Some Mexican citizens had sympathy for the cartel prior to its most recent violence. The cartel manufactured a cult of personality that raised El Mencho to almost godlike status. It handed out toys to children and boxes of food to citizens. It claimed to protect populations under its control from other cartel groups.

The question now that El Mencho is gone is whether the next level of commanders will fracture and create multiple CJNG splinters, leading to a civil war among them, or whether they will remain unified and choose one among them to lead the organization. Other cartels will likely attempt to use any confusion to launch further attacks against a weakened CJNG. A rise in fuel theft and extortion of lime and avocado plantations by small gangs is also likely.

Sheinbaum deserves credit for greenlighting the operation against El Mencho. Perhaps this was a turning point for her and Mexico. But Mexico does not have the sophisticated signals intelligence and long-range armed drone resources that are so effective against these kinds of asymmetric terrorist threats. The government has been infiltrated by cartel operatives at lower levels and intimidated at the highest levels, which makes it difficult for it to carry out operations.

So the United States could and should do far more in the fight against cartels in Mexico. This includes defeating El Mencho’s top lieutenants, who are already engaged in new cycles of violence. Lower-level gang members should also be arrested by the Mexican government. Illicit weapons exports from the United States to Mexico should be stopped.

The rest of the cartels, along with their international financial networks, should be dismantled, including the Chinese money laundering network used by CJNG. The supply chains that bring chemical precursors from China to Mexico for manufacture into illicit fentanyl should be interdicted at sea.

These requirements of U.S. national security are not easy, but they have been neglected for far too long. The United States will likely have to do much of this, as Mexican authorities will probably not take such a comprehensive approach. Nevertheless, to get Mexico as active as possible against the cartels, the United States should continue to use tariffs as a lever. Congress should ensure that this remains possible on national security grounds after the U.S. Supreme Court ruling against tariffs.

Without systemic action against the cartels in Mexico, along with their international operations, the Mexican government will remain under cartel influence, the illicit drug flow will continue largely unabated into the United States, and the flow could rise in the future. U.S. deaths from overdose in 2025 will likely come in at about 72,000. That number is down from the 110,000 who died in 2023, but cartels that were beaten in the past have revived when not completely eradicated. The best approach to cartel violence is a campaign of complete eradication from the lowest to the highest levels of the organization, using all means available by both the U.S. and Mexican governments.

The above is admittedly only a supply-side solution. The United States must also address the demand side of the problem. Addicts in the United States should be forced into drug treatment programs when they are found to violate the law. But this can be done simultaneously with a full-court press in Mexico. The more expensive illicit drugs are made by reducing the supply from cartels, the more successful the demand-side solutions will be. The full court press will likely need to include U.S. forces, whether or not the Mexican government agrees. As much of this should be done in coordination with Mexico, and with plausible deniability, so the Mexican government appears to be at the helm. But one way or the other, it must be done and soon.

Mexico Got Tough on a Cartel. The US Should Get Tougher.

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