Why Napoleon’s Russian Foray Didn’t End Well

“Napoleon I on the Borodino Heights,” by Vasily Vereshchagin (1897), depicts Napoleon (seated) watching the fighting during the Battle of Borodino on Sept. 7, 1812. Public Domain

Commentary

Napoleon Bonaparte was a man of limitless ambition and unbounded ego. Europe had not seen a man like him since the days of the Caesars: a soldier of obscure origins, rising to power, and holding a continent under his sway. From Corsican military cadet, to Revolutionary artillery officer, to conquering general, to First Consul, to Emperor of the French, making and unmaking kings and new nations, decreeing new legal codes, unbeatable in the field, his meteoric ascent dazzled the world.

In 1798, having taken Egypt, his plan was to unite the Arab world behind him and sweep down on British India, snatching the jewel from King George III’s crown. Only the need to dash back to France to seize power there prevented him from creating an Asian empire. In 1812 he had his eye on another imperial crown, that of Russia.

In that year, Napoleon dominated all of the European continent; only Britain and its navy defied his rule. He ordered his subject nations and timid allies to cease trading with the British and thus cripple its economy. This so-called Continental System caused grumbling amongst those allied to the French: Why should honest Dutchmen, Germans, Danes, etc., lose lucrative business opportunities to please the French? Most irritated was Emperor Alexander I of Russia, a man who had once been one of Napoleon’s most worshipful fans but who now grew tired of being bullied. In 1811, he declared he would not refrain from economic ties with Great Britain. This vexed Napoleon, and by the next year both sides were preparing for war with the other.

On June 24, 1812, Napoleon launched his Grande Armée against Russia. His force consisted of over 600,000 troops drawn from his European empire—Frenchmen, Italians, Swiss, Poles, and Spaniards—and from his Austrian and Prussian allies. The Russians could match that in numbers, but their greatest allies were the vastness of Russia and the approaching winter.

Organizing his forces into three columns with himself leading the central spearhead, Napoleon met no serious military resistance for the first month or so, but heat and disease were already taking their toll. Columns to the south and north of his line of attack were to keep the enemy from uniting their forces. His plan was to bring the Russians to battle quickly, destroy their armies, and seize Moscow, forcing Czar Alexander to agree to peace.

“Kutuzov before the Battle of Borodino” by N.S. Samokish (1912). Public Domain

At the Battle of Smolensk on the road from Warsaw to Moscow in August, Napoleon defeated a Russian army and burnt the city to the ground. This led Alexander I to place a new general at the head of his armies: the old, fat, one-eyed Mikhail Kutuzov. The wily Kutuzov fought Napoleon to a standstill at the Battle of Borodino on Sept. 7, but realized that he had insufficient forces to defend Moscow. He could either save the capital or save his army. A week later Napoleon entered the city.

Napoleon expected, rather reasonably, that capturing the enemy’s spiritual and patriotic capital (St. Petersburg was the official capital city) meant that he had won the war—surely Russian officials would soon appear and sign the surrender. No such officials appeared. In fact, the Russians set Moscow on fire, which prompted the French army, at the end of an impossibly long supply chain constantly under attack, to retreat.

Winter snows arrived with temperatures at minus 35, and Napoleon had to withdraw through territory that had already been looted and burnt over. French armies were notorious for being poorly supplied and obliged to live off the land, but now the land offered them nothing. His massive army dwindled daily, harassed by Cossacks and guerillas; his troops were freezing, starving, and dying from disease, with Kutuzov always at their heels. The 40,000 wagons full of loot that the French had pillaged, and the artillery, were gradually abandoned as horses and mules, bereft of fodder, perished in the cold. Those men who could not walk were left behind to die.

Just as he had done in Egypt, Napoleon abandoned his troops. He had heard of a conspiracy back home to overthrow him so he took to a sled on Dec. 5 and, guarded by cavalry, fled toward Paris. It is said that when he reached the Nieman River he asked the ferryman who was to carry him across, “Have any deserters come this way?” The man replied, “No, you are the first.” He left behind 20,000 soldiers still living and struggling toward the border.

Napoleon’s Russian adventure had cost the lives of a million men, women, and children.

Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.