Terms on Contractors May Make Afghan Withdrawal Tricky

Contractors are taking the reins in Iraq as U.S. troops come home, and while a similar approach will likely be taken as the war in Afghanistan draws to a close.
Terms on Contractors May Make Afghan Withdrawal Tricky
Afghanistan National Army (ANA) soldiers undergo training by a U.S. contractor at Camp Leatherneck on the outskirts of Lashkar Gah, in Helmand Province, on May 19. (Massoud Hossaini/AFP/Getty Images)
Joshua Philipp
11/30/2011
Updated:
11/30/2011
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Contractors are taking the reins in Iraq as U.S. troops come home, and while a similar approach will likely be taken as the war in Afghanistan draws to a close, the situation on the ground could look very different.

President Barack Obama announced Oct. 22 that more than 39,000 U.S. troops would be home from Iraq by the holidays, and the U.S. war in Iraq will finally be over. Yet much of that weight shifted to an estimated 17,000 civilian contractors.

In Afghanistan, however, the United States will hand security responsibilities to the Afghan government fully by 2014. The problem is that while contractors will play heavy roles in training and various services, Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s opposition to private security contractors means U.S. troops will need to stick around until Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) can fully protect the country.

There has been plenty of buzz about “mercenaries” taking over the war in Iraq after the troop pullout, yet of the 5,500 security contractors in Iraq, 1,500 will act as bodyguards, while the rest will focus mainly on perimeter security, according to a report from the Congressional Research Service (CRS).

The situation in Afghanistan will likely be very different. “What we’re seeing in Iraq is that as the Army withdraws, there is a big need for contractors to do personal security details,” said Charles Tiefer, professor of government contracting at the University of Baltimore Law School and the commissioner of the former Commission on Wartime Contracting. The Commission, set up to study contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, was disbanded in late September.

“But we’re far from that in Afghanistan because what’s being talked about is turning over security for their country in 2014—not a complete withdrawal,” he said.

According to Tiefer, the role of contractors “is not going to be the fighting after our troops leave,” since the ANSF has pledged to do this. Rather, contractors will likely continue their roles of conducting training and supporting the ANSF.

Although the situation in 2014 is currently left to speculation, it is likely U.S. troops will continue their role of providing personnel and perimeter security in Afghanistan—responsibilities that are being passed to contractors in Iraq.

In August 2010, Karzai issued a decree giving private security firms—both local and international—four months to disband. There were an estimated 30,000 to 40,000 armed security contractors in Afghanistan at the time.

Yet, this was not the first time Karzai called for a ban on private security contractors. His stance was that they undermine the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), according to Al Jazeera.

Private security firms run by Afghan nationals were mainly warlords and their private militias—which Karzai has been at odds with since the beginning of his administration.

In 2002, Karzai proclaimed warlord militias as “the greatest threat to Afghanistan, a threat even greater than the Taliban insurgents,” and efforts to disarm the warlords and their militias failed, according to a report in 2005 by the U.S. Army’s Strategic Studies Institute.

Shortly after, however, more than 200 Afghan warlords were placed under the rule of the Karzai administration by the United Nations.

Using them to provide security was, in part, a solution to other problems they posed. “What used to be called warlord militias are now private security companies,” stated the Kandahar Stability Operations Information Center on March 30, 2010, according to a United States Senate Armed Services Committee report.

Security Training

According to The Long War Journal, there are close to 100,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan—which, as Obama announced in June 2011, will be reduced to 68,000 by September 2012.

By 2014, when security responsibilities are handed fully to the Afghans, there will only be somewhere between 10,000 and 20,000 U.S. troops in the country. At that time, the U.S. focus will shift to training and mentoring the ANA and the ANP, as well as giving supportive services, including helicopter transportation, medical treatment, and intelligence gathering.

Counterterrorism operations will continue under U.S. and allied special operations forces.

Training the ANA and the ANP is no small task. By October 2012, the ANA is expected to have 191,000 troops, and the ANP is expected to have 162,000 police officers.

According to Tiefer, the U.S. military will likely continue training the ANA, while contractors will continue training the ANP.

Ensuring the Afghan police are up to par, however, will be of particular significance when security responsibilities are passed to the Afghan government. The ANP plays a paramilitary role—having been made targets by the Taliban and their security roles will be closer to that played by a military.

While some Afghan forces are ready for the responsibility, others still have a ways to go.

A few years back, the state of the Afghan police force was of particular concern, according to Barry Searle, who oversaw training of Afghan forces from 2007 to 2008 as the commander of Afghanistan’s Regional Coalition Assistance group East, with the embedded training teams.

There were a few common problems. Maintenance was one of the larger issues—the ANSF tended to run cars with no oil or neglect cleaning their weapons until they became little more than hunks of metal.

Trying to get them to unlearn what was taught by the Soviets was another problem. “The Afghan army trained by the Russian army would say, ‘Well, the commander said do X, and we’ll do X even if it doesn’t make sense,'” Searle said in an earlier interview.

“You’re trying to teach them things in a matter of five or six years that took the United States and other nations hundreds of years to develop,” Searle said.

According to Tiefer, even after the shift in security responsibilities, “The contractors needed for training will be high—even without a complete withdrawal.”

Afghanistan also needs a large police force since “there is an idea it is going to be all over the country.” “Given the nature of the war, if the Taliban are so universal in that they don’t have a front, the way there is a front in organized warfare, wherever the police are, it’s the front,” Tiefer said.

Managing Contractors

Ensuring Afghans can sustain what was built through the course of U.S. operations will be the cornerstone of the role played by contractors, yet aside from the Taliban, there are other problems they could face.

Warlords could bring trouble to contractors in other ways. “It may make it hard for contractors to do their job in militia-controlled areas,” Tiefer said.

Militias have been known to charge convoy fees for “safe passage,” but they may also charge additional money for construction in areas they control. “Those who extract money don’t typically call it bribes. They call it taxes. We have state and local taxes. The warlords might well look at it as local taxes for providing militia security in areas where it’s either their security or no security,” Tiefer said.

“If Karzai could do it, he would tell contractors not to pay off militias, but that would require him to provide security throughout the country,” he said.

As the United States passes control over to the Afghans, the other problem that will likely come up is how the Afghans will manage contractors and ensure they’re not overcharging.

Even now, there is a problem of contractors monopolizing government contracts. Under the U.S. system, contractors are made to compete to renew contracts. The problem could be more pronounced under Afghan governance; however, since it is not clear if the Afghans have as much leverage to force such competition, Tiefer said. “In which case, they will allow some high level of charges by the contractors who hold on.”

Yet overall, the main concern with government contractors in Afghanistan, moving forward “is that without a lot of governmental oversight, they can become very wasteful, and their effectiveness can come into question,” Tiefer said.

“Specifically, with respect to withdrawals, then the question becomes sustainability,” he said. “Is what is being accomplished now, with a substantial military presence, or as it was in Iraq, until recently a substantial military presence—will that prove sustainable over time when it is completely turned over to local nationals or to contractors and local nationals without U.S. government oversight?”

Joshua Philipp is an award-winning investigative reporter with The Epoch Times and host of EpochTV's "Crossroads" program. He is a recognized expert on unrestricted warfare, asymmetrical hybrid warfare, subversion, and historical perspectives on today’s issues. His 10-plus years of research and investigations on the Chinese Communist Party, subversion, and related topics give him unique insight into the global threat and political landscape.
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