Russian President Vladimir Putin meets with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) leaders' summit in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, on Sept. 16, 2022. (Alexandr Demyanchuk/Sputnik/AFP via Getty Images)
According to the U.S. Department of State, the “U.S.-India strategic partnership is founded on shared values including a commitment to democracy and upholding the rules-based international system.” The two countries, we’re assured, “have shared interests in promoting global security, stability, and economic prosperity through trade, investment, and connectivity.”
Sadly, reality paints a far different picture. India is no ally of the United States. This has been the case for many years. As I write this, and as tensions with Russia and China escalate, the United States is seeking to build closer ties with India. However, for the reasons described below, the United States shouldn’t be surprised if its efforts fail to achieve the desired outcome.
Before proceeding further, let’s get our definitions in order. In politics, an alliance involves one person, party, or country joining another person, party, or country to promote common interests and shared ideologies. A successful alliance is built on mutual respect and trust.
India and the United States—once seemed destined to be powerful partners—have staggeringly different worldviews. India should be viewed as a fair-weather friend, at best. If in doubt, let me point you in the direction of a recent essay published by Asia Times. In this rather absorbing piece, the author, Peter Layton, outlines the many ways in which India selectively chooses when to side with the United States (and like-minded countries) and when not to.
To find a recent example of this selective choosing, one must only go back to October, when the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted a resolution condemning the Russian annexation of various Ukrainian regions. Although 143 members voted in favor of the resolution, five voted against it, and dozens of other countries, like India, abstained from the resolution. As Layton was quick to highlight, this unspoken support for Russian President Vladimir Putin totally contradicts India’s membership of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, more commonly referred to as the Quad.
For the uninitiated, the Quad is a strategic partnership between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. It was established to address problematic countries like China and Russia.
Interestingly, Australia, Japan, and the United States voted in favor of the UNGA resolution. When it comes to Russia, the Quad appears to be badly torn.
Why would India passively support Russia?
It’s quite simple: India’s geostrategic objectives are extremely complex and ever-changing. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has aspirations of making India a superpower capable of redefining the international order. “Achieving this ambition,” according to Layton, “involves placing atma-nirbhar (strategic autonomy) as the first pillar of Indian diplomacy.”
Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, U.S. President Joe Biden, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi attend the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity at the Izumi Garden Gallery in Tokyo on May 23, 2022. (Saul Loeb/AFP via Getty Images)
For India, strategic autonomy makes complete sense. It allows Modi, very much a diehard nationalist, to, first and foremost, pursue goals that directly benefit his country. “Such autonomy,” states Layton, “is most easily achievable in a multipolar international system where several great powers can be played off against each other.” This explains why one of the key pillars of Indian diplomacy involves “multipolar focus.” This also explains why India can engage in constructive dialogue with the United States one week, and China and Russia the next.
Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, India’s minister of external affairs, has spoken openly about policies built around the exploitation of opportunities. India’s desire to employ “strategic flexibility,” writes Layton, explains India’s desire to choose “strategic partnerships over formal alliances.” It also explains why it chooses to align itself with multiple partners “rather than committing to particular allies.”
From an international relations perspective, India’s actions are steeped in realism. It also emphasizes the absence of any central authority. In this unpredictable world, individual states, according to the theory, must rely on themselves. The international system is viewed as anarchic; the primary concern of all states involves power and enhanced security. This fact is not lost on Mr. Modi.
To those unfamiliar with the South Asian’s approach to politics, “Indian foreign policy may thus appear unpredictable and perplexing,” notes Layton. India’s relationship with Russia is particularly interesting. From an American perspective, it’s also more than a little alarming. Moscow and New Delhi enjoy a long-established friendship built around weapons. The vast majority of India’s tanks and missiles come from Russia.
Sameer Lalwani, a senior expert at the U.S. Institute of Peace, told CNBC that India will rely “heavily on Russia for force sustainment including spares, maintenance, and upgrades” for years to come. Harsh V. Pant, vice president of studies and foreign policy at Observer Research Foundation, a think tank based in New Delhi, added to Lalwani’s point. India also needs Russia to help it “manage China.”
Relations between India and China are best described as volatile. At one stage, just a few years ago, there was talk of war breaking out between the countries. Since then, however, things appear to have cooled. Russia may very well have played a crucial role in this cooling process. As is clear to see, India relies heavily on Russian support in more ways than one.
This is not to say that India is an enemy of the United States. It’s not. However, as long as it maintains its tight bond with Russia, it can’t be a true ally of the United States.
Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
John Mac Ghlionn is a researcher and essayist. He covers psychology and social relations, and has a keen interest in social dysfunction and media manipulation. His work has been published by the New York Post, The Sydney Morning Herald, Newsweek, National Review, and The Spectator US, among others.
Friends Read Free