A fisherman drives a boat in a harbor on Pingtan Island, opposite Taiwan, in Fujian Province, China on April 9, 2023. China was conducting a second day of military drills around Taiwan on April 9 in what it has called a "stern warning" to the self-ruled island's government following a meeting between its president and the U.S. House speaker. (Greg Baker/AFP via Getty Images)
The likelihood of a Chinese military blockade on Taiwan is very high. The only question is whether Chinese leader Xi Jinping will use the blockade itself as a weapon to defeat Taiwan or if he'll employ a blockade in conjunction with a military invasion.
The possibility of China blockading Taiwan was discussed on Oct. 5 at the Center for Strategic and International Studies China Power Conference. U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Ely Ratner explained that Mr. Xi has set a timeline for the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which many people believe coincides with the timeline for the invasion of Taiwan. To counter a Chinese invasion, the U.S. military has increased its presence in the Indo-Pacific, including the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan’s military has also developed significant capabilities focused on repelling an invasion, such as launching missiles and artillery shells from land bases.
Beijing is aware that a full-scale invasion of Taiwan could not only provoke a response from the United States but also potentially draw in Japan, the AUKUS nations, the Quad partners, and even NATO allies, with the potential to escalate into a global conflict. Another option in Beijing’s arsenal would be a blockade. China could cut off access to Taiwan, preventing the island nation from receiving supplies of fuel, ammunition, and even food.
According to Lonnie Henley, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a blockade is also expected to elicit a response from the United States and its allies, although it would carry a lower likelihood of igniting a world war. However, if the United States and its allies opt for a military response to the blockade, neither the United States nor the Taiwanese armed forces are adequately prepared. Both military establishments have dedicated decades to preparing for an invasion scenario rather than a blockade.
Phil Saunders, director of the National Defense University’s Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, concurred that a blockade would be less taxing on the PLA, resulting in fewer casualties. It would also be easier to sell diplomatically to the world community. The United Nations and the European Union would quickly condemn an invasion, apply harsh sanctions, and then vote on whether or not to send troops. But with a blockade, there would likely be a strongly worded letter urging both sides to find a peaceful resolution.
On the other hand, Mr. Saunders also pointed out that a blockade on Taiwan would become a de facto blockade on China, a nation that depends on imports of both food and energy. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has never liked chaos, and the civilian population of China would react badly if they found themselves on reduced food and fuel rations. Mr. Saunders conjectured that the CCP might seek to shift blame onto Taipei for the blockade, redirecting public anger toward Taiwan. The CCP could simultaneously leverage this contrived blame as a diplomatic instrument when explaining the blockade to the international community. Beijing’s rationale for an invasion could then be magnified through social media channels and the CCP’s extensive network of wumao trolls (also known as the 50 Cent Army), bots, and compromised journalists so as to undermine foreign support for any military intervention.
Part of the Chinese Communist Party's army of "internet trolls," in an undated leaked photo, in Fangzheng County, Harbin City, China. (The Epoch Times)
Despite the numerous advantages of a blockade, Mr. Saunders expressed the view that the drawbacks would significantly exceed the benefits. A blockade on Taiwan would be costly to the global economy and could trigger an aggressive reaction by countries suffering as a result of losing access to Taiwan-made chips. The allies would immediately blockade China. Shipping through and fishing in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea would grind to a halt, causing hunger in Southeast Asia, as well as a global financial crisis. This would bring most of the world into the war and on Taiwan’s side.
Another drawback with a blockade, observed Mr. Saunders, is that it would last for an indeterminate time, as there would be no way of knowing when Taiwan would surrender. And each day that passes would deepen Beijing’s economic woes. At the same time, the world would attempt to resupply Taiwan. The PLA could sink resupply ships and shoot down planes doing food drops, but this would escalate the blockade into a world war, which is exactly what Beijing would be trying to avoid in a blockade scenario.
A further point that Mr. Saunders made was that a blockade would involve bombing ports, container facilities, airports, and other infrastructure to prevent Taiwan from using them. To observers around the world, this would look very much like an invasion, and they would react accordingly.
Ultimately, he believed that a military invasion was Mr. Xi’s best option. If the invasion could be executed swiftly, it would limit the opportunity for the United States and its allies to respond. Moreover, if the CCP established a presence on Taiwanese soil, the allies may become less inclined to attempt their removal. The invasion might offer the advantages of greater speed, cost-effectiveness, and decisiveness compared to a blockade. Additionally, from the perspective of the CCP’s global power projection, it would not only damage the reputation of the United States but also sow doubt among U.S. allies about the extent of American security guarantees.
Mr. Henley felt that in the event of Beijing taking action against Taiwan, the imposition of a blockade, either preceding or following an invasion, appeared highly likely. Given this, the blockade scenario held the highest probability. Moreover, if the CCP were to gain control on the ground in Taiwan, the international community might be inclined to engage in negotiations with China to reopen global shipping as soon as possible.
Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
Antonio Graceffo, PhD, is a China economic analyst who has spent more than 20 years in Asia. Mr. Graceffo is a graduate of the Shanghai University of Sport, holds a China-MBA from Shanghai Jiaotong University, and currently studies national defense at American Military University. He is the author of “Beyond the Belt and Road: China’s Global Economic Expansion” (2019).
