Commentary
Tensions between communist China and Taiwan are at an all-time high. This article examines some key questions about timing, the actions of allies, and the course of the likely war.
Introduction
Trying to glance into the future is always tough, but the failures of the Biden administration and the Russian aggression against Ukraine suggests that an aggressive move by the Chinese regime on Taiwan is likely going to happen sometime soon.This two-part series describes when China will make its move, the possible outcome of the war, including an undermining of Xi Jinping’s leadership and the unravelling of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
When Would China Attack Taiwan?
The exact timing is tough to gauge. At the very least it would take place after the Winter Olympics. There are suggestions that China is facing an economic slowdown. Xi is facing criticism and, according to some analysts, will need this war to solidify his rule. Meanwhile, the Biden administration’s decision to pull out U.S. troops from Afghanistan has created a strong perception of American weakness. Taiwan is planning for “more severe” struggles with China in 2022, which could include war, and both their defense ministers and the U.S. admiral in the Pacific predict war within years.Beijing has invested billions of dollars into the Olympics, so it won’t start an active shooting war before that. The CCP wants to get a chance to showcase China’s greatness to the world and increase the tourism and leisure industry. It would be like Germany invading France before the 1936 Olympics. The exact timing is always a fool’s errand. But the world clearly has lost faith in American commitments, and there is little initiative from the current administration that suggests a forceful policy change to restore that faith and deter communist China.
What Would the Allies in the Region do?
The reaction of the allies depends on how quick the invasion would be. Most Americans support sending troops to defend Taiwan. But that could change quickly if it seems like the United States would have to liberate the island on behalf of the free Taiwan government, and shoulder most of the burden for a faraway place that most Americans couldn’t find on a map.Moreover, public support means nothing when the political leadership has no will to make the decision. For example, Washington has done little to stop Russian aggression against Ukraine, so the most likely aid will be in the form of military supplies such as missile defense and intelligence sharing. Washington could provide intelligence to Taiwan, similar to how the United States aided Britain from 1939 to 1941 in tracking German ships.
China may see any involvement as a declaration of war and drag the United States into it anyway. If America was drawn into the war, politicians would like to be seen doing something with little investment. Thus, air sorties from a carrier group at standoff distance would be the most likely support in that case, but it could be much more substantial. The war will primarily involve naval forces, with the possible insertion of quick reaction forces. The exact course is tough to fathom, but the United States would offer more help in a long war than a short one.
The involvement of allies would largely depend on America’s involvement because they are not as large or designed to fight a great power war. Without large American involvement, they are unlikely to commit much of anything beyond some material aid.
Japan has a peace constitution and limited capabilities outside of defensive weapon systems, which limits its involvement even if it wanted to get involved. The Japanese military is also not designed to project power in a quick manner, though Japan’s southernmost island chains would put its troops almost in the theater of combat. The Japanese have made contradictory statements in the past that make their potential role unclear. Plus, much more of Japan is within missile and bombing range than the United States, and so it would face more loss and be hesitant to commit even as a minor partner to the United States.
The Australians are more clearly committed and they have practiced using a quick reaction task force in the region. The one carrier group and an Australian task force, which is composed of destroyers, frigates, and submarines, seem like meager help but it is the most Taiwan can expect, and is largely dependent on U.S. leadership.
What Would Victory for China Look Like?
China’s victory would have to be quick. The longer it takes, the more likely the allies would intervene with greater force. Beijing’s ideal scenario would be to launch paralyzing cyberattacks on critical communication and infrastructure, then launch decapitating missile strikes on government and military leaders. As that scenario happens, its invasion force would stream across the Taiwan Strait, quickly capturing some minor outlying islands, before taking the island without a fight.It is true that China’s military budget and military is much larger than their cross-strait neighbor in Taiwan. But its plan for quick domination is overly optimistic for several reasons. Compared to China, Russia is operating over land and has had practice for years taking small chunks of contiguous territory, usually facing little fight. As the British know, who bragged to Hitler about only facing one successful invasion in the last thousand years, there are many natural defensive advantages to an island. Defeating a navy, transporting soldiers, securing the beachhead, and taking over a country of 23 million people is tough. And that is before the Chinese regime expects to do it with super weapons that are unproven in combat, an army that has zero combat experience from the rank and file all the way to the senior leadership, and no experience in the cross-service coordination needed for an ambitious operation supported by cyberwarfare. The massive numbers of weapon systems and soldiers with a dismal performance against a smaller neighbor will end up recalling the Soviet Union’s inept Winter War.
Plus, this is before we consider Taiwan’s natural defenders of rocky shoals and rough waters, mobile missile batteries that will be tough to hit in a first strike, and an extensive reservist system. Taiwan and its allies, like the United States, have been concerned about missiles for decades. They are constantly upgrading the ability to track and destroy them by using interlocking layers provided by weapon systems in air, land, and sea. And weapon systems are only as good as the people who operate them. Western training, particular the American sea and airmen, are much better than the often rote and unrealistic training exercises and politicized junior officers who are too afraid of making mistakes to be aggressive and show initiative.
All the above factors mean the promised missile swarms from China will not be as decisive as analysts assume. In the hypothetical invasion of Taiwan, it would mean failure despite the regime having vastly superior numbers and Taiwan having reluctant allies.
Read part II here.
Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
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