The Regime Has Changed. Investors Haven’t Noticed.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the United States entered a period that bears uncomfortable similarities to today.

Traders work on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange in New York City on March 19, 2026. Spencer Platt/Getty Images

Commentary

For most of the past four decades, investors operated in a world defined by falling inflation and declining and eventually low interest rates. The 60/40 portfolio worked beautifully. Central banks held inflation down and stock markets up. That world is gone. What has replaced it looks considerably less comfortable—and disturbingly familiar to anyone who has studied the 1960s and 1970s.

We are in a regime change. The question is not whether investors will eventually acknowledge it, but how much wealth will be destroyed before they do.

The Deflationary Tailwind Is Over

The great disinflationary era from roughly 1982 to 2020 rested on identifiable structural foundations: integration of the developing world into global supply chains, the free flow of goods across open borders, and demographic expansion in the labor force. Globalization was, in effect, a decades-long deflationary subsidy to Western consumers and corporations.

That subsidy is being withdrawn. Supply chains are being reshored or friend-shored. Tariffs are rising. Industrial policy is becoming mainstream across the political spectrum. These shifts do not resolve quickly. They are structural, and their inflationary effects will compound over years, not quarters.

Add to this the energy picture. Even setting aside acute geopolitical flashpoints, the long-term trajectory of energy investment—constrained by years of capital withdrawal from fossil fuels driven by environmental, social, and governance policies—points toward sustained tightness in supply. Energy costs feed into virtually every price in a modern economy.

History Rhymes

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the United States entered a period that bears uncomfortable similarities to today. Fiscal deficits were expanding—driven in part by the Vietnam War and the Great Society programs—while the Federal Reserve, under pressure to accommodate government borrowing, kept real interest rates too low for too long. Inflation, once dismissed as transitory, became entrenched.

The parallels extend further back. After World War II, the U.S. ratio of debt to gross domestic product peaked at nearly 110 percent. Washington did not grow its way out of that burden, nor did it impose brutal austerity. Instead, policymakers employed what economists now call financial repression: The Federal Reserve pegged interest rates at artificially low levels while inflation eroded the real value of debt. Real interest rates were deeply negative for extended periods.

By keeping real interest rates below 1 percent for two-thirds of the time between 1945 and 1980, the United States effectively inflated away the enormous debt legacy of the Great Depression and the war. Bondholders paid the bill. They just weren’t told that in advance.

Today, U.S. federal debt is far more than 100 percent of gross domestic product—again—and the government is running large deficits not in the depths of a recession but at full employment. That is not a cyclical problem. It is a structural one. History suggests that there are limited tools available to address it, and that inflation is among the most politically convenient.

Real Rates Are Not as Tight as They Appear

The conventional narrative until very recently held that monetary policy is restrictive and that rate cuts are just around the corner. This deserves scrutiny. Nominal rates may be higher than in the post-2008 era, but real rates—adjusted for actual inflation experience rather than official targets—remain modest by historical standards. Meanwhile, fiscal policy continues to inject demand into the economy at a pace inconsistent with genuine disinflation. A combination of moderately tight monetary policy and aggressively loose fiscal policy is not a recipe for returning inflation to significantly below 2 percent. It is a recipe for keeping it sticky.

The 1960s and 1970s taught a painful lesson about assuming that inflation had been tamed prematurely. Arthur Burns, Fed chairman through much of that era, was not incompetent—he was operating under political pressures that caused him to ease too soon, repeatedly. Each premature easing embedded inflation more deeply. The pattern of declaring victory and cutting rates is precisely what investors should be watching for today.

The Investment Implications

If the regime has genuinely changed, the implications for portfolio construction are significant—and underappreciated.

The most important: Long-duration bonds may no longer serve as a reliable hedge against equity market drawdowns. In the low-inflation era, when stocks fell, bonds rallied—the classic negative correlation that made the 60/40 portfolio so effective. But in the inflationary regime of the 1970s, both stocks and bonds lost real value simultaneously. Importantly, real equity returns in the 1970s were dismal. If inflation remains structurally elevated, there is no reason to assume that correlation reverts to its post-1982 behavior.

Investors conditioned by four decades of experience will find this counterintuitive. It is nonetheless what history suggests.

The appropriate response is not panic but recalibration. Shortening portfolio duration—reducing exposure to long-dated bonds in favor of short bonds, Treasury bills, and inflation-linked securities—reduces the risk of being caught in a bond market that no longer behaves as expected. Real assets—commodities, infrastructure, and tangible productive capital—have historically preserved purchasing power in inflationary environments. They deserve more attention than they typically receive in conventional portfolio construction.

The Uncomfortable Conclusion

Wars are expensive. The geopolitical environment is producing more of them, not fewer, and history consistently shows that governments under fiscal pressure from military spending reach for inflation as the path of least political resistance. Combined with the structural unwinding of globalization, and a debt overhang for which no bipartisan plan has yet emerged, the conditions for a prolonged inflationary episode are firmly in place.

The 2 percent inflation target is not wrong as an aspiration. It is simply unlikely to be the consistent reality for the decade ahead. Investors who position accordingly—with shorter duration, real assets, and a healthy skepticism toward long bonds as a safe haven—will be better prepared than those waiting for a return to the world of 2015.

That world is not coming back.

Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.