CIA’s Chinese Recruitment Ads: A Psychological Operation Against the CCP?

The seal of the Central Intelligence Agency stands next to a U.S. flag at CIA headquarters in Langley, Va. Carolyn Kaster/AP Photo

Commentary

What may appear as clumsy CIA recruitment videos to some could actually be a calculated strike in the psychological war against the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

The CIA on May 1 released two professionally produced Mandarin-language videos titled “Why I Contacted the CIA: To Take Control of My Fate” and “Why I Contacted the CIA: For a Better Life.” These short dramatizations depict fictional Chinese officials growing disillusioned with the CCP—haunted by purges, disheartened by career stagnation, weary of endemic corruption, and ultimately choosing to contact the CIA.

The agency distributed the videos on platforms like YouTube, Facebook, and Instagram, offering detailed instructions on how to make secure contact through encrypted channels and dark web portals.

This highly public recruitment effort is part of a broader campaign that began in October 2024, aimed at rebuilding the CIA’s intelligence networks in hard-to-penetrate states such as China, Iran, and North Korea. The initiative follows a string of past recruitment successes in Russia and a renewed U.S. focus on China, which CIA Director John Ratcliffe has described as America’s top military and cyber threat.

The effort also responds to historic losses; in the early 2010s, Chinese counterintelligence dismantled a major CIA spy ring, resulting in the arrests and executions of numerous informants. Since then, China has become one of the most difficult environments in the world for espionage. By going public with recruitment efforts, the CIA may be seeking to bypass traditional barriers and reestablish contact with potential sources inside the regime.

The CCP has yet to issue a formal statement addressing the CIA videos. However, the Ministry of State Security (MSS) has recently ramped up public warnings against foreign espionage. The MSS has accused foreign agencies of posing as romantic partners or job recruiters to lure citizens into providing sensitive information.

The Chinese spy agency also alleges that U.S. intelligence services buy Chinese social media accounts and SIM cards to bypass national ID systems and reach targets online. On platforms like WeChat, the MSS has increased its messaging, urging citizens to report suspicious behavior and even offering rewards to those who reinforce Beijing’s counter-espionage culture.

Reactions on Chinese social media have largely ridiculed the CIA campaign. Users mocked the videos as amateurish, unrealistic, or simply laughable, and many questioned whether any serious individual would risk contacting the CIA given China’s strict surveillance. Parodies quickly circulated online, turning the recruitment videos into memes. The dominant sentiment on Chinese platforms is that the CIA underestimates both Beijing’s ability to control information and the average citizen’s loyalty, or fear, of the regime.

Despite online ridicule, the CIA’s recent video campaign—though seemingly ham-handed, hokey, and easy to mock—may have been deliberately crafted that way. According to CIA psychological operations strategies, the videos could serve purposes far beyond straightforward recruitment.

The style and tone of the videos align closely with established psychological operations (PSYOP) doctrine, designed not only to influence individuals but to generate systemic doubt, fear, and instability within target institutions. The CIA’s “Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare” training manual outlines tactics for shaping perception and behavior, principles that remain relevant in today’s digital disinformation battles.

There is a longstanding precedent for this type of information warfare. During the Cold War, the CIA covertly funded cultural outlets, newspapers, and broadcasters to counter Soviet influence across Europe. In 2014, USAID launched “ZunZuneo,” a covert social media platform in Cuba aimed at encouraging political dissent among young users. Though not run by the CIA, the program reflects the broader U.S. strategy of using media to stir unrest and amplify dissatisfaction under authoritarian regimes.

In this case, the CIA videos appear tailored to exploit rising disillusionment within the CCP. Under Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign, thousands of officials have been purged, often without warning or due process. The dramatizations in the recruitment videos mirror this reality, portraying mid-level bureaucrats living in fear of arbitrary punishment and ambitious professionals frustrated by career stagnation and inequality.

According to former CIA China analyst Dennis Wilder, the campaign marks a shift from passive intelligence collection to active engagement. It may also serve as a form of psychological disruption, with the video targeting the CCP’s internal cohesion.

The campaign may also serve as a global signal. It tells U.S. allies and the American public that the intelligence community is once again taking the CCP threat seriously, following years of setbacks. It also projects a message to the Chinese diaspora, particularly professionals in academia, technology, and business: We’re watching, and we want you on our side.

According to the CIA’s “Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare“ manual, once the enemy’s mind has been reached, victory can be achieved without firing a shot. In this case, the CIA video may be pursuing five key objectives.

First, the videos show paranoia inside the CCP, forcing the regime to divert resources to internal surveillance.

Second, they highlight internal corruption and dissatisfaction, amplifying fractures within the bureaucracy.

Third, the campaign targets Chinese nationals abroad, positioning them as potential long-term intelligence assets.

Fourth, its public nature reasserts the presence of U.S. intelligence and challenges the narrative of American decline.

Finally, the operation may be designed to provoke an overreaction from Beijing, such as mass purges, heightened censorship, or crackdowns on foreign media, which could backfire diplomatically and further expose the CCP’s authoritarianism. A heavy-handed response could also fuel internal dissent, increasing the likelihood that public officials or Chinese citizens might choose to cooperate with the CIA.

The world of espionage is built on layers of lies and disinformation. The mere fact that the CIA released this video may be as significant—if not more so—than whether it actually recruits anyone. Xi Jinping now knows the CIA is targeting CCP members and Chinese citizens, and regardless of public mockery, he will be forced to respond, diverting resources at a time when he’s already facing President Donald Trump in the White House and an escalating trade war.

Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.