Commentary
China’s export economy, medical goods, and foreign investments did well in 2025. How well is uncertain because the regime’s numbers cannot be trusted. But the country’s reported exports and foreign direct investment are so eye-wateringly high that they raise concerns for the future of democracy.
China’s trade figures for 2025 showed a record $1.2 trillion surplus of exports over imports. As a proportion of the global economy, this is bigger than any country has achieved at any time in history.
Beijing is actively seeking independence from external producers, for example, with plans to make its semiconductor and energy sectors independent of the global economy. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is also attempting to reduce its reliance on food imports. China made no soybean purchases from the United States for an unprecedented fifth straight month in October.
Simultaneously, the CCP is attempting to control global economic chokepoints, such as rare-earth elements, in order to maximize its leverage through the weaponization of trade. Revenues from China’s medical goods, including pharmaceutical and medical devices, are expected to increase from $1.4 trillion in 2024 to $2.1 trillion in 2030. Were war to break out, the CCP could suddenly cease exports of medicine to the United States.
Some of its medical production is based on stolen U.S. technologies. China is estimated to steal up to $600 billion in intellectual property from the United States annually. Beijing owes $1 trillion to U.S. bondholders. But Washington does almost nothing about it, even though the government could theoretically bar China from U.S. capital markets. Or the United States could confiscate at least some of the regime’s assets to pay back U.S. investors. For example, the U.S. Treasury could selectively cancel its debt to China, or the U.S. Navy could capture or tax some of China’s vulnerable shipping lines as they transport exports internationally.
China’s trade surplus is typically used to purchase foreign debt and assets, and to build up foreign reserves. Some of the country’s 2025 haul went to Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. These foreign investment deals reached a record $213 billion in 2025. The focus was on creating energy alternatives to countries like Iran and Venezuela, which are vulnerable to U.S. maritime interdictions.
Starting in late 2025, the U.S. Coast Guard accelerated the interdiction of sanctioned oil tankers. Most were part of a vast global shadow fleet linked to U.S. adversaries like Russia, Iran, and, until recently, Venezuela. The shadow fleet transports sanctioned oil from these countries to China.
The United States used to be the center of global trade, and so it was in its interests to promote free trade. This dominant U.S. position gave the United States the ability to wield economic sanctions against countries to effect. But it was eroded by China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001 and by the growth of Chinese manufacturing to the detriment of U.S. manufacturing.
