U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Manila on July 22. The most revealing aspect of the meeting was not what the two men discussed, but rather what Wang chose not to say.
Although Beijing had publicly and forcefully rejected President Donald Trump’s allegations that China interfered in the 2020 U.S. election just days before the summit, Wang made no attempt to raise the issue when meeting face-to-face with America’s top diplomat. That silence could indicate Beijing’s lack of confidence.
According to media reports, Rubio and Wang discussed various issues, including Beijing’s actions in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. Chinese state media did not disclose the agenda of the meeting, stating only that Wang “made clear China’s solemn position regarding a series of recent negative words and actions by the United States, urging the United States to respect China’s core interests and abide by the one-China principle.”
While that language was primarily directed at Taiwan-related issues, U.S. media later reported that Rubio confirmed the two never discussed Chinese election interference. Perhaps Rubio avoided raising the issue to prevent an unnecessary confrontation.
However, Wang’s decision not to protest directly is notable. Shortly after Trump declassified intelligence alleging Chinese interference in the U.S. election, China’s foreign ministry said the allegations were “completely fabricated and malicious smears” that had “long been proven groundless.” It also said that China has “neither the interest nor the intention to interfere in U.S. elections.”
One might have expected China’s top diplomat to seize the opportunity to confront Rubio directly. In several previous meetings, Chinese officials have not hesitated to denounce what they described as U.S. “fabrications” and “smears,” or to demand that Washington correct “damaging accusations.”
Beijing’s reluctance to address election meddling could reflect a lack of confidence. It knows that the allegations are substantiated, including Trump’s claim that China illegally obtained data on approximately 220 million American voters.
Days before the Wang–Rubio meeting, the White House released a series of declassified documents to support the U.S. president’s claims.
According to those documents, the stolen data included names, addresses, phone numbers, party affiliations, and other sensitive information useful for voter analysis. They reveal that Chinese authorities assigned a dedicated data-development team to the effort.
Beijing also knows that Trump’s broader allegations are not without basis. According to the declassified materials, China sought to exploit domestic and international anti-Trump organizations and other anti-Trump forces in an effort to reduce his electoral support and prevent his reelection.
The materials allege that these efforts included leveraging business ties with major U.S. companies, amplifying negative media coverage of Trump, and using platforms such as TikTok, Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube to shape public opinion on issues including the COVID-19 response, the economy, racial tensions, immigration, and partisan conflict.
No matter how carefully such operations are conducted, they inevitably leave traces, especially when facing the capabilities of U.S. intelligence agencies. Moreover, although Beijing has publicly dismissed the allegations as fabricated, it has largely avoided directly addressing the specific declassified documents released by the United States.
One intelligence memorandum, declassified on July 10, describes China’s analysis of voter registration data obtained from 18 states. The North Carolina files alone covered more than 8 million registered voters.
Another document, a Presidential Daily Brief assessment dated June 25, 2020, concluded that Beijing had attempted to pressure a White House official by threatening to reveal damaging personal information about the individual.
An FBI report dated Sept. 25, 2020, based on information from a single confidential source, alleged that Chinese operatives produced counterfeit U.S. driver’s licenses to enable Chinese students and immigrants to cast illegal mail-in ballots for Joe Biden.
The reason why Beijing has not confronted Washington directly is simple: it can’t risk prompting the United States to release more evidence. In my view, this is a key reason why Wang chose not to bring up the issue during his meeting with Rubio.
Beijing also knows that if Wang had accused the United States directly, Rubio would have almost certainly fired back without hesitation. Wang could have easily found himself unable to respond, turning the encounter into yet another embarrassment for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), one that would quickly spread across both traditional and social media.
There is another reason for Beijing’s restraint. Trump has proven to be an unconventional opponent who has seen through the CCP’s playbook. As Trump’s rhetoric toward Beijing has grown increasingly forceful, Chinese leaders have become even more reluctant to issue a protest they cannot confidently defend, fearing it would only further provoke him.
On July 21, during a bilateral meeting with the president of Lebanon at the White House, Trump was asked whether he planned to exert pressure on China over declassified intelligence alleging its interference in the 2020 election.
Trump replied: “Well, we’re going to talk to them about it ... I think China is maybe a little bit different today than it was then. But look, they do things and we do things to them, I’ll be honest. We do things to them, too. It’s not a one-way street.”
Trump once again sent a clear message to Beijing: The United States is prepared to talk, but it will not ignore the CCP’s hostile actions. If Beijing chooses confrontation, Washington will respond in kind. In the end, the CCP may find that the boomerang of its own actions has come back to hit it.
