Commentary
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s plan to cut 20 percent of four-star officers and 10 percent of the rest of the general and flag officer community is yet another in a long series to manage what has been perceived as an excess of senior military leaders in the U.S. armed forces.
Critics of current flag officer numbers some times compare current rosters of admirals and generals to the much smaller number of such leaders relative to enlisted personnel during the Second World War. Large numbers of flag and general officers have been said to reduce efficiency and limit warfighting potential. Having more admirals and generals produces more retired officers in those ranks who often get accused of trying to influence defense acquisition choices as members of corporate boards after they retire. The real villain in this process is not the senior officers but rather the explosion of joint and interagency staffs since the end of the Second World War, and especially since the inception of the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986. This growth in joint and interagency positions has in turn demanded a larger number of senior leaders to manage them. Any meaningful reductions in the general and admiral ranks must begin with a look at the staff swamp that created them.
The number of admirals and generals relative to the overall number of troops has been the operative question in flag officer limitations for decades rather than their overall numbers, which by the end of World War two were in the thousands of officers. Before 1980 the military services controlled officer promotions, and the Army and Navy employed quite different systems of officer management. The 1980 Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) mandated common officer management processes across the services, using an “up or out” system that forced officers out of service earlier than in civilian careers. It also imposed some initial caps on numbers of flag officers which had risen over the Cold War, not so much in overall numbers, but instead relative to the overall number of people in uniform. DOPMA stated that no general officer appointments that created more than 25 percent of all flag and general officers above two star rank could be made. In 1987, Congress replaced the ad hoc grade cap exemptions, many of which had occurred since DOPMA, with a general mechanism allowing up to 15 percent of all three- and four-star grades to be transferred between services by offsetting any increase in one service with a corresponding decrease in another service, keeping the total number constant.[
While DOPMA may have capped the flag and general officer numbers, the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986, and its massive effort to expand the joint force control over the armed forces again drove up flag officer numbers. Many new senior flag officer jobs were created to build the joint oversight of the armed forces mandated by the legislation. These included the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS,) the entirely new Unified Transportation (TRANSCOM,) and Special Operations (SOCOM,) commands (with attendant flag level leaders from four star and down,) The 400 person cap on the Joint Staff was repealed by the Goldwater Nichols legislation as well, allowing that organization to expand in size and scope to first 1600 military and civilian personnel in 1990, with some shrinkage back to 1250 by 2007. It was four thousand persons in 2016. This included new senior officer positions as well. The national Guard’s addition to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 2011 and the creation of the Space Force in 2020 further expanded the overall flag and general officer footprint. Finally, there was an explosion in the interagency staffs in the wake of the 1986 legislation, with dozens of new agencies created for joint work, and after 1991 for the post-Cold War, interagency efforts. Post 1991 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq created additional joint commands and organizations needing flag level leadership. While many of those have been deactivated, there are many opportunities for further reductions and cost-saving in reducing the larger “joint” footprint where effort is already supported by the uniformed services.
The flag officer footprint as of March 2024 is 809, with up to 20 four-star officers allocated to the Secretary of Defense for joint officer employment. Thirty-seven such billets currently exist with the Army in control of fifteen, the Air Force 11, the Navy just seven, and the Marine Corps and Space Force with two each. Each is paid around $210,00 to $223,000 per year. Reduction of a few of these leaders is not exactly vast cost savings. Consolidations of existing staff and outright cuts of some will save more money over time than cutting individual flag officer billets. Taking a hard look at the vast array of new joint staffs that have developed since the end of the Cold War, as well as the Defense Department’s own expansive bureaucracy might also be a good starting point for cuts.
Flag officer reductions would undoubtedly figure in cuts that begin with examining the staffs that demand flag leadership. That said, it is unlikely that the ratio of enlisted people to generals and admirals will return to World War two levels so often referenced by those who think there are too many flag and general officers. The continued automation of war alone has reduced the number of enlisted service members, and that trend is likely to continue.
Calls for flag officer reductions appeal to many constituencies, from defense budget hawks intent on cost reductions to some veteran groups who think current U.S. leaders are like the much-maligned “chateau generals” of the First World War. Real savings in defense spending, and the support that comes with that takes time, and can be achieved through a deep dive into the nation’s vast defense bureaucracy rather than high-profile cuts in high-ranking leadership.
From RealClearWire
Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.