Many “China watchers” have speculated that Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s removal of nine senior defense officials over the past month may have reduced the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) combat readiness.
They are wrong. If the reports about PLA Rocket Force missiles having poorly constructed missile silos and water-filled missile fuel tanks are just half true, those dismissals will improve PLA combat capability. Rebuilding the silos may take time, but the results will be more missiles ready for use, and only the PLA’s cruise and older ballistic missiles are liquid-fueled. Refueling the former will take little time, and the latter are being phased out and replaced by new, more accurate, solid-fueled missiles.
Also, Xi has left the middle-to-second tier-level leadership untouched so far: the officials and leaders who lead, train, supply, and maintain units. Moreover, they are on notice that corruption will have dire personal consequences. More importantly, the PLA’s other components will see the anti-corruption message. That should reduce, if not deter, malfeasance.
Although removing high-ranking officials does affect organizations, ministerial-level leaders make policy, not daily operational, tactical, and training decisions. Also, prosecuting corrupt officials has the additional benefit of improving the PLA’s acquisition-cost-to-delivery ratio, enabling the PLA to get more “bang for its buck.” That should improve combat readiness over time.
Also, looking beyond equipment purchasing, the new PLA Navy and defense ministry leadership share Xi’s operational and strategic focus at the naval and joint-theater level. Similarly, he has placed his own people in charge of the PLA Rocket Force. Those appointments will ensure that the theater-level and below leadership will fall in line with Xi’s intentions and vision. That may take time, but overall combat readiness will not be affected negatively. More importantly, unless Xi’s purge reaches deeper into the ranks, readiness to execute Xi’s plans will improve in the months ahead.
So far, Xi has taken a measured, patient approach to conducting his purge. He has yet to remove the working and intermediate-level military leaders who run the PLA’s day-to-day operations. It is their actions and leadership that constitute the key contributors to the PLA’s combat readiness.
Additionally, Xi is advancing leaders with recent joint operations experience and using corruption to remove those who may undermine, if not impede, his power and plans. The next stage of his purge will tell the story and determine the PLA’s future combat readiness and operational capabilities. If he focuses on displacing political officials, the PLA will remain operational untouched. But if the purge extends to the middle ranks, combat readiness will suffer with a detrimental effect on the PLA’s ability to deliver on Xi’s territorial expansion plans.
