There are so many variables now at play in the global strategic architecture—a world in flux, marked by failures, weaknesses, and varying strength of leadership—that this interim period between eras throws much to chance.
- Decisive and informed leadership able to galvanize a social contract;
- A united polity within a state of secured physical, electronic, and cultural borders and shared history;
- Relative freedom to control essential elements of survival, including wealth;
- Strength, flexibility, and innovation within a formal defense structure;
- Alliance arrangements that are based on mutual needs and mutual respect.
It could be argued that the United States and many other governments lack “informed” leadership, which is based on sound intelligence and governed by a historically contextual framework. Good decisions cannot be made without sound intelligence, and sound intelligence cannot exist unless it is contextually based, avoiding mirror-imaging and geo-cultural bias.
Most governments get this wrong, with leaders thinking they can “wing it” and responding instinctively without referencing historical trends. This is why “chance happeneth”: It is the failure of leaders or societies to appreciate their own position or the position of their potential adversaries. The rapid collapse of the Syrian government in December 2024 highlighted how quickly things can change in ways that could have a profound impact on the wider world.
This new age means that attempts at “collective government” have again failed, and any residual impact of the United Nations would merely distort or impede states now bent on seeking security or advancement. The sanctity of borders, as the United States has demonstrated (and, indeed, as the false faith put in other borders in Africa, Europe, and elsewhere has shown), is evident only where those borders have some form of strength to keep them secure—and not just military or security force strength.
There is little evidence, going into 2025, that China is in any position to contest global strategic dominance with the United States. And yet the Chinese regime, despite its domestic economic and political woes, has committed so much to its internal security and armed forces budgets that—and despite massive trust problems—it has some elements of creativity and nimbleness that could deal a significant blow to any of its neighbors or the United States and its allies.
The United States, to a greater degree than most major powers, is locked into conventions, structures, payroll obligations, and retirement benefits for its military, that degrade its potential wartime competitiveness with China to a significant degree. And if China, under the Chinese Communist Party, cannot boast of a viable social contract between the state and its population, it can actually claim to have some of the other five elements of strategic power under control or at least partially addressed.
Part of the problem with most societies, governments, and militaries is that they do not clearly understand what type of war they are fighting now and must fight tomorrow. The amorphous elements—non-kinetic—dominate the “New Total War” doctrine now in play. The destruction, partially from within, of an opponent’s capacity to function generates the collapse of the target state.
What is also important is that while a society’s descent might be protracted, messy, and apparently in slow motion, the end can be sudden. It is much like a skydiver jumping without a parachute from an aircraft; all is well until the final moment. And this end may well not be a “kinetic moment” at the end of a military conflict. Most likely, it will not be, but rather, an end of a society that has been eroded internally (with or without external interference).
However, there is little doubt that in such times of a reversion to sovereign responsibility for security, a state that allows its defenses and demonstrable willpower (and prestige) to evaporate will present what appears to be the profile of an inviting target. The wise antagonist may be best advised to hold its movement and allow the target to collapse of its own weight rather than provoke a conflict that would inspire unity and a revived social contract within the weak state.
The planned U.S. move toward streamlining governance and bolstering the economy should also seek leanness, procurement innovation, and efficiency if it is to leave less to chance.
