America Is No Longer for Sale to the CCP

America Is No Longer for Sale to the CCP
Farmland is seen in Lancaster County, Pa., on Nov. 8, 2022. Branden Eastwood/AFP via Getty Images
Antonio Graceffo
Updated:
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Commentary
President Donald Trump has launched the most comprehensive effort in modern U.S. history to block the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from accessing American capital, technology, and farmland—and to stop China’s military-linked entities from “buying up America.”

The media are fixated on the rising cost of Chinese imports caused by tariffs during the Trump administration’s ongoing trade war with China. They’re focused on the impact this has on discount retailers such as Walmart and Target, as well as on low-income families, claiming the strategy is backfiring or that the administration’s trade war is failing. However, the fact that Chinese imports have become more expensive means the strategy is working. It will force these retailers to source locally or find alternative supply chains if they wish to stay in business.

Meanwhile, the national security threat posed by the Chinese regime’s trade and investment in U.S. technology and farmland is real, and is finally being addressed by Trump. One reason Americans are feeling the impact so sharply now is that the previous administrations ignored the issue almost entirely, with some in the media even suggesting that the CCP national security threat was a conspiracy theory.
The narrative that communist China’s rise is harmless has been echoed and promoted by the CCP. Yet some U.S. politicians and lawmakers continue to downplay the threat, disregarding reports from the intelligence community and House Select Committee on the CCP that identify the Chinese regime as a serious and immediate threat.

Despite the pain Americans may feel from reduced purchasing power, tariffs remain a strategic instrument of national defense. By raising the cost of Chinese goods, they reduce U.S. dependence on adversarial supply chains, protect key domestic industries, and deny revenue to companies linked to the CCP or its People’s Liberation Army (PLA). This economic pressure is part of a broader effort to sever the financial ties that allow Beijing to exploit U.S. markets while funding its military buildup and global influence campaigns.

But tariffs are only one front in the Trump administration’s economic war. Trump also uses the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to block CCP-linked investments in critical technologies and U.S. real estate. Chinese companies with military ties have increasingly targeted U.S. tech companies and farmland, prompting a forceful policy response. In February, Trump issued the America First Investment Policy memorandum, which explicitly targets China’s use of investment and capital markets to acquire American technology, infrastructure, farmland, and intellectual property.
The memorandum empowered CFIUS to reject Chinese investment in sensitive sectors such as technology, agriculture, energy, and health care, and called for new legal tools—including sanctions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act—to prevent U.S. capital from fueling the CCP’s military-industrial complex. It also ordered a crackdown on Chinese variable interest entities trading on U.S. exchanges, directed a review of the 1984 U.S.–China tax treaty (blamed for deindustrialization), and urged universities and pension funds to divest from China’s defense-linked sectors. Even greenfield investments were placed under tighter scrutiny to counter Beijing’s Military-Civil Fusion strategy.
U.S. allies have expressed frustration that the Trump administration’s investment restrictions apply to their countries and China. However, this policy reflects a necessary precaution. Chinese companies frequently use shell companies in jurisdictions such as the Cayman Islands and Singapore to obscure their true origins and evade U.S. oversight. For example, ByteDance, the parent company of TikTok, is incorporated in the Cayman Islands, allowing it to mask its Chinese ties while operating globally. Singapore, with its strong banking secrecy laws and flexible business registration rules, has also become a favored hub for Chinese investors looking to hide financial activities behind layers of legal opacity.
The CCP’s Military-Civil Fusion strategy depends not just on capital but on acquiring knowledge through students, researchers, and joint ventures. American universities have increasingly served as inadvertent conduits for this transfer of talent and funding. For example, the University of Texas/Texas A&M Investment Management Company (UTIMCO) invested in several Chinese companies, including BOE Technology Group and Haier Smart Home, both tied to China’s military-industrial complex. In response, Trump’s memorandum calls for a reevaluation of fiduciary standards, urging universities and pension funds to divest from China’s defense-linked sectors and cut off this indirect financial support for the CCP’s military buildup.

A more direct example is the case of Xiaofeng Wang, a cybersecurity professor at Indiana University Bloomington, whose home was raided by the FBI in March amid suspicions of undisclosed affiliations with Chinese institutions. Although he was not charged, the case highlights the heightened scrutiny of Chinese scientists in the United States. In response, the Trump administration has implemented measures to restrict CCP access to U.S. talent and research, particularly in artificial intelligence, through increased export controls, tightened visa policies, and legal tools designed to ensure American innovation does not fuel Beijing’s military buildup.

These actions have been carried out through a combination of executive orders and legal authorities spanning both of Trump’s terms, demonstrating a consistent focus on countering the CCP’s infiltration of U.S. markets, research, and institutions. In addition to the America First Investment Policy, the expansion of CFIUS authority, and powers under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, the administration has relied on tools such as Presidential Proclamation 10043, which restricts entry for Chinese researchers tied to military-linked entities, and the Export Control Reform Act, which limits foreign access to sensitive technologies, are key tools in this strategy. These measures are reinforced by ongoing investigations by the Justice Department and FBI under national security laws, many rooted in the China Initiative era.

Together, this legal framework reflects the most extensive initiative in modern U.S. history to block CCP access to American capital, assets, and innovation, and to stop China’s military-linked entities from gaining a foothold in critical U.S. sectors.

Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
Antonio Graceffo
Antonio Graceffo
Author
Antonio Graceffo, Ph.D., is a China economy analyst who has spent more than 20 years in Asia. Graceffo is a graduate of the Shanghai University of Sport, holds an MBA from Shanghai Jiaotong University, and studied national security at American Military University.