The Illusion of Readiness: An Adaptive Failure of Chinese Naval Command

The type 052D guided missile destroyer Taiyuan of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy participates in a naval parade to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the founding of China's PLA Navy in the sea near Qingdao, in eastern Shandong Province, China, on April 23, 2019. Mark Schiefelbein/AFP via Getty Images

Commentary

In mid-June, the Ticonderoga-class cruiser USS Princeton encountered elements of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) while operating in the Western Pacific. The event, known as the Princeton incident, has reaffirmed U.S. intelligence assessments of the PLAN’s leadership, command, and control.

Inability to Adapt Under Pressure

Despite years of modernization, numerous far-seas operations, and expanded realistic training around Taiwan, the PLAN’s response during the Princeton incident exposed a troubling lack of tactical adaptability. The encounter, initiated with aggressive maneuvers from a Type 052D destroyer, J-15 fighters, and a Type 039 submarine, culminated in an unprovoked escalation when the destroyer locked its fire-control radar onto the USS Nimitz, risking direct conflict with the U.S. Pacific Fleet.