Is China’s Military Weaker Than We Thought?

Is China’s Military Weaker Than We Thought?
Military delegates arrive for the third plenary session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in Beijing on March 10, 2018. (Fred Dufour/AFP via Getty Images)
Anders Corr
1/9/2024
Updated:
1/11/2024
0:00
Commentary
Some Chinese missiles are filled with water rather than rocket fuel, and the doors to large numbers of Chinese nuclear-capable silos don’t function, according to U.S. intelligence cited in a Jan. 7 Bloomberg report.

The information is from anonymous U.S. officials, who claim that Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s discovery of the faulty defense systems led to his recent purges of military officials and would delay his plans of a military takeover of Taiwan.

“The corruption inside China’s Rocket Force and throughout the nation’s defense industrial base is so extensive that US officials now believe Xi is less likely to contemplate major military action in the coming years than would otherwise have been the case, according to the people, who asked not to be named discussing intelligence,” the Bloomberg report reads.

“The US assessments cited several examples of the impact of graft, including missiles filled with water instead of fuel and vast fields of missile silos in western China with lids that don’t function in a way that would allow the missiles to launch effectively, one of the people said.”

The sources are familiar with U.S. assessments on the matter, according to Bloomberg.

“The US assesses that corruption within the People’s Liberation Army [PLA] has led to an erosion of confidence in its overall capabilities, particularly when it comes to the Rocket Force, and also set back some of Xi’s top modernization priorities, the people said,” the media outlet stated.

Although most of the corruption is reportedly in the PLA Rocket Force, the purges extend further, including to naval and air force leaders, making more than a dozen sacked in the past half year. The Wall Street Journal reported that “among those removed are two generals who previously commanded China’s strategic-missile force, a former air force chief and an admiral who led naval forces operating in the South China Sea—a geopolitical hot spot where China is increasingly facing off against the U.S. and others.”

The dysfunction of China’s nuclear missiles, at least, is unlikely to be Chinese disinformation as the entire point of its nuclear arsenal is to deter and compel, both of which require the perception of functionality on the part of adversaries. That doesn’t mean the information couldn’t be disinformation by another nation.

But if true, and depending on how deep the rot extends, the information would have major implications for our understanding of the viability of China’s military. Numerous indicators show that the more involved the Chinese Communist Party, the less efficient the economic, diplomatic, and military decision-making. The same applies to nearly all communist countries, past and present.

Widespread and debilitating corruption in China’s military would relieve some pressure on the U.S. military, freeing it to shift resources to ongoing hot conflicts with Russia and Iran. We want to believe that the PLA is weaker than we thought. But that’s why we should be particularly cautious about the latest revelations, which are humiliating to Xi, both domestically and internationally. Even before the problem is fixed, he could respond by attempting to prove the power of the PLA in other ways and sooner than expected.

PLA forces shouldn’t be underestimated. China’s PLA Air Force (PLAAF) flew more than 1,700 flights to intimidate Taiwan in 2023, including fighters, bombers, and frequent incursions over the median line, which used to be inviolate. Some PLAAF flights have circumnavigated the entire island. These flights are partly meant to influence the electorate to vote for China-friendly candidates.
On Jan. 5, the PLA Navy (PLAN) upgraded its naval “exercises” in the South China Sea, which included eavesdropping on prior joint exercises conducted by the United States and the Philippines in the latter’s exclusive economic zone. The PLAN is now the biggest navy in the world by number of ships. It has used its extensive economic resources to build not only a navy but also a world-class coast guard, a “maritime militia,” and artificial islands in the South China Sea under joint command to effectively threaten other navies, coast guards, undersea energy development, and artisanal fishing.

The PLAN routinely harasses the U.S. Navy by shadowing its ships and reconnaissance planes at dangerously close distances. Vietnam and the Philippines have borne the brunt of it, including military-grade lasers, water cannons, and ramming that resulted in sunk fishing boats.

The critical questions are: How far does corruption and the resulting dysfunction in the PLA really extend, for how long will it last, and to what extent has it really compromised the organization’s military readiness? Can the U.S. military trust enough in the intelligence and the sacking of more than a dozen military leaders from multiple services to conclude that China’s military can not only not take Taiwan in the near future but also knows that it can’t take Taiwan? The second element is critical, as even a militarily weak dictator could start a devastating war if he doesn’t know his weakness. Former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein is a recent example.

When it comes to dictators such as Xi, the tried and true guidelines remain. Expect the unexpected, don’t give an inch, and never let down one’s guard.

Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
Anders Corr has a bachelor's/master's in political science from Yale University (2001) and a doctorate in government from Harvard University (2008). He is a principal at Corr Analytics Inc., publisher of the Journal of Political Risk, and has conducted extensive research in North America, Europe, and Asia. His latest books are “The Concentration of Power: Institutionalization, Hierarchy, and Hegemony” (2021) and “Great Powers, Grand Strategies: the New Game in the South China Sea" (2018).
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