The Ukrainian companies remain unnamed for security reasons. They will supply designs for American testing.
It was an unusual move because Washington typically sticks with its own defense giants for weapons projects.
However, in this case, the Ukranians have a unique advantage: hard-earned experience from the ongoing war with Russia.
The contract is for the Artemis project run by the Pentagon’s Defense Innovation Unit (DIU).
The project, launched last year, has a clear goal: build affordable, long-range “kamikaze,” or single-use, drones. These drones must fly up to 186 miles and work in challenging conditions, such as severe weather and disrupted telecommunications.
The push for developing these drones came from U.S. Commands in Europe and the Indo–Pacific in anticipation of new challenges in modern conflicts. The DIU wants a working Artemis prototype by the end of 2025, with testing wrapped up by the end of May.
Since the Russia–Ukraine conflict started, Ukrainian drone makers have gained extensive hands-on knowledge in building and testing long-range attack drones—some flying farther than the distance required by Artemis—and used them to hit Russian air bases, oil facilities, and other key targets.
They’ve learned what works in a live war zone and what it takes to survive tactics such as GPS jamming, spoofing, and other electronic countermeasures that can down or disable less sophisticated drones.
During a virtual talk hosted by the Air and Space Forces Association’s Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, Hecker noted that some NATO countries even prefer to build simpler gear because “they can’t afford the exquisite stuff.” The general also said cheaper systems could sometimes accomplish the same missions as high-end ones or even complement them for better overall performance.
This thinking seems to have guided the Pentagon’s decision to look beyond established weapons giants and partner with new, more agile companies—especially those with battlefield experience.
Meanwhile, the United States has been reluctant to use costly high-end missile systems—such as the Army Tactical Missile Systems—against Russian targets, which makes smaller, less restricted drones all the more appealing.
The Artemis drones have a specific job description. They need to launch from the ground, be able to carry different payloads, and stay cheap enough for bulk production.
They must also keep working even if GPS gets knocked out—a technical capability that Russia and Ukraine have mastered in battle. Russia has resorted to tethered drones to reduce jamming risks, although they have limited range and are mostly tied to front-line zones. On the other hand, Ukraine’s drones achieve a more extended range and have been used for precision attacks, decoys, and everything in between.
The war has highlighted how fast munitions can run out. The U.S. defense industries couldn’t quickly produce the 155-millimeter shells for long-range artillery fire to replenish the stockpile. In large battle spaces, such as the Pacific, where the United States might someday face China, cost-effective, long-range weapons could be a game-changer, and Artemis is a step toward building up that stockpile.
Bringing Ukrainian companies into the fold does more than add expertise—it upends the traditional U.S. defense supply chain. By casting its net wider, the Pentagon shows it’s rethinking how it acquires weapons, especially for scenarios where cost, speed, and adaptability matter as much as raw firepower.
Ultimately, Artemis is more than a drone program—it’s a model for the future of warfare. Rapid production, affordability, and adaptability are now key factors in large-scale conflicts. By tapping into Ukrainian know-how, the United States invests in drones that can outmaneuver modern threats in Eastern Europe, the Western Pacific, or wherever deployed next.
