Joint U.S.–Armenian military exercises kicked off this week at two military facilities near Yerevan, Armenia’s capital.
The move has served to irritate Russia, which sees Armenia as a regional ally and has historically viewed the South Caucasus as its backyard.
Involving 175 Armenian and 85 U.S. soldiers, including members of the Kansas National Guard, the 10-day wargames officially started on Sept. 11.
Dubbed “Eagle Partner,” the exercises are ostensibly aimed at training Armenia’s military to take part in international peacekeeping operations.
According to Armenia’s Defense Ministry, the drills aim to “raise the level of interoperability of the unit participating in international peacekeeping missions ... and exchange best practices in control and tactical communication.”
The joint drills with the United States come despite Armenia’s membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a six-nation military alliance led by Moscow.
Russia also maintains a military base in Armenia near the latter’s northwestern city of Gyumri.
Along with Russia and Armenia, the CSTO includes Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.
Sergei Ryabkov, Russia’s deputy foreign minister, recently chided Armenia for conducting drills with the United States.
“We have always operated on the premise that CSTO members should hold maneuvers with their allies,” the diplomat said.
Last week, CSTO member states wrapped up joint drills in Belarus, a key Russian ally. Armenia was the only alliance member that didn’t take part in the exercises.
As the U.S.–Armenian drills kicked off on Sept. 11, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov voiced Moscow’s misgivings.
“As for Armenia’s reluctance to hold drills with the CSTO and its plan to host drills with the United States, these are decisions that will require thorough analysis to understand Armenia’s motivations,” he said.
Diplomatic Friction
Armenia has also annoyed Moscow recently by signing on to the Rome Statute, thereby endorsing the legitimacy of the International Criminal Court (ICC).Earlier this year, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin on war crimes charges.
On Sept. 11, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan insisted that his country’s ratification of the Rome Statute wasn’t directed at Russia.
“The [ratification] process began last December and is unrelated to our relations with Russia but rather to the situation with Azerbaijan,” he said in televised comments.
Days earlier, Mr. Pashinyan’s wife, Anna Hakobyan, visited Kyiv, where she met Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his wife.
Yerevan also recently began sending aid to Kyiv for the first time since Russia’s invasion of eastern Ukraine last year.
Recent days have also seen mounting friction between Moscow and Yerevan over the latter’s perennial dispute with Azerbaijan.
On Sept. 1, a flare-up of violence on the Armenian–Azerbaijani border reportedly left several Armenian soldiers dead.
Mr. Pashinyan accused Russia of failing to ensure his country’s security in the face of what he called “aggression” by Azerbaijan.
In a Sept. 3 interview, Mr. Pashinyan claimed that Moscow was turning its back on Armenia—a CSTO member—and the South Caucasus region in general.
Yerevan, he said, would therefore seek to diversify its security arrangements—an apparent reference to the United States and the West in general.
Mr. Pashinyan went on to assert that dependence on “just one partner”—Russia—to ensure its security had been “a strategic mistake.”
Gunther Fehlinger, head of the European Committee for NATO Enlargement, appeared to pour fuel on the fire by urging Armenia to join the Western alliance.
Soon afterward, Russia’s TASS news agency cited a “diplomatic source” who accused Western powers of using Yerevan “to eject Russia” from the South Caucasus region.
Moscow Sides With Baku
Violence between Armenia and Azerbaijan has erupted sporadically since 2020, when they fought a six-week war over the Nagorno-Karabakh region.Although most of Nagorno-Karabakh’s 120,000 inhabitants are ethnic Armenians, the region is internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan.
The 2020 conflict, in which thousands were killed on both sides, ended with a Moscow-brokered ceasefire agreement that left Azerbaijan in control of the flashpoint region.
Since then, Russian peacekeepers have remained deployed along the fraught Azerbaijani–Armenian border, where they still maintain a significant presence.
Although Azerbaijan isn’t a CSTO member, it enjoys close relations with Moscow.
On Sept. 12, Mr. Putin, speaking from Russia’s eastern city of Vladivostok, said explicitly that–under the ceasefire deal–Nagorno-Karabakh belongs to Azerbaijan.
“It isn’t only the outcome of the [2020] conflict; it’s the fact that the Armenian leadership has recognized Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over Karabakh,” he said.
Both sides, Mr. Putin noted, had “put it on paper.”
He also asserted that Russia’s peacekeeping mandate on the Armenian–Azerbaijani border—as laid out in the ceasefire deal—was “still valid.”
Since the recent border flare-up, Armenian officials have repeatedly claimed that Azerbaijan was amassing troops on its border.
Baku, for its part, rejects the assertion, accusing Yerevan of “political maneuvering” and refusing to give up Nagorno-Karabakh in breach of the ceasefire agreement.
