC).A LinkedIn profile appearing to belong to the suspect accessed July 30 notes she is fluent in English, Mandarin, and French, and includes a self-description as “aggressively Asian” along with displaying flag icons of China and Canada.
Her work history describes her as a systems engineer with a background in computer science, systems engineering, and economics, and that she attended Oxford University as well as the University of Ottawa and University of Montreal.
The profile goes on to list several years of work experience in the economic research division of the World Trade Organization in Geneva in Switzerland, along with work as a systems engineer at the Canadian Space Agency working with “satellite operations.”
It also lists four years working as an economist for Statistics Canada in Ottawa and a position as a data scientist with NRC’s Digital Technologies Research Centre in 2017.
Social media posts also show the apparent suspect posting to find housing in Mons ahead of her NATO internship starting last summer, along with a similar search in 2023 in Geneva just prior to starting her internship at the World Trade Organization.
Vetting Process
It is unclear what level of security clearance the suspect had at each Canadian government organization or while at NATO.The website for NATO’s SHEP program, where the suspect worked, says its six-month internship accepts 35 interns each year. It notes that applicants must first obtain a security clearance from their national authority before NATO conducts its own vetting process and makes a final decision on admission to the program.
According to NATO, obtaining a security clearance in a member nation can take anywhere from eight weeks to 18 months.
“Canadian law enforcement and Canadian authorities are continuously monitoring and will monitor the impact of the work this individual has done, if they have done any work in Canada,” Anandasangaree said July 27.
Scott McGregor, a former Canadian Armed Forces intelligence operator and intelligence adviser to the RCMP, says often security risks could go unnoticed in Canada because Canada’s intelligence apparatus is “deeply fragmented.”
“Multiple agencies operate under different mandates, security-clearance systems, and information-sharing protocols, making the timely exchange of classified intelligence unnecessarily difficult,” McGregor told The Epoch Times.
Past Cases
There have been a number of cases in which foreign agencies flagged security concerns related to Canada, prompting Canadian authorities to take action afterward.The case of former Canadian navy officer Jeffrey Delisle, found guilty of spying for Russia in 2012, was first flagged by the FBI to Canadian authorities.
As well, McGregor points out that the case of former senior RCMP officer Cameron Ortis, who was found guilty of leaking secrets in 2023, was brought to the attention of Canadian authorities by Americans.
He also points out that the cases of Chinese regime-backed fentanyl and money laundering operations in B.C., which later became subject of a public inquiry, were first flagged by U.S. authorities.
In 2014, Chinese national Su Bin was arrested in Richmond, B.C., on a U.S. extradition request. He pleaded guilty to attempting to steal American military secrets in 2016 in a California court.
In late 2018, Canada arrested Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou on a U.S. extradition request alleging she engaged in fraud.
McGregor said there is a pattern of Canadian authorities often appearing “reactive” on intelligence and security matters.
“Too often, Canadian authorities appear reactive rather than proactive, with meaningful enforcement occurring only after pressure, intelligence, or direct assistance from the United States,” he said.
“When the FBI must help advance cases involving figures such as Bin Su or Meng Wanzhou, it raises serious questions about whether Canada has the institutional coordination, legal tools, and operational will needed to confront transnational organized crime and state-linked threats on its own.”
Requests for comment to the National Research Council, Canadian Space Agency, Statistics Canada, and Global Affairs Canada were not returned by the time of publication.
