The CCP Uses TikTok to Target US Military

The CCP Uses TikTok to Target US Military
Cadets walk into Michie Stadium during West Point's graduation ceremony in West Point, N.Y., on May 27, 2023. (Spencer Platt/Getty Images)
Antonio Graceffo
3/22/2024
Updated:
3/27/2024
0:00
Commentary

The use of TikTok by young military personnel poses risks of exploitation by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

In the past, Russia extensively trained spies for years until they achieved flawless English proficiency. Then, it needed to devise plausible reasons for these individuals to obtain U.S. visas and gain access to military installations, where they would discreetly capture photos using spy cameras hidden in newspapers.

Today, the process has evolved drastically. Hundreds of thousands of U.S. soldiers unwittingly aid the CCP by taking and sharing photos on TikTok.

TikTok’s appeal to young people is evident in its popularity among U.S. military personnel, with the average recruit being just 19 years old. Despite being banned from government devices, troops and their families continue to use the app on personal devices. This poses a significant national security risk, as the Chinese regime closely monitors U.S. activity on the app to strategize on how to harm the United States. While concerns persist about the CCP accessing user data, as has happened in the past, the real threat lies in the videos shared on the platform.
Beijing is using its monitoring technology meant for its citizens to gather data from social media platforms in Western countries. This information is then shared with military and intelligence agencies. Since 2020, there has been a noticeable increase in state contract bids for software specifically designed to collect data about foreign targets from Western social media. State media, propaganda departments, police, military, and cyber regulators are all involved in these purchases.
State entities affiliated with the CCP have acquired various data mining tools. One such tool is a software program developed for Chinese state media, which extracts information from Twitter and Facebook to compile a database containing details about foreign journalists and academics. Additionally, the Beijing police operate a surveillance program that scrutinizes discussions about Hong Kong and Taiwan on Western platforms. Furthermore, a cyber center located in Xinjiang collects and categorizes Uyghur language content from abroad.

Brendan Carr, the senior Republican on the Federal Communications Commission, warned, “At its core, TikTok functions as a sophisticated surveillance tool that harvests extensive amounts of sensitive data from search and browsing history, keystroke patterns, location data, and biometrics including face prints and voice prints.”

Countless TikTok videos feature soldiers in uniform, prominently displaying their name and unit crest. These videos capture various aspects of military life, including training, installations, barracks, equipment, and maneuvers. Additionally, soldiers share glimpses of their off-duty activities. However, regardless of the content, these videos inadvertently provide valuable information to Beijing. Locations are often disclosed or easily inferred from the imagery, enabling adversaries to track the movements and activities of specific military units.

By analyzing TikTok, the CCP can gather details such as the names, ages, and locations of military families. This information could be exploited to threaten, influence, or manipulate these individuals, ultimately exerting control or gaining leverage over U.S. personnel.

TikTok serves as a platform for identifying and targeting soldiers for recruitment, espionage, or other malicious activities. Soldiers’ profiles on TikTok offer valuable insights into their interests, affiliations, and vulnerabilities, rendering them susceptible to exploitation.

Consequently, soldiers increasingly fall victim to targeted online financial fraud and scams. If these scams lead soldiers into economic distress, they become more vulnerable to CCP bribes. Chinese criminal gangs, operating massive online scam centers primarily from Burma (Myanmar), illicitly extract millions from Americans. Chinese authorities can direct these criminals toward Americans with security clearances, exemplifying Beijing’s whole-of-government approach and civil-private partnership, utilizing private and criminal assets to advance CCP policy objectives.
The CCP implements a program called “public opinion guidance work“ within China, whereby propaganda departments assist in promoting specific opinions until they become mainstream. Similarly, countless Chinese social media accounts on platforms such as Twitter and TikTok serve this purpose. Through AI-powered analysis of soldiers’ uploaded videos, the CCP gains insights into military morale and sentiment, enabling the crafting of convincing social engineering attacks tailored to soldiers’ interests or affiliations.

By packaging opinions effectively, the CCP increases the likelihood of acceptance among U.S. military personnel. It uses this tactic to disseminate desired opinions or spread disinformation. Ultimately, these computing techniques aim to undermine U.S. military effectiveness or morale.

Besides its other risks, TikTok also poses a threat to operational security. Soldiers have been discovered using TikTok in the field, where the enemy could trace signals. During the Ukraine war, Russian sources acknowledged that the Ukrainians exploited cellphone activity among young troops for targeting purposes.

TikTok presents a significant national security concern, but the CCP’s activity extends to platforms such as Twitter and Facebook as well. TikTok poses particular challenges for the military because of its popularity among younger users and its video format, which offers deeper insights into soldiers’ lives, personalities, locations, and activities than text-based tweets or photos.

Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
Antonio Graceffo, PhD, is a China economic analyst who has spent more than 20 years in Asia. Mr. Graceffo is a graduate of the Shanghai University of Sport, holds a China-MBA from Shanghai Jiaotong University, and currently studies national defense at American Military University. He is the author of “Beyond the Belt and Road: China’s Global Economic Expansion” (2019).