The New Biden Defense Strategies—Clarity or Ambiguity?

The New Biden Defense Strategies—Clarity or Ambiguity?
President Joe Biden meets with Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley, and Department of Defense leaders, not pictured, to discuss national security priorities, in the State Dining Room of the White House on Oct. 26, 2022. (Saul Loeb/AFP via Getty Images)
John Mills
11/1/2022
Updated:
11/2/2022
0:00
Commentary
Each presidential administration issues key documents to articulate the public-facing presidential policy on important issues. In the national security world, these start with the National Security Strategy (NSS).

The NSS is the foundational document for an administration to communicate its intent, goals, and end state to the world. Clarity is the essence of communicating an NSS. We want other nations to clearly understand what the United States desires at home and abroad with as little ambiguity as possible. There’s possibly a role for ambiguity in certain situations, and that will be referenced.

The Biden team issued interim NSS guidance in March 2021 and just released the first complete NSS on Oct. 12. The three key actions out of the Biden NSS are invest, build, and modernize. What exactly is meant by these actions? The document goes into further detail, but there’s room for interpretation, as always.

Upon issuance of the NSS, the Department of Defense releases its subordinate document(s) that gives more details on its plan of action to implement its portion of the NSS. This is called the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin just released it. The NDS includes the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) (pdf) and the Missile Defense Review (MDR) (pdf) as supplemental documents.
The essential questions concerning these documents are about what they messaged and if they added clarity or ambiguity to the era of “strategic competition” (a Biden term) between the United States and China.

The Biden Nuclear Posture Review

Because of the rapid escalation in world tensions between China, Russia, and the Western powers and the return of nuclear matters to the forefront of dialogue, the NPR should be discussed first to refresh everyone’s memory of the nuclear state of affairs.
Several things stand out in the Biden NPR. First, the American policy on the use of nuclear weapons might be called “calculated ambiguity” (pdf), otherwise interpreted as that the United States reserves the right of first use, with several caveats.
With the release of the Biden NPR, one media source asserted that Biden essentially maintained the status quo. I would say that, traditionally, “ambiguity” found its effectiveness in having a robust, diverse, and large number of means to deliver nuclear weapons as well as a large number of nuclear weapons themselves.

There’s a fundamental problem with applying “ambiguity” to the current status of the American nuclear force. The “triad” of bombers, ground-based missiles, and submarine-based missiles is ancient. Their replacements are on the schedule, but actual numbers are years away, and the nuclear weapons themselves are for the most part elderly—well maintained, but very old. This significantly undermines the concept of “ambiguity” and actually communicates a lack of resolve in this area by the United States.

There are a couple of other issues. The Biden policy—against uniformed military recommendations—is canceling the program to return sea-based nuclear cruise missiles to the fleet and is retiring the biggest U.S. bomb, the B-83. These missiles and nuclear bomb did add ambiguity in a good way by greatly expanding the possible platforms that could carry nuclear weapons and in being the largest U.S. bomb. In the end calculation, the Bident administration has expanded “bad” ambiguity and shrunk “good” ambiguity through their NPR.

Missile Defense Review

In the MDR, the Biden team also expands “bad” ambiguity. One statement in the MDR caught my attention. Perhaps succumbing to an excess of nuance, the administration essentially states that missile defense of America against China and Russia is not necessary, and that the administration will instead depend upon nuclear deterrence to ensure China and Russia won’t attack America or its allies with nuclear weapons.
Another interesting reference in the MDR is a statement that Guam is American territory and that an attack on Guam will be considered a “direct” attack on the United States. On the one hand, this is clarity (a good thing); on the other hand, it’s asking another country not to attack the United States, which is “bad” clarity. As I’ve studied the situation as a professional military planner, Guam (and Hawaii) is vital and irreplaceable to responding to a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) attack on Taiwan. Asking another country not to attack us directly when they make a military move is counterproductive. Taking this into account, the scorecard on these documents continues to build up the “bad” ambiguity and “bad” clarity numbers.

National Defense Strategy

The core document, the NDS, has two key issues that should be addressed. First, China is now firmly placed as the country of greatest concern, the very senior partner in the terms of “strategic competition.” This is a good thing since it now articulates that the Biden administration places China as the center of prime concern. This is “good” clarity.

The next is how the NDS addresses “climate,” “energy,” and “pandemics.” By reintroducing the amorphous and unclear salute to climate, the United States is communicating that it is once again focused on a topic that, in the end, allows the biggest polluter to pollute and the United States to obsess over virtue signaling.

In energy, there’s a failure to reassert U.S. energy dominance, which, as former President Donald Trump demonstrated, can be a decisive national security tool. On pandemics, the administration talks about the topic abstractly, without holding CCP-led China accountable for the coronavirus.

In the End, Clarity or Ambiguity?

The documents released by the White House and the Pentagon are important, mandated issuances to articulate the administration’s positions on vital national security topics. The importance of these documents lies in how they’re interpreted by the countries referenced as threats or competitors. Communicating clarity and resolve are crucial to maintaining peace. Ambiguity may have a role, but only when backed up by clarity and resolve. In the end, these documents appear to point more toward a lack of clarity and resolve and inappropriate ambiguity.
Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
Col. (Ret.) John Mills is a national security professional with service in five eras: Cold War, Peace Dividend, War on Terror, World in Chaos, and now, Great Power Competition. He is the former director of cybersecurity policy, strategy, and international affairs at the Department of Defense. Mr. Mills is a senior fellow at the Center for Security Policy. He is author of “The Nation Will Follow” and “War Against the Deep State.” ColonelRETJohn on Substack, GETTR, and Truth Social
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